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  首頁 > 影音網>影音-新書-Free Formosa自由福爾摩沙-盧主義博士
影音-新書-Free Formosa自由福爾摩沙-盧主義博士

Jay Loo]

[ 台灣海外網]於2021-11-15 02:11:11上傳[]

 



新書記錄了從 1950 年代開始的美國台裔美國人社區的早期歷史


Jay Loo 宣布發行“自由福爾摩沙:開始”

費城——繼 2010 年《美國的安全與台灣的自由》和 2019 年的《自由台灣:回憶錄》上映後,Jay Loo 完成了三部曲,出版了《自由台灣:開始》(由 Xlibris 出版)一書它記錄了美國台裔美國人社區從 1950 年代開始的早期歷史。盧的文章還解釋了崛起的中國如何威脅世界和平。

1956 年 1 月 1 日,第一個台獨組織——台灣自由台灣(3F)——在費城成立。兩年後,3F 被重組為台灣獨立聯盟 (UFI)。 1950 年代中期,台灣裔美國人協會的前身福爾摩沙會誕生於芝加哥和紐約市。 Loo 介紹了俱樂部誕生的主要貢獻者。新聞通訊的樣本頁面被複製,以展示早期生活的一瞥。

太平洋時報是一份全國性的中文報紙,在洛杉磯為台裔美國人社區出版。盧在 1999 年至 2008 年期間為該論文撰寫了簡短的英文社論。該書還涵蓋了 1999 年至 2009 年期間未發表的 19 篇論文。主題包括美台中關係和美國國家安全。它還顯示了盧在 1958 年至 2009 年間給美國報紙和學術期刊編輯的信件的重印。一些信件涉及值得注意的事件,例如中國頒布《反分裂國家法》。

“一些台裔美國人會對台灣裔美國僑民的早期歷史感興趣。美國政策精英應該注意我關於崛起的中國對包括 14 億中國人在內的人類構成滅絕危險的警告,”盧指出。當被問及他希望讀者從這本書中得到什麼時,他回答說:“通知美國,它必須調動所有資源,包括物質和智力,以威懾中國,維護美國國土安全,並幫助盟國防禦中國侵略。自由是不可替代的。美國必須不惜一切代價捍衛民主。”

“自由福爾摩沙:開始”

Jay Loo·盧盧主義博士
精裝 | 8.5 x 11 英寸 | 336 頁 | ISBN 9781664152281
平裝 | 8.5 x 11 英寸 | 336 頁 | ISBN 9781664152298
電子書 | 336 頁 | ISBN 9781664152274
可在亞馬遜和 Barnes & Noble 購買

關於作者
Jay Loo 出生於台灣台南市。他19歲來美國上大學,1969年成為美國公民。在從事精算諮詢事業的同時,他將一生的大部分時間奉獻給了台灣的民主化和獨立事業。他撰寫了大量關於沙文主義中國崛起對美國國土安全構成的無數危險的文章。他以優異成績獲得政治學學士學位(明尼蘇達大學)和普林斯頓大學公共事務碩士學位。他是精算師協會的會員和國際評估與戰略中心的傑出會員。他曾在《外交事務》、《新共和國》和《英國國防評論》等著名期刊上發表文章。他以筆名李天鶴(Xlibris,2010)和“自由台灣:回憶錄”(iUniverse,2019)著有“美國的安全和台灣的自由”。他和他的妻子海倫住在賓夕法尼亞州的蘭斯代爾。 

------------------------------------------------------------

New book documents the early history of the Taiwanese American community in the United States beginning in the 1950s
Jay Loo announces the release of ‘Free Formosa: The Beginning’
PHILADELPHIA – After the release of “America’s Security and Taiwan’s Freedom” in 2010 and “Free Formosa: A Memoir” in 2019, Jay Loo completes the trilogy with the release of “Free Formosa: The Beginning” (published by Xlibris), a book that documents the early history of the Taiwanese American community in the United States, beginning in the 1950s. Loo's essays also explain how a rising China threatens world peace.

On January 1, 1956, the first Taiwan independence organization — Formosans’ Free Formosa (3F) — was launched in Philadelphia. Two years later, 3F was reorganized as United Formosans for Independence (UFI). Formosan Clubs, the forerunner of present day Taiwanese American Associations, were born in Chicago and New York City, in the mid-1950s. Loo introduces the key contributors to the clubs’ birth. Sample pages of the newsletters are reproduced to show a glimpse of life in the early days.

Pacific Times was a nationwide Chinese language newspaper, published in Los Angeles for the Taiwanese American community. Loo wrote short English editorials for the paper from 1999 to 2008. The book also covers 19 unpublished essays from 1999 to 2009. The topics include U.S.-Taiwan-China relations and U.S. national security. It also shows reprints of Loo’s letters to the editor of U.S. newspapers and academic journals from 1958 to 2009. Some letters dealt with noteworthy events, such as China’s enactment of the Anti-Secession Law.

“Some Taiwanese Americans will be interested in the early history of the Taiwanese American diaspora. U.S. policy elites should heed my warning about the danger of extinction which a rising China poses to mankind, including the 1.4 billion Chinese,” Loo points out. When asked what he wants readers to take away from the book, he answers, “To inform the U.S. that it must mobilize all its resources, both physical and intellectual, to deter China, preserve the security of the U.S. homeland and help allies defend against Chinese aggression. Freedom is irreplaceable. America must defend democracy at all costs.”

“Free Formosa: The Beginning”
By Jay Loo
Hardcover | 8.5 x 11in | 336 pages | ISBN 9781664152281
Softcover | 8.5 x 11in | 336 pages | ISBN 9781664152298
E-Book | 336 pages | ISBN 9781664152274
Available at Amazon and Barnes & Noble

About the Author
Jay Loo was born in Tainan City, Taiwan. He came to the U.S. for college at age 19 and became an American citizen in 1969. While pursuing a career in actuarial consulting, he devoted much of his life to the cause of Taiwan’s democratization and independence. He has written extensively regarding the myriad dangers to U.S. homeland security posed by the rise of a chauvinistic China. He earned a BA summa cum laude in politics (University of Minnesota) and a Master of Public Affairs from Princeton University. He is a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries and a Distinguished Fellow of the International Assessment and Strategy Center. He has published in prestigious journals including Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, and UK’s Defence Review. He is the author of “America’s Security and Taiwan’s Freedom” under his pen name Li Thian-hok (Xlibris, 2010) and “Free Formosa: A Memoir” (iUniverse, 2019). He and his wife Helen live in Lansdale, Pennsylvania.
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自由福爾摩沙——開始

免費預覽

啟示錄說,一條七頭十角的大紅龍,撒旦的化身,將在哈米吉多頓帶來世界末日。中國的崛起​​能否引發世界大戰?中國是否會對美國本土發動核珍珠港?沒有確定的答案。但作者的見解(第六部分,未發表的論文)為思考這些嚴重問題提供了不可或缺的信息。
許多文章都包含對中國惡意意圖的先見之明的警告,例如,2000 年 3 月的文章,儘管中國嚴重侵犯了人權,但仍給予中國最優惠的貿易關係地位。我在 2001 年 11 月的演講中談到了中國可能對美國使用生物武器雖然冠狀病毒起源於中國武漢尚不清楚,但很明顯,一旦北京意識到冠狀病毒的威力,它就會將病毒武器化以削弱西方國家,尤其是美國。
這些文章追溯了美中台關係的演變,解釋了台灣在維護東亞和平方面的地緣戰略價值,以及為什麼維護台灣自由最終與美國國土安全和世界和平息息相關。

這本書的其餘部分基本上是台裔美國人的歷史記錄。在美國的台灣僑民開始於 1950 年代初期的灑落,並在 1970 年代和 1980 年代逐漸發展成為一場傾盆大雨。這可能是唯一一本描述台灣俱樂部早期歷史和出版台灣兄弟會的書。在芝加哥和紐約創辦這些組織的人是誰?他們在促進台裔美國人社區的社會凝聚力方面發揮了什麼作用?這裡匯集的文件將使讀者瞥見早年的生活。

本書還記錄了鮮為人知的台灣獨立 (TI) 運動如何於 1956 年在費城興起,以及早期組織台灣自由台灣 (3F) 和台灣獨立 (UFI) 的活動——在第一次幾年的運動。 3F和UFI的傳奇是台裔美國人歷史和台灣民主化歷史的一部分。

已經出版了許多關於美國 TI 運動的中文書籍。大多數都缺乏事實,而且常常充滿錯誤。 Florence Chen 是一名在德克薩斯州執業的律師。她關於 3F 誕生的研究論文是對這些文獻的真實補充。
本書收錄了許多迄今未發表的文件,例如與 TI 運動先驅 Thomas Liao 博士以及與 Adlai Stevenson 等美國傑出人士、美國參議員和學者的通信。包括台灣過去的珍貴紀念品以及朋友和家人的照片。

這本書是三部曲的第三部。第一本書《美國的安全與台灣的自由》(Xlibris,2010 年)是 1956 年至 2009 年的論文和演講集。第二本書《自由台灣:回憶錄》(iUniverse,2019 年)是一本自傳,其中包括一本記錄草根外交的期刊。我和我的妻子海倫從 1957 年到 2012 年進行了指揮。這本書包括 150 張彩色照片
21 世紀是一個充滿混亂和日益不穩定的世紀。人類生活在一個越來越不安全、充滿危險的世界。為了維護世界和平,西方民主國家必須結成大聯盟來抵制中國的沙文主義野心。我希望我的文章能夠喚醒美國對紅龍生存威脅的認識,並幫助美國領導人發展智慧和決心,繼續站在歷史的正確一邊,維護和平。 免費預覽

啟示錄說,一條七頭十角的大紅龍,撒旦的化身,將在哈米吉多頓帶來世界末日。中國的崛起​​能否引發世界大戰?中國是否會對美國本土發動核珍珠港?沒有確定的答案。但作者的見解(第六部分,未發表的論文)為思考這些嚴重問題提供了不可或缺的信息。

許多文章都包含對中國惡意意圖的先見之明的警告,例如,2000 年 3 月的文章,儘管中國嚴重侵犯了人權,但仍給予中國最優惠的貿易關係地位。我在 2001 年 11 月的演講中談到了中國可能對美國使用生物武器雖然冠狀病毒起源於中國武漢尚不清楚,但很明顯,一旦北京意識到冠狀病毒的威力,它就會將病毒武器化以削弱西方國家,尤其是美國。

這些文章追溯了美中台關係的演變,解釋了台灣在維護東亞和平方面的地緣戰略價值,以及為什麼維護台灣自由最終與美國國土安全和世界和平息息相關。

這本書的其餘部分基本上是台裔美國人的歷史記錄。在美國的台灣僑民開始於 1950 年代初期的灑落,並在 1970 年代和 1980 年代逐漸發展成為一場傾盆大雨。這可能是唯一一本描述台灣俱樂部早期歷史和出版台灣兄弟會的書。在芝加哥和紐約創辦這些組織的人是誰?他們在促進台裔美國人社區的社會凝聚力方面發揮了什麼作用?這裡匯集的文件將使讀者瞥見早年的生活。

本書還記錄了鮮為人知的台灣獨立 (TI) 運動如何於 1956 年在費城興起,以及早期組織台灣自由台灣 (3F) 和台灣獨立 (UFI) 的活動——在第一次幾年的運動。 3F和UFI的傳奇是台裔美國人歷史和台灣民主化歷史的一部分。

已經出版了許多關於美國 TI 運動的中文書籍。大多數都缺乏事實,而且常常充滿錯誤。 Florence Chen 是一名在德克薩斯州執業的律師。她關於 3F 誕生的研究論文是對這些文獻的真實補充。

本書收錄了許多迄今未發表的文件,例如與 TI 運動先驅 Thomas Liao 博士以及與 Adlai Stevenson 等美國傑出人士、美國參議員和學者的通信。包括台灣過去的珍貴紀念品以及朋友和家人的照片。

這本書是三部曲的第三部。第一本書《美國的安全與台灣的自由》(Xlibris,2010 年)是 1956 年至 2009 年的論文和演講集。第二本書《自由台灣:回憶錄》(iUniverse,2019 年)是一本自傳,其中包括一本記錄草根外交的期刊。我和我的妻子海倫從 1957 年到 2012 年進行了指揮。這本書包括 150 張彩色照片。

21 世紀是一個充滿混亂和日益不穩定的世紀。人類生活在一個越來越不安全、充滿危險的世界。為了維護世界和平,西方民主國家必須結成大聯盟來抵制中國的沙文主義野心。我希望我的文章能夠喚醒美國對紅龍生存威脅的認識,並幫助美國領導人發展智慧和決心,繼續站在歷史的正確一邊,維護和平。 
-------------------------------------------------------
Free Formosa – The Beginning

Free Preview
 The book of Revelations says a great red dragon with seven heads and ten horns, the incarnation of Satan, will bring on the end of the world at Armageddon. Can the rise of China lead to a great world war? Will China launch a nuclear Pearl Harbor against the U.S. homeland? There are no definitive answers. But the author’s insights (Part VI, Unpublished Essays) provide indispensable information for pondering these grave questions.

 Many essays contain prescient warnings about China’s malign intentions, e.g., the March 2000 article about granting China most favored trade relations status despite its atrocious human rights violations. My November 2001 speech touched on China’s potential use of biological weapons against the U.S. While the origin of the coronavirus in Wuhan, China is not clear, it is clear that once Beijing realized the potency of the coronavirus, it weaponized the virus to weaken Western nations, especially the United States.

 The essays trace the evolution of US-China-Taiwan relations, explain the geostrategic value of Taiwan in keeping the peace in East Asia, and why the preservation of Taiwan’s freedom is tied ultimately to the security of U.S. homeland and world peace.
 The rest of this book is basically a documented history of Taiwanese Americans. The Taiwanese diaspora in America started as a sprinkle in the early 1950's and grew into a steady downpour in the 1970's and 1980's. This may be the only book describing the early history of Formosan Clubs and the publication Formosan Brotherhood. Who were the people who started these organizations in Chicago and New York? What role did they play in advancing the social cohesion of the Taiwanese American community? The documents assembled herein will give readers a glimpse of life in the early years.

 This book also documents the little known story of how the Taiwan Independence (TI) movement came into being in Philadelphia in 1956 and the activities of the early organizations Formosans’ Free Formosa (3F) and United Formosans for Independence (UFI) – during the first several years of the movement. The saga of 3F and UFI is part of the history of Taiwanese Americans and the history of Taiwan’s democratization.

 Many books have been published about the TI movement in America in Chinese. Most are scant on facts and often full of errors. Florence Chen is an attorney practicing in Texas. Her research paper on the birth of 3F is an authentic addition to this literature.
 Many hitherto unpublished documents are included in this book, e.g., correspondence with TI movement pioneer Dr. Thomas Liao and with U.S. luminaries such as Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Senators and scholars. Photos of rare mementos from Taiwan’s past and of friends and family are included.

 This book is the third tome of a trilogy. The first book America’s Security and Taiwan’s Freedom (Xlibris, 2010) is a collection of essays and speeches from 1956 to 2009. The second, Free Formosa: A Memoir (iUniverse, 2019), is an autobiography which includes a journal documenting grassroots diplomacy which I and my wife Helen conducted from 1957 to 2012. This tome includes 150 color photos.

 The 21st century is a century of disruptions and growing instability. Mankind is living in an increasingly unsafe world full of perils. To keep world peace, the Western democracies must forge a grand alliance to resist China’s chauvinistic ambitions. I hope my essays will awaken America to the red dragon’s existential threat and help U.S. leaders in developing the wisdom and resolve to stay on the right side of history and keep the peace.
==================================

Free Formosa:The Beginning 自由台灣之起源

下面論述摘自盧主義最近出版之新書 ” Free Formosa The Beginning”

From Page 17 to page 41

Part I

Launching Formosans’ Free Formosa (3F)
Research Paper by Florence Chen
Florence Chen is currently a lawyer at a boutique law firm. She spent four years as an investment banker prior to attending Columbia Law School. Florence also studied finance and international studies through the Huntsman Program in international studies and business, a dual-degree program with the Wharton School and the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania.

 Florence completed her senior honors thesis under the supervision of Professor Arthur Waldron. She is very thankful for Professor Waldron’s guidance and for introducing her to Jay Loo. And she is also incredibly grateful that Jay Loo took the time to share his story.
Formosans’ Free Formosa
A Study of the First Taiwan Independence Movement Organization in America
by Florence Chen

 Huntsman Program
Senior Honors Thesis
 May 9, 2008

 As condensed and edited by Jay Loo
July 31, 201
翁進治 譯

第一部

發動台灣人之自由台灣(3F)
Florence Chen 的研究論文

Florence Chen 目前是一家律師事務所的律師。 在進入哥倫比亞法學院之前,她曾擔任過四年的投資銀行家。 Florence 還經由 Huntsman課程學習金融和國際研究,這是一個在賓夕法尼亞大學Wharton School(沃頓商學院)和藝術與科學學院合作的雙學位項目。

  Florence 在 Arthur Waldron 教授的指導下完成了她的榮譽論文。 她非常感謝 Waldron 教授的指導,並將她介紹給 盧主義(Jay Loo)。 她也非常感謝 盧主義 花時間分享他的故事。
台灣人的自由台灣
美國第一個台獨運動組織研究
by 弗洛倫斯·陳

Huntsman計劃
榮譽畢業論文

  2008 年 5 月 9 日
由 盧主義 縮短和編輯
2019 年 7 月 31 日
 文章摘要
在明朝1600年代滅亡的混亂時期當中,有許 多中國人逃到臺灣島,就此成爲臺灣最早的漢族臺灣 人。臺灣是到了清朝時代1684年才開始受到中國大陸的朝廷統治,但是由於臺灣的社會結構不穩定、 離大陸的距離造成行政訊息不順通、等等許多原因,造成那時候的臺灣發生許多暴動。所以到了1887 年,臺灣才正式成爲中國清朝的一個省,真正開始受到清朝政府的直接領導。

1895年,中國被日本打 敗,就把臺灣交給日本,臺灣就此成爲日本的殖民地,再次遭受到外人的統治,直到1945年世界二戰 之後才被還給中國國民黨。但是,臺灣人的這種歷史經驗,經過多年的種種曲折,與中國大陸的歷史 經驗相差的距離越來越大,造成臺灣人開始發覺自己明顯與中國大陸人的價值觀、氣質、教養、社會 制度、等等文化方面已經大有異處。

 1947年,這些臺灣人,因爲認爲臺灣人擁有臺灣特色的民族主義,所以向中國國民黨要求自治權, 而中國國民黨以暴力拒絕允許臺灣人追求自治夢想,造成二二八事件的悲劇。二二八事件染發了一 些臺灣人的心,鼓舞他們創始台獨運動,請世界各國支持臺灣人的自治權,要求世界各國承認臺灣 為一個獨立自主的國家。台獨運動發生在許多不同的國家,而這篇文章就是美國第一個台獨運動組 織的故事。

美國最早的台獨運動歷史是由一些臺灣的留學生1956年創立”臺灣人的獨立臺灣”(Formosans’ Free Formosa)才開始的。這篇文章將會敍説最早期的美國台獨運動的誕生、組織目標、活動等等。當 時的這些學生領導所面臨了種種困難,其中有内部的一些問題,還有最嚴重的外來問題,來自外界滿 懷敵意的環境。雖然早期的美國台獨運動者必須對付這些許多難題,經過詳細調查,筆者認爲他們 還是做出值得讚揚的貢獻。

 並且討論一下這些學生領導人所作出的貢獻還有面對的困難。在英語的歷史文學當中雖然有很多 人談到臺灣問題,極少數人討論到最早期的美國台獨運動,希望以下的文章能夠促進臺灣歷史學界 對這個題目的了解。這段歷史故事也許能夠幫助下一代的臺灣人更加了解臺灣人獨特的歷史經驗
Introduction

Though the issue of Taiwan independence looms large in modern-day politics, the early activities of the Taiwan independence movement have not yet been studied very much by historians. This is especially true for the early Taiwan independence movement that developed in America in 1956 with the founding of Formosans’ Free Formosa in Philadelphia. The following study seeks to study the conditions fostering the early movement for independence, the goals, activities, and accomplishments of the early organizations in America, and the main challenges they faced. This paper argues that despite adverse circumstances, the early Taiwan independence movement in the United States was able to achieve significant goals. Ultimately, of course, the activities of the independence movement in America were not enough to help Taiwan gain independence in the 1950s. To this day, the status of Taiwan remains ambiguous and undecided. By understanding the often untold story of perseverance and dedication from Taiwan’s early student leaders abroad, however, the lessons of old independence activists can serve as inspiration for the current generation.

I. The History of Taiwan

In order to better understand the conditions leading to the rise of the Taiwan independence movement, it is crucial to first briefly study Taiwan’s interesting path throughout history.

Taiwan has been ruled by the Dutch, the Spanish, Koxinga, the Manchus, Japan, and the Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang (KMT). Taiwan’s history has been an incessant struggle for liberty against alien rulers. It is not within the purview of this book, however, to cover Taiwan’s history of agonies. Interested readers may peruse the following sources.

Jonathan Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan. Palgrave McMillan, New York, 2002. Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2007.

Ong Iok-tek, Taiwan: A History of Agonies. Avanguard, Taipei, 2016. Translated by Shimamura Yasuharu from the 1970 Japanese edition.

For a description of Chinese Nationalist rule of Taiwan during the years after World War II, George H. Kerr’s Formosa Betrayed (Second ed., Taiwan Publishing Co., Upland, CA 91784 USA, 1992) is an excellent source.
The February 28 incident of 1947 is an important factor in the rise of the Taiwan independence movement. For a concise summary, see Li Thian-hok, America’s Security and Taiwan’s Freedom (Xlibris, 2010, pp. 427–445).

II. The Taiwan Independence Movement Abroad
The conception of the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) is difficult to characterize precisely, especially during its early history, since it was a “heterogeneous, amorphous movement filled with personality clashes, disagreements about whether to pursue violent revolution or peaceful reform, and tension between Taiwan and overseas elements.” Due to the danger of organizing dissenting political activities in Taiwan, the location of most independence movement activities was abroad, especially in Japan and the United States, though later TIMs also spread to places like Canada and Western Europe. After the suppression of the February 28 incident in 1947, as many as 3,000 political activists escaped to various international locations and began to establish anti-Nationalist organizations.

Historical ties made Japan a logical haven for TIM. The formulation of Taiwanese identity had begun under Japanese colonial rule, as evidenced by the flourishing of cultural and political organizations representing Taiwanese interests in both Japan and Taiwan. The very first of these organizations, the Taiwanese Cultural Society founded in 1920, was first established in Tokyo and is even argued by some as signifying the “beginning of the island’s independence movement” since “there was never any idea of the organization urging a reunification with China.” In any case, the historical ties of Taiwanese political organizations to Tokyo, the supportive atmosphere provided by sympathetic liberal Japanese political reformers, the relatively larger numbers of Taiwanese studying abroad in Japan and other conveniences of geographical proximity all help to explain why some Taiwanese political activists would see Japan as a natural place to base an independence movement.

 In light of these fairly favorable conditions, some of the very first pro-independence organizations abroad were established in Japan. One of the most prominent of these Taiwanese leaders based in Japan was Dr. Thomas Liao.


台獨問題雖然在現代政治中舉足輕重,但歷史學家對台獨運動的早期活動還沒有深入研究。對於 1956 年台灣人在費城創立的台灣人的自由台灣,這是在美國發展起來的早期台獨運動尤其沒有研究過。以下研究旨在研究促進早期獨立運動的條件、美國早期組織的目標、活動和成就,以及他們面臨的主要挑戰。本文認為,儘管環境不利,美國早期的台獨運動仍能實現重大目標。當然,最終美國獨立運動的活動並不足以幫助台灣在 1950 年代獲得獨立。時至今日,台灣的地位仍然模棱兩可,懸而未決。然而,通過了解台灣早期海外學生領袖的堅持不懈和奉獻精神的故事,老獨立活動家的教訓可以為當代人提供靈感。

一、台灣歷史

為了更好地了解導致台獨運動興起的條件,首先要研究台灣歷史上有趣的路徑。

台灣曾由荷蘭人、西班牙人、鄭成功、滿族人、日本人和中國國民黨(也稱為KMT)統治。台灣的歷史一直是為自由與外國統治者不斷鬥爭的歷史。然而,台灣的痛苦歷史在本書的範圍內。有興趣的讀者可以仔細閱讀以下資料。

喬納森·曼索普,《禁忌之國:台灣歷史》。 Palgrave McMillan,紐約,2002 年。
 Murray A. Rubinstein 編輯,台灣:新歷史,Armonk,紐約,M. E. Sharpe,2007 年。
主育德,台灣:苦悶的歷史。 Avanguard,台北,2016 年。 島村康治翻譯,1970 年日文版。

喬治·H·克爾 (George H. Kerr) 的《被背叛的台灣》(第二版,台灣出版公司,Upland,CA 91784 美國,1992 年)是關於二戰後中國國民黨對台灣統治的描述。

1947年2月28日事件是台獨運動興起的重要因素。有關簡明摘要,請參閱 李天福,美國的安全和台灣的自由(Xlibris,2010 年 第 427-445 頁)。

二、海外台獨運動

台獨運動(TIM)的概念很難準確描述,特別是在其早期歷史中,因為它是一個“多質的、無定形的運動,充滿了個性衝突、是否追求暴力革命或和平改革的分歧,以及台灣和海外分子之間的緊張關係。” 由於在台灣組織反對政治活動的危險性,大多數獨立運動活動的地點都在國外,尤其是日本和美國,但後來的 TIM 也蔓延到了加拿大和西歐等地。 1947 年 2 月 28 日事件被鎮壓後,多達 3,000 名政治活動家逃往國際各地,並開始建立反抗中國國民党的組織。

歷史淵源使日本成為 TIM 合乎邏輯的避風港。自認是台灣人身份的形成是在日本殖民統治下開始的,在日本和台灣代表台灣利益的文化和政治組織的蓬勃發展就證明了這一點。這些組織中的第一個組織,即 1920 年成立的台灣文化協會,最初是在東京成立的,甚至被一些人認為是“島內獨立運動的開始”,因為“從來沒有任何組織主張與中國統一的想法”。”無論如何,台灣政治組織與東京的歷史淵源、有同情心的日本自由派政治改革者提供的支持氛圍、在日本留學的台灣人相對較多,以及其他地理鄰近的便利,都有助於解釋為什麼一些台灣政治活動家將日本視為獨立運動的自然基地。

 鑑於這些相當有利的條件,一些最早的海外獨立組織在日本成立。在這些駐日本的台灣領導人中,最傑出的一位是 Thomas Liao(廖文毅) 博士。

After the February 28 incident in 1948, Thomas Liao was forced to escape from Taiwan to Hong Kong. There, Thomas Liao and his brother Joshua Liao worked together to distribute publications advocating Taiwan independence. Thomas Liao worked with Hsieh Hsueh-hung to found the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Taiwan in Hong Kong in March 1948.4 On September 1, the group of Taiwanese refugees filed a petition with the United Nations on behalf of the 7 million Taiwanese people in their homeland, demanding that Taiwan be held under United Nations trusteeship until a plebiscite could be held for Taiwan, to allow the Taiwanese people to determine their future. Liao’s nephew and others were able to establish a branch of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Taiwan in April 1949, though it was infiltrated by Nationalist agents and shut down in May 1950.

As more and more Nationalist refugees migrated to Hong Kong, however, it became evident that Hong Kong would no longer be a safe place to conduct independence movement activities. In January 1950, Liao was again forced to flee, this time to Tokyo. Hsieh Hsueh-hong, on the other hand, decided that Taiwanese independence would be most feasible in cooperation with the Chinese Communists, so she escaped to Beijing instead.

Meanwhile, Liao immediately resumed independence activities in his new location of Japan. In February 1950, Liao established the Formosa Independence Party there in Tokyo. On September 1, 1955, two dozen representatives from various prefectures of Taiwan declared the establishment of the Provisional Congress, electing Liao as president. The Provisional Government then declared independence on February 28, 1956, in memorial of the ninth anniversary of the February 28 incident.

Due to his many efforts toward furthering independence during this early time period, Thomas Liao was perhaps the most prominent figure in the early independence movement. However, the movement was never consolidated under his leadership; instead, it was split into many different branches. One major organization that split from Liao’s Provisional Government was an organization founded in February 1960 by Ong Joktik (王育德) and other Taiwanese students studying in Japan. The group was at first called Taiwan Chinglian (Youth) Associates, though the name was later changed to be the Formosan Association. This organization focused more on “steady propaganda work and secret organization” with the publication of its newsletters Taiwan Chinglian in Japanese and Formosa Quarterly in English. The fragmentation of the Taiwanese Independence Movement in Japan was in large part due to instances of “personality clashes” involving Liao. Also important was the existence of very different opinions as to how to proceed with achieving independence for the Taiwanese people. It is also important to note that being based in Japan was not favorable to garnering more international support since in the post–World War era, war-torn Japan was not really in a position (nor did it have the political capital) to speak out on behalf of the Taiwanese.

Thus the other major base of TIM operations was the United States, with organizers and participants consisting primarily of graduate students from Taiwan. Since the United States emerged as one of the two major powers in the Cold War era, if the clout of the American government had been aligned with Taiwanese goals for self-government, there could perhaps be a greater possibility of success for the Taiwan Independence Movement. A number of factors acted as barriers to this.

1948 年 2 月 28 日事件後,廖文毅被迫從台灣逃往香港。在那裡,Thomas Liao 和他的兄弟 Joshua Liao(廖文奎) 一起分發宣傳台獨的出版物。

 1948 年 3 月,廖與謝雪紅在香港成立了台灣再解放聯盟。 9 月 1 日,台灣難民團體代表他們的祖國700 萬台灣人向聯合國提交了請願書。要求將台灣置於聯合國託管之下,直到可以為台灣舉行公民投票,讓台灣人民決定自己的未來。廖的侄子等人於 1949 年 4 月成立了台灣再解放聯盟的一個支部,後來被國民黨特工份子滲透而於 1950 年 5 月被關閉。

然而,隨著越來越多的國民黨難民移居香港,香港顯然不再是開展獨立運動活動的安全場所。 1950 年 1 月,廖再次被迫逃離,這次是前往東京。另一方面,謝雪紅認為運作台獨最可行的辦法是與中共合作,所以她逃到了北京。

與此同時,廖立即在他的新駐地日本恢復了獨立活動。 1950年2月,廖在東京成立台灣獨立黨。 1955年9月1日,台灣各縣市派二十多人代表參與並宣布臨時代表大會成立,選舉廖為總統。臨時政府隨後於 1956 年 2 月 28 日宣布台灣獨立,以紀念2 月 28 日事件的第九週年。

由於他在早期為推進獨立所做的許多努力,廖文毅可能是早期獨立運動中最傑出的人物。然而,運動從未在他的領導下得到鞏固。相反,它被分成了許多不同的分支。

1960 年 2 月,王育德和其他台灣留日學生成立的一個組織,是從臨時政府分裂出來的一個主要組織。該團體最初被稱為台灣青年協會,後來更名為台灣同鄉會。該組織更注重穩定宣傳工作和秘密組織,以日文出版《台灣青年》和英文《台灣季刊》。

 台灣獨立運動在日本分裂最大的原因是由於個性
衝突。 同樣重要的是,對於台灣人民如何實現獨立,存在非常不同的意見。同樣重要的是要注意,駐紮在日本不利於獲得更多的國際支持,因為在戰後時代,飽受戰爭蹂躪的日本實際上沒有能力(也沒有政治資本)發聲為台灣人發言。

因此,TIM 行動的另一個主要基地是美國,組織者和參與者主要由台灣留美研究生組成。 由於美國在冷戰時代成為兩大強國之一,如果美國政府的影響力與台灣的自治目標保持一致,台獨運動成功的可能性更大。有許多因素阻礙了這一點。

III. The Early American TIM Movement

Since the most prominent leaders in the Taiwan independence movement in these early stages were based in Japan, most studies on the independence movement have focused on these more eye-catching activities. Leaders like Thomas Liao were often cited on the international stage, and so historians tend to focus more on the unfolding of events in Japan when thinking about the early Taiwan Independence Movement. Meanwhile, the beginnings of the early American TIM are often overlooked by historians. However, just like its Japanese counterpart, the early American TIM activists were able to make significant, and perhaps more lasting, contributions to the overall independence movement abroad.

 The Birth of Formosans’ Free Formosa
 In the period from 1950 to 1960, the number of Taiwanese students in the United States grew from only about 50 to at least 554. The American Taiwan Independence Movement grew as the number of Taiwanese students abroad increased, since the movement in the United States during this early period was almost exclusively comprised of Taiwanese students.

During this time, it was very difficult for Taiwanese students to leave the island to pursue studies abroad in the United States, so it was often only the best and the brightest who were able to do so. In August 1955, five such Taiwanese students studying in America were introduced to each other and quickly became close friends. Four of the five were students at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia: Dr. Tom Yang (楊東傑) was the eldest of the five and studying radiology, John Lin (林 榮勳) and Edward Chen (陳以德) were both pursuing graduate studies in international relations, and Echo Lin (林錫湖) was pursuing a doctorate in chemistry. The youngest of the five was Jay Loo (盧主 義), who was studying medicine at nearby Temple University.

These five Taiwanese students were drawn together by their common experiences in Taiwan and enjoyed getting together every weekend. Invariably, they found that their topics of discussion often tended to gravitate toward issues of politics in their homeland. In the foreign country that was America, they were finally able to debate Taiwanese politics, a topic that had been taboo in Taiwan whether under Japanese or Nationalist Chinese rule. The group of five friends shared similar complaints about the Nationalist government and the mainlanders who migrated to the island in droves during and after the Chinese civil war. They discussed the initial excitement and celebrations organized to greet the Nationalists and their disappointment upon seeing a ragtag group of soldiers in disarray during the retrocession of Taiwan in 1945. They recalled the pronounced differences in values and culture between mainlanders and Taiwanese, since after years of Japanese rule, the Taiwanese were much more accustomed to rule of law and enjoyed better standards of civilization. A popular anecdote shared among Taiwanese was how some mainlander refugees would steal bicycles, but because they did not know what the bicycles were for, they would carry them away upon their shoulders. They described their anticipation of increased Taiwanese autonomy after the Japanese surrendered, and the resulting bitter disappointment when policies of discrimination and nepotism in political and economic spheres were implemented once again. They recounted their anger as elementary school children witnessing fellow classmates being brutally beaten by the Japanese, and their feeling of deep sadness when, in middle school, the Nationalists again unfairly punished Taiwanese classmates; it seemed that the Taiwanese were doomed to always be treated as second-class citizens. Taiwan’s sad destiny seemed only further confirmed as they witnessed Taiwan’s descent into a harsh rule of law often deemed as White Terror after the February 28 incident.

三、美國早期的 TIM(台灣獨立)運動

由於早期台獨運動中最傑出的領導人都在日本,因此大多數關於台獨運動的研究都集中在這些更引人注目的活動上。國際舞台上經常引用像廖文毅這樣的領導人,因此歷史學家在思考早期的台獨運動時,往往更關注日本事件的發展。與此同時,歷史學家經常忽視早期美國 TIM 的起源。然而,就像日本的同伴一樣,早期的美國 TIM 活動家能夠為海外的整體獨立運動做出重要的,也許更持久的貢獻。
 台灣人的自由台灣的誕生

 1950年至1960年期間,在美國的台灣留學生人數從僅約50人增加到至少554人。 美國台灣獨立運動隨著海外台灣學生人數的增加而成長,因為這個早期階段幾乎完全由台灣留學生組成。

這段時間,台灣學生離島赴美留學非常困難,往往只有最優秀、最聰明的人才能夠做到。 1955年8月,五位這樣的台灣留美學生互相介紹,很快就成了好朋友。五人中有四人是費城賓夕法尼亞大學的學生:五人中最年長的楊東傑博士正在學習放射學,約翰 林(林榮勳)和 陳以德都是讀 國際關係的研究生. 林錫湖正在攻讀化學博士學位。五人中最年輕的是Jay Loo(盧主義),他在附近的天普(Temple)大學讀醫學院。

這五位台灣學生被他們在台灣的共同經驗所吸引,每個週末都很快樂地聚會。他們總是發現,他們討論的話題往往傾向於台灣國內的政治問題。在美國這樣的地方,他們終於能夠辯論台灣政治,這個話題在台灣無論是在日本還是國民黨的統治下都是禁忌的。五位朋友對國民黨政府和在中國內戰後成群結隊移居該島的大陸人有類似的抱怨。他們討論了最初的興奮和為迎接國民黨而組織的慶祝活動,以及他們在 1945 年二次大戰後看到一群亂糟糟破玻爛爛的士兵時的失望。經過多年日本人統治,台灣人習慣於法治,享受更好的文明水準,他們同意大陸人與台灣人之間有明顯的價值觀以及文化的差異。在台灣人中流傳著一個軼事,一些大陸難民會偷自行車,但因為不知道自行車是做什麼用的,所以他們把自行車扛在肩上。他們描述了日本投降後台灣增加自治的期待,以及當政治和經濟領域的歧視和裙帶關係政策再次實施時造成的痛苦失望。他們講述當小學生時目睹同學被日本人老師殘酷毆打時的憤怒,以及在中學時國民黨再次對台灣同學進行不公平懲罰時的深切悲傷;台灣人似乎注定永遠被當成二等公民。台灣悲慘的命運似乎得到進一步證實,因為他們目睹了台灣在 2 月 28 日事件後陷入通常被視為白色恐怖的嚴酷統治。

 Each of the five students had their personal encounters with the Nationalists, all of them unfavorable. John Lin had perhaps the most negative perception of Nationalist rule because of a traumatic personal experience in which he was arrested and almost jailed because of a student protest when he was the student council president at the National Taiwan University. But it was the youngest of the five, Jay Loo, who pushed the group to “take the next step” and formulate the opinion that “Taiwan independence was not only the right thing to do but was also feasible.” As Loo recalled in an interview, when he first got to America and discovered Fred Riggs’s Formosa

Under Chinese Nationalist Rule, one of the few books available on Taiwan, he became enthralled by the objective historical analysis he was encountering for the first time and started to read “just about every book on Taiwan [he] could get his hands on.” Loo’s knowledge of Taiwanese history and the latest political commentary on the island’s status helped him win most of the group’s debates on Taiwanese politics, much to the chagrin of his older friends. John Lin and Edward Chen were usually reluctant to admit that the younger Loo’s arguments were more logically sound, especially since their expertise was in the area of international relations. Often it was Tom Yang, the senior figure, who would side with Loo to keep the rest of the group from dismissing Loo’s arguments just because of his younger age.

 In that fall of 1955, the group of five students would get together every weekend and discuss Taiwan politics. Soon the group was convinced that Taiwan ought to be an independent state ruled by Taiwanese, and they were determined to help make this dream a reality. Although at first some in the group were pessimistic about how much they could really accomplish to further the goal of Taiwanese independence, they were galvanized into action when Loo’s letter to the editor on Taiwan was published in the New York Times in December 1955 soon after he submitted it. In the letter, Loo asked Americans to help Taiwanese people fight against the Nationalist dictatorship, warning that failure to do so would be dangerous to American interests since continued Nationalist rule could result in Taiwan being more susceptible to falling under Communist rule. The publication of Loo’s letter in the New York Times showed the five Taiwanese students that not only was it possible to voice an opinion in America, it was also the case that Americans might listen and support their cause. It was this event that empowered them, and on January 1, 1956, in Philadelphia, the five friends founded Formosans’ Free Formosa (3F, or 臺灣人的自由臺灣) as the first American organization giving voice to calls for Taiwan independence.

五名學生中的每一個都曾與國民黨發生過個人接觸,但都對他們不利。林榮勳對國民黨統治的最負面看法可能是因為他在擔任國立台灣大學學生會主席時因學生抗議而被捕並幾乎入獄的創傷性個人經歷。但推動該團體“邁出下一步”並形成“台獨不僅是正確的做法而且是可行的”的意見的,是五人中最年輕的盧主義Jay Loo。盧在一次採訪中回憶,在為數不多的關於台灣的書籍之中,當他第一次在美國發現弗雷德·里格斯(Fred Riggs)的「國民政府統治下的台灣」時是他第一次遇到客觀的歷史分析所吸引,由此開始閱讀幾乎所有他 能接觸到的關於台灣的書。盧對台灣歷史和關於該島地位的最新政治評論的了解幫助他贏得了他們小組關於台灣政治的大部分辯論,這讓他的老朋友們非常懊惱。 John Lin 和 Edward Chen 通常不願意承認年輕的 Loo 的論點在邏輯上更合理,尤其是因為他們的專長是在國際關係領域。通常是高齡的Tom Yang楊東傑會站在 Loo 一邊,以防止團隊中的其他人僅僅因為 Loo 年輕而駁回他的論點。

 1955 年的那個秋天,這五個學生每個週末都會聚在一起討論台灣政治。很快,該集團確信台灣應該是一個由台灣人統治的獨立國家,並決心幫助實現這一夢想。起初,雖然小組中的一些人對他們能夠真正實現台獨目標的成就感到悲觀,但當盧主義於 1955 年 12月 向New York Times(紐 約時報) 寄出”Letter to the editor”被發表後不久,他們就採取了行動。盧在信中要求美國人幫助台灣人民反抗國民黨獨裁統治,並警告說如果不這樣做將危及美國的利益,因為國民黨的持續統治可能導致台灣更容易落入共產黨的統治之下。 《紐約時報》刊登盧的信,向五名台灣學生表明,不僅可以在美國發表意見,而且美國人也可以傾聽和支持他們的事業。正是這一事件賦予了他們力量,1956 年 1 月 1 日,五位朋友在費城成立了台灣人的自由台灣(3F),這是第一個在美國為台灣獨立發聲的組織。

Goals and Activities of the Formosans’ Free Formosa
The goal of Formosans’ Free Formosa was to educate and persuade people to support Taiwan
independence. The audience of the group included Taiwanese students, the American people, and the
wider international community.

First, the organization aimed to educate its fellow Taiwanese students in the United States on the
history of Taiwan and persuade them that independence was the right course of action. To achieve
this, a newsletter written in English was created and sent out to Taiwanese students across America.
The newsletter was typewritten and personally mailed to various contacts for distribution on school
campuses with other Taiwanese students. Within each issue, the group would describe various aspects
of Taiwanese history, always with a cover letter calling for Taiwan independence.

台灣人的自由台灣的目標和活動

台灣人的自由台灣的目標是教育和說服人們支持台灣 獨立。 該團的觀眾包括台灣學生、美國人民和更廣泛的國際社會。

首先,該組織旨在教育在美國的台灣同胞 台灣的歷史,並說服他們獨立是正確的行動方針。 為達到此目的,組織製作了一份用英文撰寫的時事通訊,並發送給美國各地的台灣學生。時事通訊打字後並親自郵寄給各個聯繫人,以便在學校分發與其他台灣學生。 在每個討論問題中,該小組描述有關各個方面的台灣歷史,主要是附有一封呼籲台灣須要獨立的信。

For example, in the very first newsletter, Formosans’ Free Formosa wrote that:

This is a critical moment for the future destiny of our beautiful island. For the first time in history we have a great opportunity to attain our long-cherished goal, if we let our voice be heard and show by our deeds that we are a proud people, not to be subjugated by armed minorities forever. We, the Formosans here under the sanctuary of the United States, are in a unique and most advantageous position to do this . .
 .
This first issue contained two articles, one titled “The Status of Formosa: From the Point of View of History” (which described the various events in Taiwanese history that symbolized Taiwanese independence should be a logical conclusion) and another titled “The February 28th Incident” (which detailed the causes and details of the tragedy). There was also a quiz in order to test Taiwanese students’ knowledge about their
homeland’s history. The newsletter was set up to include information that Taiwanese did not have available back home, and since there was very limited material on Taiwan during the time it was published in the first place, it served as a valuable resource for educating Taiwanese students on their homeland.

Second, the organization wanted to rouse the American public opinion and attract American support for the cause of Taiwan independence. Members of Formosans’ Free Formosa felt that if Americans only understood the situation that the Taiwanese were in, then much could be accomplished with their support. To achieve this, Formosans’ Free Formosa actively lobbied members of the American government. They wrote letters defending Taiwan’s case for independence and arranged meetings to argue their points in person. In 1956, the organization was in correspondence with US diplomat George
Kerr. By keeping in contact with American political leaders, Formosans’ Free Formosa hoped to influence American policy toward Taiwan. Lastly, the organization sought to plead its case to the United Nations and the wider international
community. Soon after the creation of Formosans’ Free Formosa, the organization began a correspondence with Dr. Thomas Liao in Tokyo. Since Liao was at the heart of the independence movement for Taiwan at the time, the young Taiwanese students contacted him with the hopes of receiving some guidance from the provisional government that Liao had set up in 1955. In their correspondence, Liao asked the
group to appoint someone to serve as the US representative for their provisional government. There were none among the students who were willing to make such a full-time ommitment in light of their other responsibilities as busy students, but they promised that if “something comes up,” they would “assign someone to fill that role” and help perform any necessary duties. In the fall of 1956, Liao contacted Formosans’ Free Formosa and asked for help with filing a petition
with the United Nations. The idea of the petition was to explain the injustices of what was going on in Taiwan and ask the United Nations to intervene by setting up a trusteeship with a referendum at the end to allow Taiwanese to decide their future. Jay Loo penned the petition for the provisional overnment in Tokyo and closed the arguments for Taiwan independence with a final plea for the United Nations to do its duty.

例如,在第一期時事通訊中,台灣人的自由台灣 寫道:

這是關乎我們美麗島嶼未來命運的關鍵時刻。如果我們讓我們的聲音被聽到並通過我們的行動表明我們是一個自豪的民族,而不願永遠被少數武裝的外族征服,歷史上第一次我們有一個很好的機會來實現我們長期追求的目標。我們在這裡受美國庇護的台灣人,處於獨特和最有利的地位來做到這一點 .
第一期有兩篇文章,一篇題為《從歷史的角度看: 台灣的現狀》(描述台灣歷史上各種事件象徵台灣獨立應該是合乎邏輯的結果),另一篇題為《2月28日事件》 ”(其中詳述了悲劇的起因和細節)。

還有一個小測驗是為了測試台灣留學生對台灣歷史的知識。

這份通訊的設立是為了包括台灣人在國內無法獲得的信息,而且由於最初出版時關於台灣的資料非常有限,因此它成為台灣留學生認識祖國台灣的寶貴資源.

其次,該組織想喚起美國輿論,吸引美國對台獨運動的支持。台灣人的自由台灣(3F)的盟員認為,如果美國人能了解台灣人的處境,那麼有他們的支持就可以大有作為。為了實現這一目標,3F盟員積極遊說美國政府人員。他們寫信為台灣的獨立辯護,並安排會見親自辯論他們的觀點。 1956 年,該組織與美國外交官喬治克爾(George Kerr)通信。通過與美國政治領導人保持聯繫,3F盟負希望影響美國的對台政策。最後,該組織試圖向聯合國和更廣泛的國際社會主張台灣獨立之正當性。3F成立後不久,該組織開始與東京的 Thomas Liao (廖文毅)博士通信。由於當時廖是台獨運動的核心,年輕的台灣留學生聯繫他,希望能得到廖於 1955 年成立的臨時政府的指導。

Liao 要求 3F任命某人擔任其臨時政府的美國代表。考慮到他們忙碌學生的其他職責,學生中沒有人願意做出這樣的全職承諾,但他們承諾如果“有事”,他們會“指派某人來填補那個角色”並提供幫助履行任何必要的職責。 1956年秋,廖與 3F織聯繫,請求幫忙向聯合國請願。

請願的目的是申明台灣正在發生不公正的事情,並要求聯合國進行干預,建立託管並最終進行公民投票,讓台灣人決定自己的未來。 盧主義(Jay Loo) 為東京 臨時政府寫了請願書,並請求聯合國履行其職責,以鼓吹台灣獨立的論述做結束:

      Formosans’ free Formosa, this is the common aspiration of the Formosan people. Formosa rightfully belongs to us Formosans. Our right to self-determination must be respected in the name of justice and humanity. On behalf of the eight million Formosans, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa hereby appeals to the Eleventh General Assembly of the United Nations, to place on its agenda the settlement of the legal status of Formosa which is consistent with the wishes of the Formosan people, with the principle of justice and world security.

The group then sent the petition to the United Nations headquarters in New York under the pseudonym of Peter Ong, with a request for an appointment to see the secretary-general and explain the contents of the petition. Soon after sending the petition, they received a reply from the United Nations legal counsel on November 24, 1956, saying that since no country in the world recognized the Provisional Government, it would not be appropriate to meet with them. Aside from continuing correspondence with Liao’s group to explain their activities and continue exploring opportunities for further cooperation, this was pretty much the extent of involvement” on the part of 3F regarding the Provisional Government. Even so, their submission of a petition to the United Nations showed that Formosans’ Free Formosa wanted to also try to extend their influence beyond American borders and ask for the support of peoples abroad for Taiwan independence.

      台灣人之自由台灣,這是台灣人的共同心願 。台灣理所當然地屬於我們台灣人。我們的自決權必須 以正義和人道的名義受到尊重。我們代表八百萬台灣人的台灣共和國臨 時 政府特此呼籲第十一屆聯合國大會,本著正義和世界安全的原則以及符合台灣人的意願,將解決台灣法律地位的議題置於其議程。

該組織隨後以 Peter Ong(盧主義) 的化名將請願書發送到紐約聯合國總部,要求約見秘書長以解釋請願書的內容。發出請願書後不久,他們於1956年11月24日收到聯合國法律顧問的回信,稱由於世界上沒有任何國家承認臨時政府,與他們會面是不合適的。除了繼續與廖的團隊通信解釋他們的活動並繼續探索進一步合作的機會之外,這幾乎是3F對臨時政府的參與程度。儘管如此,他們向聯合國提交的請願書表明,台灣人的自由台灣也想嘗試將其影響力擴展到美國邊界之外,並要求海外人民支持台灣獨立。

(下期待續)



=======================================

3F Becomes United Formosans for Independence
In January 1957, FBI detective Watson contacted one of the members of Formosans’ Free Formosa in Minnesota, George Lu (盧建和), and began asking questions about the activities of the organization. There was concern that the 3F organization might be a revolutionary group with ties to the Communists, and thus a threat to national security. Jay Loo, who was also studying there at the time, joined George Lu to help answer questions. The two of them began visiting the FBI office in Minneapolis every few weeks for the next three to four months to cooperate with the FBI investigation. By showing the detectives all the group’s materials and newsletters, the two were able to convince the FBI that theirs was a harmless organization, determined to fight for democracy, not a Communist revolution.
Even so, according to legal protocol, the FBI had to pass the investigation and all of the relevant documents to the US Department of Justice in order to properly close the case. The Department of Justice then ruled that Formosans’ Free Formosa’s submission of a United Nations petition in the name of the Tokyo Provisional Government constituted a violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act since by submitting the petition, 3F was acting as an agent of the Provisional Government. In order to settle the case, members of 3F decided to register the group with the American government.
In December 1957, Jay Loo returned to Philadelphia to convene an emergency meeting with the members of Formosans’ Free Formosa. During the entire FBI investigation, the members remaining at headquarters had been very worried that they had perhaps violated a law of some sort without even realizing it. The meeting’s agenda was to decide whether or not 3F ought to continue operations. Some members wanted to dissolve the organization and halt further independence activities. Other members thought that perhaps they should switch from being a political organization, to being a less provocative academic research group. After numerous meetings with the FBI investigators and lawyers, however, Jay Loo had successfully explained the aims of their Taiwan independence group and received reassurance that continued independence movement activities would not be in violation of any sort of American law. With this guarantee in hand, Loo was able to convince the other members that it would be a pity to compromise the group’s vision when taking into account each and every person’s passion for the cause, and all of the hard work already funneled into furthering the TIM cause. Even so, the members decided that the name Formosans’ Free Formosa ought to be changed since it had already been tainted by the FBI investigation. The new name of the organization would be United Formosans for Independence (UFI or 臺灣獨立聯盟)
 
3 F 成為臺灣獨立聯盟
1957年1月,聯邦調查局偵探 Watson(沃森)聯繫了明尼蘇達州3F成員之一盧建和,並開始詢問該組織的活動。有人擔心 3F 組織可能是一個與共產黨有聯繫的革命團體,從而對國家安全構成威脅。當時也在那裡讀書的盧主義(Jay Loo)和盧建和(George Lu)一起幫助回答問題。在接下來的三到四個月裡,他們兩人開始每隔幾周訪問一次位於明尼阿波利斯的聯邦調查局辦公室,以配合聯邦調查局的調查。通過向偵探展示該組織的所有材料和通訊,兩人能夠說服聯邦調查局他們是一個無害的組織,決心為民主, 不是共產主義革命而戰。
即便如此,根據法律規定,聯邦調查局必須將調查結果和所有相關文件交給美國司法部,才能妥善結案。司法部隨後裁定,3F以東京臨時政府的名義提交聯合國請願書違反了《外國代理人登記法》,因為 3F 提交請願書是作為臨時政府的代理人行事,為了結此案,3F的成員決定向美國政府登記該集團。 
1957 年 12 月,盧主義 返回費城,與3F的成員召開緊急會議。在整個聯邦調查局調查過程中,留在總部的成員一直非常擔心他們可能在沒有意識到的情況下違反了某種法律。會議的議程是要決定 3F 是否應該繼續運作。一些成員要解散該組織並停止獨立運動 其他成員認為,也許他們應該從一個政治組織轉變為一個不具有煽動性的學術研究團體。然而,在與聯邦調查局調查人員和律師多次會面後,盧主義成功地解釋了他們台獨組織的目的,並得到保證,繼續進行獨立運動不會違反任何形式的美國法律。有了這個保證,盧主義 能夠說服其他成員,每個人對台獨運動熱情的情況下,所有的辛勤工作已經匯入進一步推進台獨的主張, 此時如果妥協大家的願望將是一個遺憾。即便如此,成員們還是決定應更改 Formosans' Free Formosa 的名稱,因為它已經被 FBI 調查污染了。該組織的新名稱將是United Formosan for independence (UFI 即台灣獨立聯盟)。
 
Goals and Activities of United Formosans for Independence
Formosans’ Free Formosa was guided by a few main principles and had accomplished quite a lot in two years. Though active membership consisted of only eight or so members in 1958, their newsletter readership was much higher. After reorganizing under the new name United Formosans for Independence, members of the group decided to formalize the organization by writing a constitution and drawing up a structure. The organization was formally inaugurated on January 15, 1958, with Jay Loo elected as UFI’s first president. The first issue of UFI’s newsletter, named Ilha Formosa, was issued on March 26 of that year with an introduction of UFI’s main goals:
The UFI attempts to promote Formosan independence on two levels: first, by propagating our aspirations for freedom and self-determination to the outside world, particularly by the United Nations, the US Congress, influential American political and business leaders, columnists, newspapers, periodicals, the academic world, and various public opinion forming organizations; second, by disseminating the monthly Ilha Formosa among our fellow Formosans in the hope that this may facilitate concerted efforts in our common struggle. There is much to be done; and we need generous support in terms of time, energy, and finance from our readers – presently the only source of support that we have . .
Loo closed UFI’s introductory letter with a poetic appeal for support:
Think, dear fellow Formosans, what our beautiful island can be. With a genuinely democratic government interested in the development of a dynamic, constructive, and civilized society, Formosa can eventually become a symbol of freedom in the Far East. Under the sole government of God and the law, it can be a place where people can think freely, speak freely, and breathe freely. It can be a happy paradise to live in, full of gay human laughter to match its scenic beauty. Then, and only then, can it be truly Ilha Formosa.
For the moment time seems to be in our favor, but it cannot be so forever. Our opportunity is already here. Do you dare take up the challenge?
 
Therefore, although the name of the organization had changed, the basic goals of educating Taiwanese students, the American public, and cooperating internationally remained unchanged.
 
UFI之目標和活動
3F以幾個主要原則為指導,兩年來取得了很多成就。儘管 1958 年活躍會員只有八名左右,但他們的通訊讀者人數高得多。台灣獨立運動在新名重組後,該組織的成員制定章程和結構來使該組織正式化。該組織於 1958 年 1 月 15 日正式成立,盧主義(Jay Loo) 當選為 UFI 的第一任主席。 UFI 的第一期通訊名為 Ilha Formosa,於當年 3 月 26 日發行,介紹了 UFI 的主要目標: 
UFI試圖在兩個階段上促進台灣獨立:第一,通過向外界宣傳我們對自由和自決的渴望,特別是通過聯合國、美國國會、有影響力的美國政治家和商業領袖、專欄作家、報紙、期刊、學術界和各種形成輿論的組織;第二,通過在我們的台灣同胞中傳播月刊 (美麗島)《Ilha Formosa》,希望這可以促進我們共同奮鬥和共同努力。有很多事情要做;我們需要讀者在時間、精力和資金方面的慷慨支持——這是我們目前唯一的支持來源。
盧主義 以詩意的呼籲結束了 UFI 的介紹信: 
親愛的台灣同胞,想想我們美麗的島嶼可能是什麼。有一個真正民主的政府致力於發展一個充滿活力、建設性和文明的社會,台灣最終可以成為遠東自由的象徵。在上帝和法律的唯一統治下,它可以成為人們可以自由思考、自由發言、自由呼吸的地方。它可以是一個幸福的生活天堂,充滿了人類快樂的笑聲,以配合其美景。那時,也只有這樣,才能成為真正的美麗島。
目前時間似乎對我們有利,但不可能永遠如此。我們的機會已經來了。你敢接受此挑戰嗎?
因此,雖然機構名稱變了,但教育台灣留學生、美國民眾和國際合作的基本目標沒有改變。
 
The UFI continued the 3F tradition of newsletters, each issue of which contained similar content geared towards educating fellow Taiwanese students about the history of Taiwan as well as the developing political situation. In addition to publishing Ilha Formosa to educate Taiwanese students, though, the United Formosans for Independence also issued pamphlets titled Appeal for Justice and distributed essays to congressmen, scholars, and the media.
One of the major achievements of the early independence movement was Jay Loo’s successful article submission to the influential Foreign Affairs magazine, titled “The China Impasse: A Formosan View.” The article was published in April 1958 under Loo’s pseudonym of Li Thian-hok and marked the first article in North America promoting Taiwan independence. The article’s publication immediately ignited discussion of Taiwan independence among scholars and has also incited a direct reaction from Chiang Kai-shek. By some accounts, upon reading Loo’s Foreign Affairs article, Chiang convened an emergency meeting to determine how to handle the public relations mess and decided to submit a direct rebuttal by Dr. Chiang Ting-fu, chief delegate to the UN, to counter all of Loo’s arguments. When the Foreign Affairs editor rejected this submission, the Nationalist government was relegated to printing out thousands of copies of their rebuttal and mass mailing to prominent members of academia and all of the member countries of the United Nations. Loo’s Foreign Affairs article has been cited as one of the two founding documents for the current Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party’s One China, One Taiwan policy.
The article was important for three main reasons: It was published in a prestigious journal in an issue containing the works of influential contributors including Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, among others; it was the first time a native Taiwanese had expressed wishes for independence on such a global forum; and, lastly, the article produced a thorough analysis offering perspectives from the subjects of law, international relations, history, government, and culture to support the arguments for Taiwan independence. Because of these reasons, the Foreign Affairs article has become a classic document for the Taiwan independence movement and will remain so for generations to come. Another major success of the UFI’s campaign to increase the visibility of the Taiwan issue came in the fall of 1958 when Lord Michael Lindsay’s article called “Formosa’s Future” was published on October 6 in the New Republic magazine. This article set off a debate on the future of Taiwan with contributions from John Fairbank, Denis Healy, and Denis Warner. On November 24, Jay Loo successfully submitted a response to Denis Warner’s critique of Taiwanese people being reluctant to stand up for democracy, titled “The Formosans Do Know What They Want.” The article’s publication in New Republic showed that once again, the voice of Taiwanese was being given a place among the voices of international heavyweights.
 
UFI延續了3F時事通訊的傳統,每期都包含類似的內容,旨在教育台灣留學生了解台灣的歷史以及發展中的政治局勢。除了出版(美麗島)以教育台灣留學生之外,台灣獨立團還發行了名為 “Appeal for Justice”“呼籲正義”的小冊子,並向國會議員、學者和媒體分發了文章。
早期獨立運動的主要成就之一是盧主義 成功地向頗具有影響力的外交雜誌(Foreign Affairs)投稿,題為”The China Impasse, A Formosan View”“中國僵局:台灣人之觀點”。這篇文章於 1958 年 4 月以盧的化名李天福發表,是北美第一篇宣揚台灣獨立的文章。文章發表後,立即引發了學者對台獨的討論,也引發了蔣介石的直接反應。據說,蔣看了盧的外交季刊文章之後,召開緊急會議,討論如何處理公關問題,並決定提交聯合國首席代表蔣廷黻博士的直接反駁,以反擊所有這些盧的論點。當外交季刊編輯拒絕了他的投稿時,國民黨政府被迫打印出數千份大量的反駁信郵寄給學術界知名人士和聯合國所有成員國。盧的外交季刊文章被引用為當前台灣民進黨一中一台党網的兩個創始文件之一。
這篇文章之所以重要,主要有以下三個原因: 它發表在著名季刊的這一期,同時刊載了有影響力的貢獻者的作品,其中包括迪恩·艾奇遜 (Dean Acheson)、亨利·基辛格 (Henry Kissinger) 等;這是台灣本土人第一次在這樣一個全球性的論壇上表達獨立的願望;最後,文章進行了透徹的分析,從法律、國際關係、歷史、政府和文化等學科的角度提供了支持台獨論點。正因如此,Foreign Affairs《外交事務》一文成為台獨運動世世代代的經典文獻。 1958 年秋天,UFI 提高台灣問題知名度的運動的另一項重大成功是邁克爾·林賽勳爵 (Lord Michael Lindsay) 於 10 月 6 日在 New Republic《新共和》雜誌上發表了題為“福爾摩沙的未來”的文章。這篇文章引發了John Fairbank(約翰·費爾班克)、Denis Healy(丹尼斯·希利) 和Denis Warner(丹尼斯·華納)開了一場關於台灣未來的大辯論。 11月24日,因丹尼斯·華納 批評台灣人不願捍衛民主,盧主義成功地回應發表了題為“台灣人知道他們想要什麼”。文章發表在《新共和》上,再次表明台灣人的聲音,在國際重量級的論壇中佔了一席之地。
 
In keeping with 3F tradition, the UFI continued to contact major political leaders of America to garner their support for the Taiwan independence cause. After its founding the UFI was able to continue its correspondence with George Kerr, and also start correspondences with former presidential candidate (and later United Nations ambassador for the United States) Adlai Stevenson, University of Chicago professor Quincy Wright, Senator Wayne Morse, and former governor and congressman of Connecticut Chester Bowles. Edward Chen and Jay Loo were also able to personally visit two members of Congress who had expressed support for the Taiwan cause in 1959. When Chester Bowles was appointed the Under Secretary of State in 1961 by John F. Kennedy, Chen and Loo were also able to make an appointment to see him. Unfortunately, when they arrived for their appointment, Bowles was called out for an emergency meeting with Bobby Kennedy, but Chen and Loo were still able to speak with two of his assistants. Through the hard work of these student activists, much was accomplished by the UFI in the way of spreading the word on Taiwan independence during these early years in the United States.
Through this formidable combination of newsletters, pamphlets, articles, letters, and personal visits, the United Formosans for Independence tried to influence the opinions of not just Taiwanese students but also that of the broader American public.
The United Formosans for Independence was also interested in expanding its activities by recruiting more members and reaching out to other similar organizations in the world. With only about eight members at the start of the organization in 1958, UFI grew to include a little over twenty members a few years later and continued to reach out to the increasing numbers of Taiwanese students in America. In 1960, when Ong Joktik founded the Formosan Association in Tokyo, also a student organization for Taiwan independence, the president of UFI at the time, Jay Loo, contacted Ong by mail to introduce the UFI and explore ways for possible cooperation. Loo also included a translated Japanese version of an article he had written for the May 1960 issue of Ilha Formosa. On August 20, the third issue of the Formosan Association’s newsletter, Taiwan Chinglian, included Loo’s article. In this way, UFI sought to broaden its reach, growing both its audience and its membership.
與3F傳統保持一致,UFI繼續與美國主要政治物領導人接觸,以爭取他們對台獨運動的支持。成立後,UFI 繼續與 George Kerr(喬治·克爾)通信,並開始與前美國總統候選人,後來成為聯合國大使Adlai Stevenson(阿德萊·史蒂文森)、芝加哥大學教授Quincy Wright(昆西·賴特)、參議員Wayne Morse (韋恩·莫爾斯)和前任康涅狄格州州長和國會議員Chester Bowles(切斯特鮑爾斯)通信。 Edward Chen 和 Jay Loo 還親自拜訪了 1959 年表示支持台灣的兩名國會議員。 1961 年,當 Chester Bowles 被約翰·肯尼迪任命為副國務卿時,陳和盧也得以預約見他。不幸的是,當他們到達約會地點時,Bowles(鮑爾斯)被Bobby Kennedy(鮑比肯尼迪)叫去參與緊急會議,但陳和盧仍然能夠與他的兩個助理交談。通過這些學生積極分子的辛勤工作,UFI 在美國早年在宣傳台灣獨立方面取得了很大成就。
通過通訊、小冊子、文章、信件和個人訪問的強大組合,台灣獨立聯盟試圖影響不僅是台灣留學生的思想,而且還影響更廣泛的美國公眾輿論。
台灣獨立運動也通過招募更多成員和接觸世界上其他類似組織來擴大其活動。 1958 年該組織成立時只有大約 8 名成員,幾年後 UFI 發展到包括 20 多位成員,並繼續與越來越多的台灣留學生在美國連絡。 1960年,當王育德(Ong Joktik)在東京成立台獨學生組織“台灣同鄉會”時,當時的UFI主席盧主義(Jay Loo)通過郵件與王聯繫,介紹UFI並探討可能合作的方法。盧 將他在 1960 年 5 月號 Ilha Formosa 撰寫的一篇文章翻譯成曰文刊登在 8月20日,《台灣青年》第三期通訊。通過這種方法,UFI 試圖擴大其影響範圍,增加其聽眾和會員。
 
Main Achievements of the Early Movement
 
In the first years of the early movement in the United States, the accomplishments of Formosans’ Free Formosa and then United Formosans for Independence were mainly in creating and encouraging awareness of the Taiwan Independence Move vment.
The independence movement promoted Taiwan independence in the early years quite successfully in America by educating fellow Taiwanese and recruiting more activists. After the creation of 3F and UFI, more and more Taiwanese students arrived in the United States, concentrating especially in cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Wherever there were students, Formosan clubs were created to promote Taiwanese culture with social events. These clubs were often very supportive of the UFI’s advocacy for Taiwan independence. Accompanying this growth in Taiwanese student population was thus growth in membership for the Taiwan Independence Movement.
Before 3F and UFI, there were no organizations in America promoting Taiwan independence. These early efforts to promote independence were thus crucial for creating a discussion on the topic in academic and political circles in America. As earlier discussed, the publication of Jay Loo’s article, “The China Impasse,” in Foreign Affairs was a key factor that ignited debate on a subject that had previously tended to be overlooked by the more influential members of American society.
The movement also made contributions toward unifying the Taiwan Independence Movement. In spring 1961, Jay Loo and Ong Joktik decided to create a declaration that student activists for independence organizations could unite behind, whether in Japan or America. Jay Loo authored the document again under his pseudonym, Li Thian-hok, and announced eight main underlying principles of the independence movement. The declaration confirmed the historical, cultural, and legal premises for Taiwan independence, calling upon the principles of democracy, self-determination, freedom, and justice to defend their case.
The movement also made contributions toward unifying the Taiwan Independence Movement. In spring 1961, Jay Loo and Ong Joktik decided to create a declaration that student activists for independence organizations could unite behind, whether in Japan or America. Jay Loo authored the document again under his pseudonym, Li Thian-hok, and announced eight main underlying principles of the independence movement. The declaration confirmed the historical, cultural, and legal premises for Taiwan independence, calling upon the principles of democracy, self-determination, freedom, and justice to defend their case.
The work of 3F and UFI also helped to provide the structure necessary to foster larger and more influential independence movement organizations that still persist today. On October 29–30 of 1965, the UFI helped to organize the Madison Conference in the University of Wisconsin, which gathered Taiwanese from the United States, Canada, and Japan and called for more cohesion of Taiwanese on the North American continent and cooperation with Taiwanese in Japan. In June of 1966, the UFI organized the Philadelphia Conference that brought together Taiwanese studying in all parts of America. It was at this conference that Taiwanese in America decided to create the United Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI) group, which in 1970 was expanded to include Canada, Europe, Japan, and other countries to be today’s World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI).
As the pioneers of the Taiwan Independence Movement in America, the leaders of Formosans’ Free Formosa and United Formosans for Independence played the following important roles:
1. Inspired many Taiwanese students in America to believe in independence as a desired and achievable goal;
2. Paved the way for future Taiwan independence activists in America by establishing contacts with government officials, members of academia, media networks and other influential figures;
3. Elevated the topic of Taiwan independence into the international sphere;
4. And contributed to establishing guiding principles for the early TIM.
 
早期運動的主要成就
 
在美國早期運動的最初幾年,3F和後來的 UFI成就主要是創造和鼓勵台灣獨立運動意識的覺醒。
在美國早期很成功地推動台灣獨立運動,經過教育台灣同胞和招募更多參與人士。 3F和UFI創立後,越來越多的台灣學生來到美國,尤其集中在紐約、芝加哥、洛杉磯等城市。哪裡有留學生,哪裡就有台灣同鄉會,通過社交活動來推廣台灣文化。這些同鄉會往往支持 UFI 的台獨宣傳。隨著台灣留學生人數的增長,台灣獨立運動的盟員也增加。
在3F和UFI之前,美國沒有任何推動台獨的組織。因此,這些早期促進台獨的努力,至關重要的是引起在美國學術界和政界人物以此話題展開討論。正如前面所討論的,盧主義 在《外交事務》上發表的文章“中國僵局”是引發辯論的一個關鍵因素,這個話題以前往往被美國社會中有影響力的人物所忽視。 
 
該運動也為統一台獨運動做出了貢獻。 1961 年春天,Jay Loo(盧主義) 和 Ong Joktik (王育德)制定一項宣言,讓獨立組織的學生活動家可以團結起來,無論是在日本還是美國。盧主義再次以化名李天福撰寫了這份文件,並宣布了獨立運動的八項主要基本原則。宣言確認了台獨的歷史、文化和法律上之正當性,主張民主、自決、自由和正義的原則。
3F 和 UFI 的工作還有助於提供必要的結構,以培養今天仍然存在的更大、更有影響力的獨立運動組織。 1965 年 10 月 29 日至 30 日,UFI 幫助在威斯康辛大學組織了麥迪遜會議,聚集了來自美國、加拿大和日本的台灣人,並呼籲在北美大陸加強台灣人的凝聚力,與在日本之台灣人合作。 1966年6月,UFI組織了費城會議,匯集了在美國各地留學的台灣人。在這次會議上,美國台灣人決定成立美國台灣獨立聯盟(UFAI),1970年擴大到包括加拿大、歐洲、日本等國家,成為今天的世界台灣獨立聯盟(WUFI)。
作為美國台獨運動的先驅,3F和 UFI的領導人發揮了以下重要作用:
1. 激勵許多在美國的台灣留學生相信獨立是一個願望和可以實現的目標;
2. 與政府官員、學術界人士、媒體網絡和其他有影響力的人物建立聯繫,為未來在美國的台獨活動人士鋪平道路;
3、將台獨問題提升到國際論壇;
4. 建立早期台獨運動(TIM) 的指導原則。
 
IV. Goal of Taiwan Independence yet to be achieved
 
Although the early independence movement was able to achieve a lot in a small amount of time, it is evident that their ultimate goal of obtaining independence for Taiwan was never achieved, and, to this day, has not yet been attained. The main obstacles preventing this goal from being achieved could be ascribed to both internal and external challenges. The fragile characteristics of the early independence movement organizations may have prevented activists from being able to accomplish even more. And perhaps even more importantly, the circumstances of the Taiwan situation and the international stalemated environment helped to create a situation hostile to Taiwan independence. These factors combined to prevent the independence movement from achieving its ultimate goal of self-determination for the Taiwanese people.
The Internal Factor
Internal difficulties decreased the potential for early groups like Formosans’ Free Formosa and United Formosans for Independence to achieve even more. The fact that all the early activists were students was a major burden for the movement and the fragmented nature of the overall independence movement exacerbated the effects of this characteristic.
The few Taiwanese in America during the 1950s were mostly students. Although student populations tend to be wonderful candidates for political activism, a political movement that is comprised of only students becomes mired with pragmatic constraints regarding time, livelihood, and finance.
The pragmatic constraint of time is difficult to overcome. Students by definition have other commitments like studying and working, and are therefore unable to devote all of their attention to furthering the cause of the movement. Instead, Taiwanese student activists were only able to commit free time on a seemingly random basis. With activists working only part-time in a voluntary capacity on a task that professionals like lobbyists do for a full-time job, it seems only logical that it should be very difficult to achieve any significant results.
Livelihood is another significant pragmatic constraint. Being a student is a short-term occupation. Eventually, after completing their studies, students must join society by obtaining a job and perhaps starting a family. This meant that after graduation, many students left the Taiwan independence movement, thus resulting in a cyclical organization varying widely in degree of influence over time. As a Taiwanese activist commented in 1965, “I’ve seen so many Formosan student groups rise and then disintegrate as their members left their campuses. A solid organization cannot be based on graduate students.” Further discouraging students from being actively involved in the movement, especially for long-term, was the enormous pressure from the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Even if Taiwanese students in America did not return to Taiwan, often their families remained, and so activities had to be kept secret in order to prevent any danger to loved ones left in Taiwan. Threat of retaliation and the resultant secrecy also had the effect of limiting the visibility of the movement; without a prominent figure to act as leader for the Taiwanese students, it was difficult to gather everyone behind one common cause. Danger to students’ livelihoods was thus often a consideration that prompted withdrawal from activism, resulting in more chaotic and decentralized organizations, thus limiting chances for success
 
四、台獨目標尚未實現
 
早期的台獨運動雖然在短時間內取得了很大的成就,但很明顯,他們最終的台獨目標從來沒有實現,直到今天也沒有實現。阻礙這一目標實現的主要障礙可以歸咎於內部和外部挑戰。早期獨立運動組織的脆弱特徵阻止盟員取得更大的成就。或許更重要的是,台灣局勢和國際僵局環境助長了不利於台獨的局面。這些因素共同阻礙了獨立運動達成台灣人民自決的最終目標。
內部因素
內部困難降低了早期團體,如3F 和UFI爭取獨立,取得更大成就的潛力。所有早期盟員都是留學生,這一事實是該運動的主要負擔,而整體獨立運動的支離破碎性質加劇了這一特徵的影響。
1950年代在美國為數不多的台灣人大多是學生。儘管學生群體往往是政治激進主義的絕佳候選人,但僅由學生組成的政治運動在時間、生計和財務方面陷入務實的限制。
時間的務實限制是難以克服的。根據定義,學生有其他承諾,例如學習和工作,因此無法將所有註意力集中在推進台獨運動上。相反,台灣學生盟員只能有空閒時間才能投入活動。由於盟員僅以自願身份從事一項通常由專業遊說者全職工作的任務,因此很難取得任何重大成果是必然的。
生計是另一個重要的務實制約因素。學生是短期職業。最終,在完成學業後,學生必須找到工作或組建家庭加入社會。這意味著許多學生畢業後離開了台獨運動,從而形成了一個影響力隨時變化很大的周期性組織。正如一位台灣活動人士在 1965 年評論的那樣:“我看到很多台灣留學生團體崛起,然後在他們的成員離開校園時瓦解。一個堅實的組織不能以研究生為主力”。 進一步阻礙學生積極參與運動,特別是長期參與,來自台灣國民政府的巨大壓力。在美國的台灣留學生即使沒有返回台灣,他們的家人也經常留在台灣,因此活動必須保密,以防止對留在台灣的親人造成任何危險。報復威脅和由此產生的保密也限制了運動的能見度;沒有一個顯赫的人物作為台灣留學生的領導者,很難將所有人聚集在一個共同的運動。因此,對留學生生計的危險往往是促使他們退出激進活動的一個考慮因素,導致組織更加混亂和分散,從而限制了成功的機會。
 
Lastly, there is the pragmatic constraint of finances. Students tend to be a poorer population, since their full-time occupation is completing their studies, not to make money. With most activities as out-of-pocket expenses for students, this limited the extent to which their activities could reach a wider audience. For example, the newsletters of Formosans’ Free Formosa had to be printed and mailed to campuses across the United States. The costs of ink, paper, and postage often limited the number of newsletters sent out. Finance was also a personal concern that might prevent students from devoting even more time to the movement, since some had to also work at part-time jobs to finance their own educations.
The course of Jay Loo’s experiences as a major leader of the early independence movement from 1955–1961 is a prime example of these pragmatic constraints. In an interview, Loo recounts one of the busiest times in his life in 1956: Thomas Liao had just requested that Formosans’ Free Formosa submit a petition to the United Nations in the name of the Provisional Government. At the time, Loo was “taking 6 or 7 courses each quarter, working 20 hours part time, washing dishes for the hospital cafeteria, and also editing the 3F newsletter,” but took on the additional task of drafting and sending out the UN petition, staying up all night to complete it. Loo explained that it was because students were often so busy with their other commitments that the 3F newsletters were frequently issued, but not on a constant periodic basis, depending instead on the schedules of the students involved. Therefore, activities that could perhaps have been promoted on a wider scale were often limited by the activists’ full-time occupations as students.
As one of the original founders of 3F, Jay Loo was definitely passionate about the Taiwan independence cause. After Loo graduated from school, however, pragmatic constraints began to take its toll. Because of all of the time spent on the movement, Loo had no permanent job and instead took odd jobs to generate some amount of income. Meanwhile, long-distance phone bills and other costs of work related to the movement were building up. He had also started a family and wanted to devote more attention to his wife and child. Finally, in 1961, Loo decided to quit his activist role. Though Jay Loo eventually returned to an active role in the Taiwan independence movement in the 1990s, the difficulties faced by the early student organizers are definitely apparent in his story.
The early independence movement was vulnerable to volatility depending on the ability of student leaders to deal with the pragmatic considerations associated with being a student. This decentralization was reinforced by the secrecy required by organizations in America for fear of Nationalist retaliation in Taiwan toward families left behind by student activists. Under safety considerations, it was highly unlikely that a Taiwanese student could rise as the main leader for the international Taiwan independence movement, thus it looked to other leaders in countries abroad such as Japan for more visible guidance.
最後,還有財政的務實限制。留學生往往貧困,因為他們的全職工作是完成學業,而不是賺錢。由於大多數活動是留學生自付費用,這限制了他們的活動覆蓋更廣泛的聽眾。例如,Formosans' Free Formosa 的通訊必須印刷並郵寄到美國各地的校園。墨水、紙張和郵資的成本通常限制時事通訊的數量。財務也是一個個人問題,可能會阻止學生將更多時間投入到運動中,因為有些人還不得不做兼職工作來資助自己的教育。
盧主義 在 1955 年至 1961 年期間作為早期獨立運動的主要領導人的經歷,就是這些務實限制的一個典型例子。在一次採訪中,盧回憶了 1956 年他一生中最忙碌的時刻:廖文毅 剛剛要求3F以臨時政府的名義向聯合國提交一份請願書。當時,盧 “每學期選了 6 或 7 門課程,兼職工作 20 小時,為醫院食堂洗碗,還編輯 3F 通訊,但承擔了額外任務,熬夜起草和發送聯合國請願書。盧 解釋說,因為學生經常忙於其他任務,所以 3F 通訊不是定期發佈,而是取決於所涉及學生的日程安排。因此,本可以在更大範圍內推廣的活動往往受到盟員作為學生的全職職業的限制。
盧主義作為3F的創始人之一,對台獨運動絕對是熱心的。然而,盧從學校畢業後,務實的限制開始產生影響。由於所有的時間都花在運動上,盧沒有固定的工作,而是打零工來賺取一些收入。與此同時,長途電話費和其他與運動有關的工作費用也在增加。他也組建家庭,想把更多的精力放在妻子和孩子身上。最終,在 1961 年,盧決定退出他的激進角色。雖然盧主義最終在1990年代重新活躍於台獨運動中,但早期留學生盟員所面臨的困難在他的故事中顯而易見。 
早期的獨立運動很容易受到波動的影響,這取決於留學生領袖處理留學生相關的務實問題的能力。由於害怕國民黨在台灣對留學生盟員的家庭進行報復,美國台獨組織要求保密,從而加強職責的分散。出於安全考慮,台灣留學生不可能成為國際台獨運動的主要領導人,因此向日本等海外國家的其他領導人尋求更明顯的指導。
The fact that the wider Taiwan independence movement was fragmented in the international arena, served to further decentralize the power of the American Taiwan independence movement. We saw that right at its creation in 1956, Formosans’ Free Formosa tried to reach out to the most prominent proponent of the Taiwan independence movement at the time, Thomas Liao. Unfortunately, due to many reasons, for example different ideas on how best to pursue independence and also some personal conflicts with Liao within the Tokyo group, the movement failed to coalesce around Liao. Perhaps if there had been stronger leadership from Liao, then the students, even under volatile internal conditions, would be able to coalesce behind his Provisional Government in Tokyo. For example, 3F followed the wishes of Liao in 1956 and submitted a United Nations petition in the name of hisProvisional Government. However, later in 1960, with the creation of the Formosan Association by Ong Joktik, United Formosans for Independence again reached out to yet another branch of the Taiwan independence movement and tried to collaborate in that way. With no clear leadership in the broader movement, it was difficult to consolidate everyone behind a common goal.
Although there were internal factors that served to weaken the early Taiwan independence movement in America, the more serious obstacles to their success were the external factors of the international political environment, namely, the Nationalist factor and the American factor.
 
The Nationalist Factor
The Nationalist government was an obstacle for two main reasons: domestic policy in Taiwan and foreign policy abroad. To give a brief background, the conditions of the Nationalist government when they first took control of Taiwan were not great. The reasons for this stem from an overall weakness since the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the Nationalist Party’s creation in 1912.
The Nationalist Government as a Backdrop
Fall of a Dynasty and Chaos in its Wake
In October 1911, an accidental bomb explosion ignited revolutionary uprisings throughout all of China and culminated in the declaration of a new Chinese republic at the inauguration of Sun Yat-sen on January 1, 1912. After the abdication of the emperor Puyi on February 12, 1912, the fall of the Qing Dynasty was complete. After these events, though it was clear which players had lost power over the country, it still remained to be seen who actually had control over all of China.
In 1923, the Nationalists (KMT) were the strongest political party. Alone, however, they still lacked the wherewithal to claim control of all of China. The Nationalists thus struck an agreement with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with Soviet Union support, to work together to unify the country. With the Nationalist brand name and the Soviet financial support, the coalition was able to wrest back substantial control of China from warlords through military successes by 1926. By 1928 the Nationalists united China from Manchuria to Guangdong. But when Communists tried to influence policy decisions more, they were forced out of power by harsh Nationalist repression tactics
更廣泛的台獨運動在國際舞台上支離破碎的事實,進一步分散了美國台獨運動的力量。我們看到,在 1956 年成立之時,3F試圖接觸當時最傑出的台獨運動者廖文毅。不幸的是,由於種種原因,例如對如何最好地追求獨立的不同想法以及在東京集團內部與廖的一些個人衝突,該運動未能在廖周圍凝聚。或許,如果廖有更強力的領導,那麼留學生們即使在動蕩的內部條件下,也能聯合起來支持他在東京的臨時政府。比如3F在1956年就按照廖的意願,以他的名義提交了一份聯合國請願書。
然而,在1960年末,隨著王育德成立台獨協會,UFI再次向台獨運動的另一個分支伸出援手,並試圖進行合作。由於在更廣泛的運動中沒有明確的領導者,很難將每個人團結在一個共同的目標。
美國早期的台獨運動雖然有內部因素而削弱,但更嚴重的障礙是國際政治環境的外部因素,即國民黨因素和美國因素。
國民黨因素
國民黨政府之所以成為障礙,主要有兩個原因:台灣的國內政策和國外的外交政策。簡單說一下,國民政府第一次控制台灣時的條件並不好。其原因在於清朝滅亡和1912年國民黨成立以來的整體疲軟。 
國民政府為背景
王朝的衰落和混亂
1911 年 10 月,一場意外的炸彈爆炸點燃了全中國的革命起義,並最終在 1912 年 1 月 1 日孫中山就職典禮上宣佈建立新的中華民國。 2 月 12 日溥儀皇帝退位後, 1912年,清朝滅亡。在這些事件之後,雖然很明顯哪些人失去了對國家的權力,但誰真正控制了整個中國還有待觀察。
1923年,國民黨(KMT)是最強的政黨。然而,僅憑他們,他們仍然缺乏控制整個中國的必要條件。國民黨因此在蘇聯的支持下與中國共產黨達成協議,共同努力統一國家。憑藉國民黨的品牌名稱和蘇聯的財政支持,到 1926 年,該聯盟通過軍事上的成功,從軍閥手中奪回對中國的實質控制。到 1928 年,國民黨將中國從滿洲統一到了廣東。但是當共產黨試圖更大地影響決策之時,他們被國民黨嚴厲的鎮壓策略逼下台。
(後期待續)
 ====================================

World War
After their military success, the Nationalists tried to turn their attention to rebuilding the country, but in light of the meager state of finances, remaining political dissent, and renewed Japanese aggression, attempts for reform were largely unsuccessful. Japan pushed Chinese troops out of Manchuria and installed a puppet regime there in 1931, then continued to invade Chinese territory, forcing the Nationalist government to finally declare Northeast China a demilitarized zone before stopping its advance as far as south of the Great Wall. Growing anti-Japanese sentiment and dissatisfaction with the government’s accommodating reactions to Japanese actions further fragmented an already fragile state.

Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek wanted to consolidate power before diverting resources to face Japan head-on. In 1936, the Communists recognized the urgency of dealing with continued Japanese incursions and began to advocate (as advised by Stalin) another alliance with the Nationalists to help “rally the country behind a united-front policy of anti-Japanese resistance.” While the Nationalists were still debating this offer, an undeclared war between China and Japan had started. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese attacked after an incident at Wanping. The attack became a full-blown assault that resulted in a large expanse of formerly Chinese territory under Japanese control. By 1938, Manchukuo, the Inner Mongolian Federation, northeast China south of the Great Wall, east-central China, and Taiwan were all controlled by Japan.

With the Japanese threat so severe, the Communist and Nationalist interests were once again aligned. As the relatively stronger factions in China, the two parties agreed to a coalition that Chiang hailed “a triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration.” In September 1937, it was announced that the Communists would halt all armed rebellion and bring its 30,000–strong Red Army under nominal Nationalist command. Communist generals focused attention on defending the northern part of China, while Nationalist generals targeted the protection of central China.

Though Chinese forces were able to inflict
 losses on the Japanese, the Japanese always responded with “shattering counterattacks, often of immense cruelty” that devastated the Chinese population, and Chinese forces were unable to make substantial inroads in weakening Japan. Fortunately, the entrance of the United States in 1941 into the war helped provide some much-needed military assistance. Though most of the decisive military operations were executed by American forces, China played a crucial role by diverting a significant number of Japanese forces to dilute the strength of their forces against America. In return for China’s contribution, the western Allied forces also began to treat China with more respect. At the Cairo Conference in December of 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill promised Chiang Kai-shek that Manchukuo and Taiwan would be returned to China after the war.
Though the Nationalists seemed to be making some gains abroad, their domestic track record was disappointing. Western journalists and other observers were appalled by the crimes against humanity exacted by Nationalist troops on their own fellow Chinese brethren and began to link responsibility for “both the human and military dimensions of the catastrophe” back to the Nationalists. Peasants were forced to pay taxes in kind even during famines and men were so brutally recruited to join the Nationalist army that of the 1.67 million Chinese drafts in 1943, 44 percent deserted or died before joining their units. Even members of the Nationalist party began to criticize their own party for corruption and lack of strong leadership. Meanwhile, the Communists consolidated their power, helped by the growing unpopularity of the Nationalists and a strong organizational structure.

世界大戰
在取得軍事勝利後,國民黨試將注意力轉向重建國家,但鑑於財政狀況微薄、政治異議仍然存在以及日本再次侵略,改革沒有成功。 1931 年,日本將中國軍隊趕出滿洲並在那裡建立傀儡政權,然後繼續入侵中國領土,迫使國民政府最終宣布中國東北為非軍事區,然後才停止向長城以南推進。日益增長的反日情緒和政府對日本行動的通融反應的不滿,進一步使本已脆弱的國家支離破碎。

國民黨領袖蔣介石想鞏固權力,然後再轉移資源正面對抗日本。 1936 年,共產黨認識到應對日本持續入侵的緊迫性,並開始倡導(按照斯大林的建議)與國民黨結成聯盟,以幫助“團結國家支持統一戰線的抗日政策”。就在國民黨還在爭論這個提議的時候,中日之間一場未宣戰的戰爭已經開始。 1937 年 7 月 7 日,日軍在宛平發生事變。這次襲擊變成了一次全面的進攻,導致大片中國領土被日本控制。到1938年,滿洲國、內蒙古聯邦、東北長城以南、中東部和台灣都被日本控制。

由於日本的威脅如此嚴重,共產黨和國民黨的利益再次符合。作一個中國強大的派系,兩黨同意結成聯盟,蔣歡呼“民族情緒戰勝了其他一切考慮”。 1937 年 9 月,共產黨宣布停止所有武裝叛亂,並將其 30,000 人的紅軍名義上置於國民黨指揮下。共產黨將軍的注意力集中在保衛華北地區,而國民黨的將軍們則著眼於保衛華中地區。

雖然中國軍隊能夠給日本人造成損失,但日本人總是以“毀滅性的反擊,往往是極其殘忍的”摧毀中國人口,中國軍隊無法在削弱日本方面取得實質性進展。幸運的是,美國於 1941 年加入戰爭有助於提供一些急需的軍事援助。儘管大多數決定性的軍事行動都是由美軍執行的,但中國通過轉移大量日本軍隊來削弱其對美的力量,發揮了至關重要的作用。為回報中國的貢獻,西方盟軍開始尊重中國。在 1943 年 12 月的開羅會議上,羅斯福和丘吉爾向蔣介石承諾,戰後將滿洲國和台灣歸還中國。

儘管國民黨似乎在國外取得了一些進展,但他們在國內的記錄卻令人失望。西方記者和其他觀察者對國民黨軍隊對自己的中國同胞犯下反人類罪行感到震驚,並開始將“這場災難的人文和軍事層面”的責任與國民黨聯繫起來。即使在飢荒期間,農民也被迫繳納實物稅,而男子被殘酷地招募加入國民黨軍隊,以至於在 1943 年的 167 萬中國征兵中,有 44% 的人在未加入他們的部隊之前離開或死亡。甚至國民黨黨員也開始批評自己的政黨腐敗和缺乏強有力的領導。與此同時,在國民黨越來越不受歡迎.在強大的組織結構下,共產黨鞏固了他們的權力。

Widespread ineptness and corruption of the Nationalist leadership were evident as war with the Japanese came to a close. When Japan issued its surrender on August 15, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government had no adequate plan for accepting the surrender of Japanese and rebuilding reclaimed areas. Chinese people were frustrated by the Nationalists’ general ineffectiveness stemming from rampant inefficiency, corruption, and lack of careful planning. scandals, and leniency for Japanese troops and their supporters all contributed to a severe deterioration of public support for a Nationalist government. Instead of focusing on building operational reconstruction policies, the Nationalists were more concerned with keeping Communists from taking control.
The period after August 1945 was thus devoted, as widely forecasted, to a renewed civil war in which the two parties were “sparring for dominance in east and north China” .

Communists had better morale, stronger military capability, and growing popular support, especially as the Nationalists continued to commit grisly acts like the fatal shooting of unarmed student protesters in Peking in July 1948. As the Communists steadily expanded their territory from the North, Mao Zedong was confident enough in the imminent victory of the Communists to assemble a new Political Consultative Conference in late September and officially declare the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek was finally forced to retreat to Taiwan in December 1949.

We see that since the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the political situation in China had been a mess. During most of this turmoil, Taiwan was under Japanese rule and had enjoyed a relatively prosperous and stable growth period. Thus when the Nationalists arrived in Taiwan, the very different Taiwanese experience led Taiwanese people to expect something different from what the Nationalists were accustomed to offering on the mainland. One might assume, then, that this meant the conditions were ripe for Taiwanese achieving independence.

Unfortunately for the independence activists, and fortunately for the Nationalists, the Nationalist government began to shape up its act when it seemed that defeat on the mainland was imminent and Taiwan would be its final resting place.

Taiwan Becomes the Republic of China
By 1948, the Nationalist government was increasingly coming to terms with the idea that Taiwan might very well be the last Nationalist stronghold. This changed the Nationalist attitude toward Taiwan from one treating the island as an expendable resource, to one more concerned with cultivating the island to be a sustainable base. On October 27, exports of food and other commodities from the island to the mainland were halted. Increasingly, price controls went unenforced. These measures helped combat inflationary pressures and ease the burden of the Taiwanese people.
In December 1949, the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek’s formal presidential inauguration took place in Taipei on March 1, 1950. At the ceremony, he took full responsibility for defeat on the mainland and pledged to institute widespread reforms.
Government reforms were unfolded with much success in improving the overall efficiency of government. Chiang streamlined the party by weeding out corruption and inefficiency and instilling a fortified structure with inspirational leadership and strict discipline. From 1949 to 1952 party enrollment tripled, and Taiwanese membership rose to comprise an impressive 57.12 percent of total membership. To keep armed forces under control and maintain social stability, the army was whittled down to a more manageable size by forcing several hundred inept officers to retire, and talented leadership was installed to train the remaining 200,000-plus soldiers. Chiang also cleaned up the government structure by dividing Taiwan into sixteen counties and five municipalities, with the provincial governor selected by the central government.

隨著與日本的戰爭接近尾聲,國民黨領導層的普遍無能和腐敗顯而易見。 1945 年 8 月 15 日,日本投降時,蔣介石及其國民政府沒有足夠的計劃來接受日本的投降和重建歸還地區。中國人對國民黨由無能、腐敗,和缺乏周密計劃感到沮喪。無法控制通貨膨脹,搶劫,腐敗,醜聞,以及對日本軍隊及其支持者的寬大處理,都導致公眾對國民黨政府的支持惡化。國民黨不專注於製定可行的重建政策,而是更關心防止共產黨奪權。
因此,正如人們普遍預測的,1945 年 8 月之後是一場新的內戰,兩黨在這場內戰中“爭奪華東和華北的主導地位”。

共產黨的士氣較高,軍事能力較強,民眾支持率也越來越高,尤其是國民黨繼續犯下諸如 1948 年 7 月在北京槍殺手無寸鐵的學生抗議者可怕的行為。隨著共產黨從北方穩步擴張領土,毛澤東對共產黨即將取得勝利充滿信心,於 9 月下旬召集新的政治協商會議,並於 1949 年 10 月 1 日正式宣布中華人民共和國成立。蔣介石最終於 1949 年 12 月被迫撤退到台灣。

我們看到,自清朝滅亡以來,中國的政局一直是一團糟。在這場動亂的大部分時間裡,台灣處於日本統治之下,經歷了相對繁榮和穩定的成長時期。因此,當國民黨到達台灣時,非常不同的台灣經歷 ,使台灣人的期待與國民黨在大陸習慣提供的東西不同。那麼,有人可能認為,這意味著台灣實現獨立的條件已經成熟。
對獨立運動人士來說不幸,對國民黨來說幸運的是,當大陸的戰敗似乎迫在眉睫,台灣將是其最後安息之地時,國民黨政府開始採取正確行動。
台灣成為中華民國
到 1948 年,國民黨政府越來越接受台灣很可能成為國民黨最後一個據點的想法。這改變了國民黨對台灣的態度,從將島嶼視為消耗性資源,轉變為更加關注將島嶼培育成可持續基地。 10月27日,該島對大陸的食品和其他商品出口停止。越來越多的價格控制沒有得到執行。這些措施有助於對抗通脹壓力,減輕台灣人民的負擔。
1949年12月,國民黨撤退台灣。蔣介石的正式總統就職典禮於 1950 年 3 月 1 日在台北舉行。在儀式上,他對大陸的失敗承擔全部責任,並承諾進行廣泛的改革。

政府改革在提高政府整體效率方面取得了很大成功。蔣通過清除腐敗和低效率,並灌輸具有鼓舞人心的領導和嚴格紀律的強化結構來精簡黨。從 1949 年到 1952 年,黨員人數增加了兩倍,台灣黨員人數上升到黨員總數的 57.12%。為了控制軍隊和維護社會穩定,強迫數百名不稱職的軍官退役,軍隊減縮到更易於管理的規模,並任命了能幹的領導來培訓剩餘的 200,000 多名士兵。蔣還清理了政府結構,將台灣劃分為十六縣五市,省長由中央政府選出。

Perhaps the “most dazzling and successful” reforms were made in the arena of economics. The introduction of a new currency and strict controls on money supply immediately helped take out of control inflation rates of over 3000 percent in early 1949 down to more reasonable levels of 8.8 percent by 1952. Policymakers astutely pinpointed the root problems which were holding back the agrarian industry and implemented a series of reforms to combat those weaknesses and help revive the important sector. Land reform beginning in 1949 more equitably redistributed arable land so that owner-farmer families increased from 36 to 65 percent by 1952. With the financial and technical aid of the SinoAmerican Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), the Nationalist government also organized farmers’ associations to sustain and grow the industry.

The retooling of government and economy helped put Taiwan on a healthy path to development, eventually flourishing into one of East Asia’s success stories holding the title with Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea of Four Asian Tigers.
Despite such successes, however, there were no significant steps toward liberalization. Though Taiwanese were allowed to participate at the local and provincial levels of government, the national level was still kept out of reach. Also, rule by martial law and other strict measures repressing political activity and freedom of speech, which had been in place formally since 1948, were left unchanged.

Therefore, although Chiang was able to rule Taiwan much more effectively than his experience with mainland China, this by no means guaranteed Taiwanese more self-government and autonomy, especially in terms of representation by Taiwanese natives. By making marked improvements in some areas, however, Chiang was thus able to muddle his poorer track record in taking steps toward political liberalization, all the while maintaining his police state policy of White Terror. By planting such shallowly misleading improvements in various parts of domestic policy, the case for independence was made more difficult for independence movement activists.
The domestic improvements made by Chiang, which helped appease some critics, were coupled with an excellent foreign policy that helped ensure the survival of the Nationalist government. By the time the Nationalist government arrived in Taiwan, few in the international community still believed in its viability. In light of the fragility of the Nationalist government, it seems that the Taiwan independence movement could perhaps have capitalized on this weakness and demanded a Taiwanese government to replace it. Chiang and his policymakers also recognized this weakness, however, and focused all efforts on ensuring their continued survival.

By realizing the importance of the American government to ensuring his government’s survival and acting on this recognition, Chiang was able to use America to prop up his Nationalist government. While his tactics were certainly shrewd, Chiang would not have been able to accomplish this without the accommodating environmental and domestic factors making the United States more susceptible to being drawn into supporting the dictatorial Nationalist government in Taiwan.

也許“最耀眼、最成功”的改革發生在經濟領域。新貨幣的引入和對貨幣供應的嚴格控制立即幫助將 1949 年初超過 3000% 的失控的通貨膨脹率降低到 1952 年更合理的水平 8.8%。政策制定者敏銳地指出了阻礙農業發展的根本問題,並實施了一系列改革以克服這些弱點,幫助重振重要的農業。 1949 年開始的土地改革更公平地重新分配耕地,到 1952 年,自耕農家庭的比例從 36% 增加到 65%。在中美農村重建聯合委員會 (JCRR) 的財政和技術援助下,國民黨政府還組織農協會以維持和發展農業。
政府和經濟的重組幫助台灣走上了健康的發展路徑,最終蓬勃發展成為東亞的成功故事之一,與新加坡、香港和韓國並列亞洲四小龍。

然而,儘管取得了這些成功,但並沒有朝著自由化邁出重要的一步。雖然台灣人被允許參與地方和省級政府,但中央政府方面仍然遙不可及。此外,戒嚴和其他嚴厲措施壓制政治活動和言論自由,這些措施,已經正式實施自 1948 年以來一直保持不變。
因此,雖然蔣能夠比他在大陸的經驗更有效地統治台灣,但這並不能保證台灣有更多的自治,特別是台灣本地人的民意代表。然而,通過在某些領域取得顯著改善,蔣因此能夠掩蓋他在採取措施邁向政治自由化方面較差的記錄,同時保持他的白色恐怖警察國家政策。通過在國內政策的各個部分植入這種淺薄的誤導性改革,令獨立運動活動家的台獨立論變得更加困難。

蔣的國內改革有助於安撫一些批評者,同時其出色的外交政策有助於確保國民黨政府的生存。國民政府抵達台灣時,國際社會幾乎沒有人相信它的可行性。鑑於國民黨政府的脆弱性,台獨運動似乎可以利用這一弱點,要求台灣人的政府取而代之。然而,蔣和他的決策者也認識到了這一弱點,並集中一切努力確保他們能繼續生存。

意識到美國政府對確保其政府生存的重視,並根據這一認識採取行動,蔣利用美國支持他的國民黨政府。雖然他的策略當然是精明的,但如果沒有 有利的環境和國內因素使美國更容易支持國民党的獨裁政府,蔣介石不可能做到這一點。

The American Factor
The environment of the United States was therefore another main obstacle to the early Taiwan independence movement. Immediately after the war, it seemed that the odds were against the survival of the Nationalist government. However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 renewed American support for the Nationalist government and diminished the probability of any American support for Taiwan independence.
After the Second World War, it seemed that domestic conditions in America were ripe for Americans to champion the cause of the Taiwan independence movement. The international atmosphere after the war in light of the creation of the United Nations meant that under the new international order’s professed values of self-government and self-determination, Taiwan should have been given a chance to decide its fate after years of colonial rule. The Truman doctrine seemed to promise that the United States would step up to champion these rights.

President Harry Truman came into office in April 1945 just as the Second World War was wrapping up and the Cold War was shaping itself into existence. The Soviet Union and the United States were the only two superpowers left standing after the total warfare of the Second World War. Due to differing ideologies and competing interests, the new world order, which emerged in the aftermath of world war was polarized, with neither superpower willing to make any concessions on their respective spheres of influence. Americans tended to view any Communist insurrections as instigated by the Soviet Union in a ploy to expand their power. Likewise, the Soviet Union constantly felt threatened by the generally anti-Communist sentiment of the West
.
Although the Second World War was the costliest international war ever fought by Americans, the United States was more fortunate in comparison to other participants in that none of the devastation brought about by the world war was inflicted within its continental borders. Due to the mass participation in war industries and development of the associated technological innovations, the destitute America that had barely scraped by during the Great Depression in the 1930s emerged as a prosperous and flourishing country after World War II. As a result of its relative prosperity, the United States stepped into a new role in the world arena as a leader and protector of “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”
 To enforce what George F. Kennan called “vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies,” the United States saw active economic and military aid as imperative to ensure the pledge of America to free peoples. The $659 million pledged through the Greek-Turkish aid act helped stabilize the economy of Turkey and defeat the Communists in Greece in 1949. Congress approved the Marshall Plan after Czechoslovakia fell to Communist revolutionaries, leading the United States to contribute more than $13 billion in financial aid to Europe from 1948 to 1951. On April 4, 1949, the United States extended its international responsibilities to include military commitments by signing the North Atlantic Treaty with twelve other nations.

美國因素
因此,美國的環境是早期台獨運動的另一個主要障礙。戰後不久,國民黨政府的生存機會似乎不復存在。然而,1950 年朝鮮戰爭的爆發使美國重新支持國民黨政府,並降低了美國支持台灣獨立的可能性。

二戰後,美國人支持台獨運動的國內條件似乎已經成熟,。聯合國成立後的國際氣氛意味著,在新國際秩序所宣稱的自治和自決價值觀下,台灣應該有機會在多年的殖民統治後決定自己的命運。杜魯門教條似乎承諾美國將加緊捍衛這些權利。

哈里杜魯門總統於 1945 年 4 月上任,當時第二次世界大戰即將結束,冷戰正在形成。蘇聯和美國是第二次世界大戰全面戰爭後僅存的兩個超級大國。由於意識形態的不同和利益的競爭,世界大戰後出現的世界新秩序兩極分化,兩個超級大國都不願意在各自的勢力範圍內做出任何讓步。美國人傾向於將任何共產主義叛亂視為由蘇聯煽動以擴大其權力的策略。同樣,蘇聯也不斷感受到西方普遍反共情緒的威脅。

儘管第二次世界大戰是美國人打過的最昂貴的國際戰爭,但與其他參與者相比,美國更幸運,因為世界大戰帶來的破壞沒有在其大陸內造成。由於大規模參與戰爭工業和相關技術創新的發展,在 1930 年代大蕭條期間勉強糊口的赤貧美國,在二戰後成為一個繁榮昌盛的國家。由於其相對繁榮,美國在世界舞台上扮演了一個新角色,成為“抵抗被武裝少數群體或外部壓力企圖征服的自由人民”的領導者和保護者。

為了執行喬治•F•凱南所說的“對俄羅斯擴張趨勢的警惕遏制”,美國認為積極的經濟和軍事援助是確保美國對自由人民的承諾的必要條件。通過希臘-土耳其援助法案 6.59 億美元幫助穩定了土耳其的經濟,並在 1949 年擊敗了希臘的共產黨。捷克斯洛伐克落入共產主義革命分子之手後,國會批准了馬歇爾計劃,致美國從1948 年到 1951 年貢獻對歐洲的援助超過 130 億美元的資金。1949 年 4 月 4 日,美國通過與其他 12 個國家簽署北大西洋公約,將其國際責任擴大到包括軍事承諾。

Also, although the United States had initially supported the Nationalist government, by 1949, this was no longer the case. The United States had certainly supported the Nationalists as allies in the Second World War, and then, despite proclaiming neutrality as China began its descent into civil war, the American policy toward China was definitely biased toward the Nationalists “after helping Chiang to regain so many cities, advancing fresh credits to his government, and promising him up to $600 million worth of military equipment at bargain prices.” As early as 1945, General Wedemeyer had expressed doubt in their capacity to perform government duties, writing that “if peace comes suddenly, it is reasonable to expect widespread confusion and disorder” since Chiang and his government had made inadequate preparations for transitioning from wartime to peacetime. The United States moved toward a policy of disengagement from the Chinese Civil War as it became apparent that the Nationalist armies “did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated” and would thus not be helped by further American involvement. By 1949, however, the American government had lost all confidence in the Nationalist government and policymakers recommended withdrawing all support to the Nationalists. On the sensitive issue of Taiwan, President Harry Truman’s statement on January 5, 1950, confirmed America’s non-interference stance:
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.
Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they consider necessary for the defense of the Island.

 Also, in January, two senators demanded protection of Taiwan without consideration of Nationalist and Communist Chinese claims that the island was a part of mainland China. Senator Taft saw Taiwan as “a small area of the world, where with no difficulty or expense, we could prevent the spread of communism to an island which might be of strategic value and whose people desire to be independent.” Senator H. Alexander Smith expressed similar sentiments toward Taiwan, and proposing a government that would be administered by a “joint political authority and responsibility there between ourselves, the Nationalists, and the Formosan people.”
 After the outbreak of the Korean War, however, the whole game changed.

此外,雖然美國最初支持國民黨政府,但到 1949 年,情況已不再如此。美國在二戰中當然支持國民黨作為盟友,然後,儘管在中共開始內戰時宣布中立,但是幫助蔣奪回多數城市,向他的政府提供新的貸款,並承諾以廉價向他提供價值高達 6 億美元的軍事裝備之後,美國的對華政策是偏向國民黨。早在 1945 年,韋德邁耶將軍就對他們履行政府職責的能力表示懷疑,因為蔣政府為從戰時過渡到和平時期沒有做好充分的準備。

他寫道:“如果和平突然來到,可以預期普遍的混亂是合理的”,由於國民黨軍隊“不必被擊敗;他們解體了”,因此美國的進一步介入也無濟於事。然而,到 1949 年,美國政府對國民黨政府失去了所有信心,決策者建議撤回對國民黨的所有支持。在台灣這個敏感問題上,杜魯門總統於1950年1月5日發表的聲明,證實了美國的不干涉立場:

美國在台灣或任何其他中國領土上沒有掠奪性意圖。美國此時無意獲得特殊權利或特權,也無意在台灣建立軍事基地。也無意動用軍隊干預當前局勢。美國政府不會採取捲入中國內戰的路線。
同樣,美國政府不會向台灣的中國軍隊提供軍事援助或建議。美國政府認為,台灣据有足以保衛該島所必需的資源 。

此外,在 1 月,兩名參議員要求保護台灣,而沒有考慮國共聲稱該島是中國大陸的一部分。塔夫脫參議員認為台灣是“世界上的一個小區域,在那裡我們可以不費吹灰之力地阻止共產主義蔓延到一個可能具有戰略價值且人民渴望獨立的島嶼上”。參議員 H. 亞歷山大•史密斯 (H. Alexander Smith) 對台灣表達了類似的情緒,並提議建立一個由“美國、國民黨和台灣人民管理的聯合政府”。
然而,朝鮮戰爭爆發後,整個遊戲規則發生了變化。

The New Game: American Government Supports the Nationalists

After the war between North and South Korea broke out on June 25, 1950, the American position toward Asia needed revision. The United States viewed the apparent North Korean attack with suspicion, citing the act as “proof that the Sino-Soviet alliance supported expansion in Asia and that the United States would, therefore, have to extend its containment policy from Europe to include the entire periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc.” Communist China’s entry into the war only further confirmed American fears that China would serve as a pawn for the Soviet Union and determined the formulation of a new American policy that Taiwan was a strategically important location for fighting against the spread of Communism.
Within two days of the beginning of war, President Truman announced that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.” In August, the American government began shipping arms to the Nationalists in Taiwan again.

Domestic opinion in the United States was also overwhelmingly supportive of the American policy change toward the Nationalist government. Before the war, a 1949 poll revealed that about 50 percent of Americans were in favor of the administration’s decision to withhold further aid to the Nationalists, and only 20 percent were against. By 1951, however, the same question yielded a complete reversal in earlier attitudes, with 58 percent in favor of providing aid for the Nationalists and 24 percent opposed. This was because the anti-Communist sentiment in foreign policy abroad was also brought back home. The House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) created early in 1938 continued to prosecute those perceived as performing the supposed Un-American Activity. In March 1947, Truman ordered all federal employees to be subjected to a background check to verify their loyalty to America. During the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, a period known as the Second Red Scare, or McCarthyism, when a Republican senator, Joseph McCarthy, incited a witch hunt and accused people of being Communist collaborators without substantial evidence. Fortunately, McCarthyism represented the height of the frenzy, after which the anti-Communist sentiment still persisted but became much less extreme.
 By 1954, the signing of the mutual self-defense treaty with Taiwan clinched the Nationalist government’s role as a new member of the “East Asian containment ring against China” (Sutter 33). In light of this development, America’s East Asia policy switched from one of indifference toward the Nationalist government, to one which prioritized the Nationalist government as being important in ensuring a balance of power in Asia.
 With the Taiwan independence movement professing ideals and no clear guarantee that passing authority over to the Taiwanese would ensure the implementation of a strong and stable government, the United States preferred a friendly and stable Nationalist government dependent on American aid even if it happened to be dictatorial and ruling against the wishes of the Taiwanese people.

新遊戲:美國政府支持國民黨
1950年6月25日南北韓戰爭爆發後,美國對亞洲的立場需要修正。美國對北韓明顯的襲擊持懷疑態度,稱此舉是“中蘇聯盟支持在亞洲擴張的證據,因此美國必須將遏制政策從歐洲擴大到整個中蘇集團的周邊地區”。”共產中國的參戰進一步證實了美國擔心中國會成為蘇聯的棋子,並製定了美國新政策即台灣是抵抗共產主義蔓延的戰略要地。
戰爭開始後兩天內,杜魯門總統宣布“台灣未來地位的確定必須等待太平洋安全的恢復、與日本的和平條約或聯合國的考慮。” 8 月,美國政府再次開始向台灣的國民黨運送武器。


美國輿論也壓倒性地支持美國對國民黨政府的政策轉變。戰前,1949 年的一項民意調查顯示,大約 50% 的美國人支持政府停止向國民黨提供進一步援助,只有 20% 的人反對。然而,到了 1951 年,同樣的問題使早先的態度完全逆轉,58% 的人讚成為國民黨提供援助,24% 的人反對。這是因為反共外交政策的情緒被帶回了國內。 1938 年初成立的非美活動委員會 (HUAC) 繼續起訴那些被認為從事所謂的非美活動的人。 1947 年 3 月,杜魯門命令所有聯邦職員接受背景調查,以驗證他們對美國的忠誠度。在 1950 年至 1953 年的朝鮮戰爭期間,被稱為第二次紅色恐慌或麥卡錫主義的時期,共和黨參議員約瑟夫•麥卡錫在沒有實質證據的情況下,指責人們是共產主義的合作者,煽動了一場政治迫害。幸運的是,麥卡錫主義代表了狂熱的高峰,此後反共情緒仍然存在,但變得不那麼極端。

到 1954 年,美國與台灣簽署相互防衛條約,使國民政府成為“東亞遏制中國”的新成員。有鑑於此,美國的東亞政策從對國民黨政府的漠不關心轉變為確保亞洲國力平衡的重要因素。
由於台獨運動宣揚理想,並沒有明確保證將權力移交給台灣人就可以確保一個強大而穩定的政府,美國選擇一個友好也依賴美國援助穩定的國民黨政府,即使它的獨裁統治違背台灣人民的意願
V. Conclusion
 In light of the many difficulties faced by student leaders in the early Taiwan Independence Movement in America, the accomplishments achieved are quite astonishing. Many of the early Taiwanese student leaders were forced to juggle school, work, and other commitments in addition to furthering the cause of Taiwan independence. The early independence movement also suffered from financial insufficiency and decentralized leadership. Meanwhile, the international environment was also uninviting, especially in light of the Nationalist government’s shrewd domestic and foreign political calculations, coupled with the American fear of the Communist threat overtaking all of Asia. Despite all of these challenges, however, the Taiwanese students were able to make the independence movement known, pushing the topic of self-government for Taiwanese people onto the international forum of discussion, and paving way for the next generations of independence movement leaders.

五、結論

在美國台獨運動初期,學生領袖雖然所面臨諸多困難,所取得的成就是相當驚人的。除了推進台獨運動之外,許多早期的台灣留學生領袖還被迫兼顧學業、工作和其他承諾。早期的獨立運動也受到財政不足和領導權分散的影響。與此同時,國際環境也不利,尤其是考慮到國民黨政府精明的國內外政治策略,以及美國對共產主義威脅席捲整個亞洲的恐懼。儘管有這些挑戰,台灣學生還是能夠讓獨立運動為人所知,將台灣人民自治的話題推到國際論壇上,為下一代獨立運動領導人鋪平道路
(全文譯完)
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