Summary of Feb. 16, 2007, Rebuttal by Plaintiffs and Opposition to US government's Motion to Dismiss

2007年2月16日摘要

-- 原告的反駁與答覆美國政府的答辯


United States District Court, Washington D.C.
美國首都華府，聯邦法院

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


本法院有此件訴訟事件的管轄權。此案並非為司法不予審理的政治問題，而是需要採用一般解釋的方式來說明條約、成文法與美國憲法。
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The case does not present a nonjusticiable political question, but rather requires interpretation of treaties, statutes, and the United States Constitution using regular means of interpretation.

原告提出本件訴訟的論據，在於被告具體行為造成原告的事實損害，於是要求本法院宣告以補救原告權利。成文法具體賦予本法院事件管轄權。被告於此件訴訟中，依法已經放棄國家賦予的主權豁免權。
Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action as they have suffered an injury-in-fact caused by Defendant's conduct and redressable by this Court's declaration of Plaintiffs' rights. This Court's subject matter jurisdiction is specifically authorized by statutes. Defendant waived sovereign immunity from this action by statute.

政治問題原則是具有狹隘性質，限制法院對「政治問題」的判定，而非「政治案件」。請參照Baker v. Carr一案[369 U.S. 186, 217, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962)]，請一併參照Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic一案[233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 796-799 (1984)] (「基於『政治問題』而來的不予審理之動作，充其量只不過是限制原則……顯然……可見，政治問題僅是司法不予審理之有限的依據。」)
The political question doctrine is a narrow doctrine that restrains the courts from deciding "political questions," not "political cases." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 796-799 (1984) ("Nonjusticiability based upon "political question" is at best a limited doctrine. . . . . It is . . . clear that the political question is a very limited basis for nonjusticiability.")

並非涉及對外交關係的所有案件都會出現「政治問題」。關於涉及對外交關係的事件，最高法院在Baker一案提出警語：「假設觸及對外交關係的每件事件，都會超出司法認定的範圍，實為錯誤之認知。」與其偏向純以案件涉及對外關係而不給予行使審判權，法院應該從事「所提特定問題的徹底分析」。
Not all cases involving foreign relations present "political questions." With respect to the cases involving foreign relations, the Supreme Court cautioned in Baker that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Rather then declining to exercise jurisdiction purely because a case involves foreign relations, the courts must engage in a "discriminating analysis of the particular question posed."

就被告爭議的範圍而言，其主張政治問題原則，阻礙了本法院解釋確認原告權利的舊金山和約1(SFPT)、台灣關係法2(TRA)、移民暨歸化法3(INA)及美國憲法，被告的立場截然不同於許多司法判例。司法判例顯示本法院具有憲法賦予之權與職責，得以解釋舊金山和約、台灣關係法、移民暨歸化法和美國憲法，進而決定其條款是否能保障原告的被執行權利。
To the extent Defendant argues that the political question doctrine bars this Court from interpreting the San Francisco Peace Treaty 1 ("SFPT"), the Taiwan Relations Act 2 ("TRA"), the Immigration and Nationality Act 3 ("INA"), and the Constitution to ascertain Plaintiff's rights, Defendant's position is contrary to judicial precedents. Judicial precedents show that this Court has the constitutional power and duty to interpret the SFPT, the TRA, the INA, and the Constitution to determine whether their provisions guarantee enforceable rights to Plaintiffs.

本法院有權考慮日本於1952年移轉台灣主權的歷史、執行此項移轉的舊金山和約、台灣關係法所體現的與台灣相關立法與行政政策宣言、行政命令第13014號、相關公報、備忘錄與其他文件。
[T]his Court has the power to consider the history of the transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan from Japan in 1952, the SFPT implementing the transfer, and the legislative and executive policy statements regarding Taiwan embodied in the TRA, Executive Order No. 13014, communiques, memoranda, and other documents.

根據Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers一案[177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959)]，即使領土地位處於懸空狀態，法院仍可檢視領土地位，並決定是否適用成文法。在Cheng Fu Sheng一案中，法院基於驅逐出境法之用，而決定台灣是否為「國家」，以及台灣是否為中國之一部分。Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers (177 F. Supp. 282處)。為了在不干擾對外交關係行為之下裁定此案，法院認為其「必須……確認並依循國務院在[台灣]是否視為中國之一部分的問題上採取的態度。」為此，法院檢視的文件中，包括了國務院公報，該公報由美國政府對台灣外交政策的發言匯集而成。國務院公報討論了讓中國割讓台灣給日本的馬關條約、開羅宣言、波茨坦宣言、1945年投降書、麥克阿瑟將軍一般命令第1號及「日本放棄對台灣一切權利、所有權與請求權」的舊金山和平條約。來源同上，283-284處引述自美國國務院公報第XXXIX冊第1017號，1958年12月22日公布，第1005-1009處。國務院公報進一步指出：「[舊金山和約]及往後的其他協議，都沒有主張將[台灣]主權移轉給中國。」法院認為：「[台灣]主權沒有移轉給中國；[台灣]不屬於中國國土的一部分；至少就目前為止仍非如此，除非往後另外簽署適當之條約方能改變此一事實。」據此，法院認為根據驅逐出境法，應驅逐出境並遣返至中國的原告，不得遣返至台灣，因為台灣不屬於中國的一部分，而且台灣並非一個「國家」。
According to Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959), the courts may examine the status of a territory and decide whether a statute applies to it even if the status of the territory is still in limbo. In Cheng Fu Sheng, the court decided the issue whether Taiwan is a "country" for the purpose of the deportation statute, and whether Taiwan is a part of China. Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. at 282. To decide the case without interfering with the conduct of foreign relations, the court felt it was "necessary . . . to ascertain and be guided by the attitude of the Department of State on the question whether [Taiwan] is to be regarded as a part of China." To that end, the court examined, inter alia, a Department of State Bulletin, which constituted an official expression of foreign policy regarding Taiwan. The Bulletin discussed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, whereby China ceded Taiwan to Japan; the Cairo Declaration; the Potsdam Declaration; the 1945 Instrument of Surrender; General MacArthur's General Order No. 1; and the SFPT, whereby Japan renounced all "right, title and claim" to Taiwan. Id. at 283-284, citing Dep't State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1017, Dec. 22, 1958, at 1005-1009. The Department of State Bulletin further stated that "neither [the SFPT] nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of [Taiwan] to China." The court held that "the sovereignty of [Taiwan] has not been transferred to China; and that [Taiwan] is not a part of China as a country, at least not as yet, and not until and unless appropriate treaties are hereafter entered into." Accordingly, the court held that under the deportation statute, the plaintiffs deportable to China could not be deported to Taiwan because Taiwan was not a part of China and Taiwan was not a "country."

對該案，華盛頓特區巡迴法院則改變了判決，其不涉及在驅逐出境法之下，法院檢視台灣地位之權，此部分該法院不提出異議。華盛頓特區巡迴法院改變的依據是，用於驅逐出境法的「國家」一字，是指超過「國家主權」的廣泛定義，這是考量到該法宗旨為「透過增加裁定外籍人士驅逐出境的最終命令能遣返之地點，進而減少『無法遣返者』的人數。」Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng[108 U.S. App. D.C. 115, 280 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960)]。有趣的是，華盛頓特區巡迴法院含蓄地承認，「[台灣]本身既非國家，亦非任何國家之一部分，其身份仍處於懸空狀態(limbo)，」不過，此情形無礙法院裁決該案。所以，審慎考量的舉動，無礙本法院裁決原告所提問題。
The D.C. Circuit reversed on the ground which had nothing to do with the court's power to examine the status of Taiwan for the purpose of the deportation statute, leaving this part of the holding intact. The D.C. Circuit reversed on the ground that the word "country" as used in the deportation statute had a broader meaning than "national sovereignties," considering that the purpose of the statute was "to reduce the number of ‘undeportables' by increasing the number of places to which an alien under a final order of deportation may be sent." Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 115, 280 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit implicitly acknowledged that "[Taiwan] is neither a country itself nor part of any country, its status being in limbo," but it did not restrain the court from adjudicating the case. Thus, prudential considerations do not restrain this Court from adjudicating the question presented by Plaintiffs.

原告已遭受事實損害。原告提出此件訴訟的論據，為台灣地位在舊金山和約以後的法律懸空狀態，導致其遭受事實損害，其認定之公民權與國籍遭到剝奪。美國在台協會(AIT)否定原告身為美國國民4(相對於公民)5之權利與特權，更是讓原告遭受具體傷害。2006年3月29日，原告(個別原告曾經到過美國本土一次以上)秉於善意，試圖向美國在台協會提交依法準備妥當的護照申請書6。然而，美國在台協會卻拒收護照申請書，亦未針對拒收原因提出說明。美國在台協會拒收原告之護照申請書的舉動，依法代表其否認原告為美國國民的身份，以及原告身為美國國民的權利及特權。7
Plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact. Individual Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action because they suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of being in a legal limbo following the SFPT and being deprived of a recognized citizenship and nationality. In particular, they suffered a concrete injury as a result of the American Institute of Taiwan ("AIT")'s denial of their rights and privileges as United States nationals4 (as opposed to citizens).5 On March 29, 2006, Plaintiffs (all of whom at some time have been physically present in the continental United States) in good faith attempted to submit duly prepared passport applications to the AIT.6 The AIT, however, refused to accept the passport applications and failed to provide an explanation setting forth the reasons for the refusal. The AIT's refusal to accept Plaintiffs' passport applications constituted a denial of their status as United States nationals, and of their rights and privileges as United States nationals.7

否定公認國籍，如同否定公認公民權，於是構成興訟論據的法定事實損害。
The denial of a recognized nationality, just as the denial of a recognized citizenship, constitutes a legally cognizable injury-in-fact for the purpose of standing.

本法院宣告原告權利之舉，不一定能從各方面補救原告所受損害，亦不阻礙原告日後訴諸救濟之權。請參照美國法典28 U.S.C. § 2201(法院「可基於利害關係人的意願下，宣告其所具權利及其他法律關係，無論日後是否能訴諸救濟亦然。」)
This Court's declaration of Plaintiffs' rights does not need to redress every aspect of Plaintiff's injury and does not preclude further relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought").

台灣建國黨以一組織身分，代表其黨員提出此件訴訟，在於其黨員遭受事實損害，因此賦予其代表自身興訟之權；該事實損害與台灣建國黨之宗旨密切相關；該黨主張或其要求的救濟方法，均未要求全體個別黨員參與。請參照Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.一案，528 U.S. 167, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000)。
The Taiwan Nation Party, an organization, has standing to bring this action on behalf of its members because the members suffered an injury-in-fact, which gives them the right to sue on their own behalf; the injury is germane to the organization's purpose; and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual member participation. See generally Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000).

台灣建國黨旨在提倡台灣人民權益，尤其致力於(a)建立台灣人民的國家認同；以及(b)推動國際調查與程序，以求國際認同台灣人民確實的國籍。此件訴訟所主張的損害 -- 不承認原告於美國憲法及法律下所具權利與特權 -- 與該黨宗旨密切相關。
The purpose of the Taiwan Nation Party is to advocate the rights and privileges of the Taiwanese people, in particular (a) to establish a national identity for the Taiwanese people; and (b) to facilitate international investigations and procedures to obtain an internationally recognized nationality determination for Taiwanese people. The injury asserted in this action -- denial of Plaintiffs' rights and privileges under the United States Constitution and laws -- is germane to the organization's purpose.

台灣建國黨身為其黨員的適任代表，主張隸屬美國政府機關的美國在台協會不當拒收護照申請書。該黨要求的救濟方法 -- 宣告美國在台協會不當拒收護照申請書 -- 得以補救台灣建國黨全體黨員的不平。
The Taiwan Nation Party is an adequate representative of its members in asserting the claim that the AIT, an agency of the United States, wrongfully refused to accept the passport applications. The relief requested -- a declaration that the AIT wrongfully refused to accept the passport applications -- would redress the grievances of all members of the Taiwan Nation Party.

本法院根據美國法典28 U.S.C. § 1331，對於「美國憲法、法律或條約所引發的一切民事訴訟」，具有聯邦問題管轄權。
This Court has federal question jurisdiction of "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

移民暨歸化法§ 360與美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1503，具體授予私人法院上的權利（可稱為「訴因」）來處理「宣告美國國籍」事宜。根據移民暨歸化法§ 360(a)-(b)與美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)-(b)：「遭到任何政府部門、獨立機關或其中任職的官員，以並非美國國民的理由」，「否認」其「身為美國國民之權利或特權」的「任何人」，具有宣告國籍之私人訴因。8
The INA § 360, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 specifically authorizes a private cause of action for "declaration of United States nationality." According to the INA § 360 (a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)-(b), "any person" who is "denied" a "right or privilege" "as a national of the United States" "by any department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States," has a private cause of action for declaration of nationality.8

舊金山和約第2條(b)9與第23條(a)10為自動執行性質，無須進行立法就能建立私人在法院上的權利（訴因）。此外，美國其他法院已將舊金山和約中有關領土的規範條款，視為自動執行性質，進而確保個人權利11。
Because Article 2(b)9 and Article 23(a)10 of the SFPT are self-executing, they create a private cause of action without any need for implementing legislation. Furthermore, other U.S. Courts have treated territorial provisions of the SFPT as self-executing and guaranteeing individual rights.11

美國條約認定為自動執行性質，美國法院「有義務讓此類條約生效」。請參照第三次對外關係重述法§ 113(3)，並一併參照Richard B. Lillich所著《在國內法院訴諸國際人權法》一文，54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 384 (1985)。美國法院賦予條約完整效力之舉，符合美國憲法的最高原則。根據美國憲法的最高原則：「美國政府簽署或理應簽署的所有條約，應為美國的最高法律。」美國憲法VI條 § 2。
United States treaties are presumed self-executing, and the United States courts are "bound to give effect" to them. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(3), see also Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 367, 384 (1985). Giving full effect to treaties in the United States courts is consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, "all Treaties made, or shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

法院在決定一份條約是否自動執行時，會檢視該份文件的語言所彰顯的當事人意圖。Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 376 (1976年華盛頓特區巡迴法院)。舊金山和約第2條(b)與第23條(a)，說明了在法院對抗美國之私人訴因的依據。舊金山和約在第23條(a)之中，將美國指為主要佔領權，並在第4條(b)進一步確認美國軍事政府的對台管轄權，就能讓美國負有義務，確保依照舊金山和約看似佔領之領土居民的基本權利。對於美國承擔義務的推論結果，即是這些人在美國法院提出行使其基本權利的私人訴因。
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing, courts look at the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the instrument. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 376 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Article 2(b) and Article 23(a) of the SFPT demonstrate intent to create a private cause of action against the United States. By designating the United States as a principal occupying Power in Article 23(a), and by further confirming the jurisdiction of the United States Military Government over Taiwan in Article 4(b), the SFPT created the United States' obligation to guarantee fundamental rights to the persons living in the territory deemed occupied by the United States under the SFPT. The corollary to the United States' obligation is these persons' private right of action to enforce their fundamental rights in the United States courts.

現有司法判例顯示，自動執行條約為個人法權得以在法院執行的來源之一。請參照Guerrero v. United States一案，502 F.2d 90, 99(1974年第九巡迴法院)。
Judicial precedents show that self-executing treaties are a source of individual legal rights enforceable in courts. See, e,g, Guerrero v. United States, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Footnotes 註解:

1. 1951年9月8日與日本簽署的和約，同盟國-日本，美國法典3 U.S.C. 3169。
Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, Allied Powers-Japan, 3 U.S.C. 3169.

2. 台灣關係法，Taiwan Relations Act，美國法典22 U.S.C. § 3301-3316。

3. 移民暨歸化法，Immigration and Nationality Act，美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1101-1178。

4. 移民暨歸化法將「國民」定義為「對國家永久效忠者」、身為「美國公民或……雖非美國公民，卻對美國永久效忠」的「美國國民」。美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21)-(22)。根據移民暨歸化法的宗旨，「永久」一詞意指「具延續或持久性質的關係，不同於暫時性質，而是即使美國或個人最後要求依法解除，仍可永久持續的關係。」美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31)。
The INA defines a "national" as a "a person owing permanent allegiance to a state," and a "national of the United States" as a "a citizen of the United States, or . . . a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21)-(22). For the purpose of the INA, "permanent" means "a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31).

就協助本法院釐清的範圍而言，美國國務院外交手冊(FAM)將「國民」定義為：「已賦予美國國籍且對美國永久效忠，卻非美國公民的人」。全體美國公民均是美國國民，但美國國民並非一定是美國公民……」美國國務院外交手冊7 FAM 1113(i)。
To the extent it is helpful to the Court, the Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual ("FAM") defines a "national," as a "person on whom U.S. nationality has been conferred and who owes permanent allegiance to the United States but who is not a citizen." All U.S. citizens are nationals, but U.S. nationals are not necessarily U.S. citizens. . . ." Dept. State 7 FAM 1113(i).

5. 就協助法院釐清的範圍而言，美國國務院外交手冊定義的「公民」，意指「基於出生或依法歸化而取得美國公民權的人。全體美國公民均為美國國民。」美國國務院外交手冊7 FAM 1113(c)。
The FAM, to the extent it is helpful to the court, defines a "citizen," as a "person who acquired U.S. citizenship at birth or upon naturalization as provided by law. All U.S. citizens are nationals of the United States." Dept. State 7 FAM 1113(c).

6. 美國國民還有申請護照之權。請參照美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2007) (「美國國民」為「美國公民或……雖非美國公民，卻對美國永久效忠的人」)；美國法典22 U.S.C. § 212 (2007)(「人民有權申請護照。唯有效忠美國者，才授予、核發或驗證護照，無論其是否為公民亦然。」)
U.S. nationals also have the right to apply for passports. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2007) (a "national of the United States" is a "a citizen of the United States, or . . . a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States"); 22 U.S.C. § 212 (2007) ("Persons entitled to passport. No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons that those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States.").

7. 拒收公民權或國籍權益申請書的舉動，實質上等同拒絕此類申請。請參照Agcaoili v. Gustafson一案，844 F.2d 620, 626 (1988年第九巡迴法院)(原告控告移民歸化局(INS)的理由，在於該局基於原告住在國外而拒收歸化申請書；法院命令移民歸化局受理申請，並附註道：「移民歸化局藉由拒絕受理菲律賓退伍軍人的申請書，就能有效防止申請案引起法院注意」，該案基於其他理由而遭到駁回，870 F.2d 462 (1988年第九巡迴法院)。
Refusal to accept an application for a citizenship or nationality benefit amounts to the denial of such application. See Agcaoili v. Gustafson, 844 F.2d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (the plaintiffs brought a claim against the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") for refusal to accept their applications for naturalization because they resided abroad; the court ordered the INS to process the applications and noted, "[b]y refusing to process the applications of the Filipino veterans, the INS effectively is preventing the applications from receiving the attention of the court"), case dismissed on other grounds, 870 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1988).

8. 第(b)款一般適用於「不住在美國」的人：
Subsection (b) generally applies if a person is "not within the United States":

如果不住在美國者，要求獲得美國國民權利或特權，然而美國政府部門或獨立機關、亦或是其中的任職官員，基於此人並非美國國民之故而否決其權利或特權時，此人可向居住國家的美國駐外外交官員或領事館人員申請身份證明，以利前往美國入境口岸申請入境。外交官員或領事館人員若有證據，證實該申請乃是基於善意而提出，並且有實質依據之時，應予以核發身份證明。申請人申請此類證明若遭拒，有權向國務卿申訴，國務卿若同意不受理，應採書面方式陳述其決定的理由……美國法典8 U.S.C. § 1503(b)
If a person who is not within the United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right and privilege by any department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the grounds that he is not a national of the United States, such person may make application to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in the foreign country in which he is residing for a certificate of identity for the purpose of traveling to a port of entry in the United States and applying for admission. Upon proof to the satisfaction of such diplomatic or consular officer than such application is made in good faith and has a substantial basis, he shall issue a certificate of identity. From any denial of an application for such certificate the applicant shall be entitled to an appeal to the Secretary of State, who, if he approves the denial, shall state in writing his reasons for his decision. . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b)

9. 舊金山和約第2條(b)之中，日本從1952年4月28日起，放棄對台一切主權。中華民國(ROC)未獲指派擔任此塊割讓領土的收受國。
In SFPT Article 2(b), Japan renounced all claims of sovereignty over Taiwan effective April 28, 1952. The Republic of China (ROC) was not designated as the receiving country for this territorial cession.

10. 舊金山和約第23條(a)之中，為了舊金山和約之地域範圍所涵蓋的領土，指定美國擔任「主要佔領權」。根據割讓波多黎各、關島、菲律賓和古巴的西班牙-美國戰爭而建立的判例，顯然可見「主要佔領權的軍事政府，持續到實施具法律效力之替代方案為止」。從1952年至今，台灣尚未成立經主要佔領權「美國」所承認的「平民政府」，以取代美國軍事政府(USMG)對台灣及澎湖的管轄權。因此，美國軍事政府對台灣的管轄權至今仍然健在。
In SFPT Article 23(a), the United States is designated as "the principal occupying Power" for the purpose of the territories covered within the geographic scope of the SFPT. According to the precedent established in the Spanish-American War cessions of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, and Cuba, it is clear that the "Military government of the principal occupying power continues until legally supplanted." In the period of 1952 to the present, no "civil government" recognized by the principal occupying power (the United States) has been established in Taiwan to supplant USMG jurisdiction over Formosa and the Pescadores. Hence, in the present day, USMG jurisdiction over Taiwan is still active.

11. 如原告於2006年10月24日提出的訴狀所概述，對於二次世界大戰後的台灣地位，舊金山和約乃是層級最高的國際法律文件。重要的是，舊金山和約缺乏認定台灣人民「效忠於中華民國」或台灣人民能正確歸類為「中華民國公民」的依據。
As summarized in the Plaintiff's Complaint of Oct. 24, 2006, the SFPT is the highest ranking document of international law regarding the status of Taiwan in the post WWII era. Importantly, there is no basis under the SFPT to hold that the Taiwanese people "owe allegiance to the ROC," or that the Taiwanese people are correctly classified as "ROC citizens."
　

資料來源:http://www.taiwankey.net/dc/taiwan/suitreply.htm