前言
Introduction

隨著冷戰結束，亞太地區戰略情勢發生複雜改變，新的權力平衡關係開始應運而生。1蘇聯瓦解後，中國與俄國試圖改善雙邊關係，結束長期以來的軍事對恃，並發展出軍事安全領域的合作。中俄的軍事合作主要表現在兩方面：第一、雙方透過信心建立措施與裁軍措施，尋求化解軍事緊張；第二、中國積極自俄國引進武器裝備與軍事技術，企圖加速解放軍現代化。本文的研究目在於探討中俄軍事合作及其對台灣安全的意涵。文中主要分為三個部分：首先，探討中俄推動軍事合作的背景，瞭解雙方追求軍事合作的政策考量；其次，探討雙方軍事合作的發展。最後，評估雙方軍事合作的整體意涵，及其對台灣安全產生的衝擊。
With the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region has entered a complex strategic situation, and a new balance of power has evolved.1 Following the collapse of the USSR, China and Russia has sought to improve their bilateral relations, put an end to long-term military confrontation, and develop bilateral cooperation in the military security field. China and Russia have developed bilateral military cooperation in two respects: first, both parties have sought to defuse military tensions through confidence-building measures (CBMs) and force reduction; second, China has tried to import weapon systems and defense technology from Russia to speed up the pace of People Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization. The purpose of this study is to examine PRC-Russia military ties and the impact on the security of Taiwan. This study consists of three parts. Firstly, it addresses the background of PRC-Russia military cooperation. Secondly, it explores the development of both sides’ cooperation. Lastly, this study analyses the impact of PRC-Russia military cooperation on the security of Taiwan.

中俄發展軍事合作之背景
Background of PRC-Russia Military Cooperation

中國的政策考量
Explanation of China’s Policy

（一）塑造穩定的外在環境
(1) Creating a Stable External Environment

鄧小平於一九七○年代末上台後，對推動經濟改革十分重視。一九八○年代中期，鄧小平將經改視為中國的「二次革命」，重申中國推動經濟現代化的決心。2在這樣的策略下，中國軍方於一九八六年提出所謂「世界大戰並非不可避免」的主張，顯示中國已針對外在安全環境進行重新評估，這為一九八○年代末期中國與蘇聯的關係正常化提供了理論依據。3一九九○年代以後，江澤民延續鄧小平的經改政策，為了塑造有利於國內經濟發展的外在環境，持續改善中國與俄國的關係。自一九九○年代初期以來，中國領導人已一再強調與周邊國家發展友好關係的重要性，並將之視為中國對外政策的優先任務。4
Since he came to power in late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping placed a great emphasis on the importance of China’s economic reform. By the mid-1980s, Deng called economic reform a “second revolution” and reiterated China’s determination to achieve economic modernization.2 Under this strategy, the Chinese military asserted in 1986 that “a world war was by no means unavoidable”. This argument highlighted a re-evaluation of China’s external security environment, and provided a theoretical basis for detente with the USSR in the late 1980s.3 Entering into the 1990s, Jiang Zemin protracted Deng’s policy on economic reform. In order to create a peaceful external environment conducive to domestic economic development, Jiang continued to improve China’s relations with Russia. Since the early 1990s, Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed the importance of developing friendly relations with neighboring countries and regarded this as a priority of China’s foreign policy.4

（二）裁減邊界駐軍，節省軍事開銷
(2) Cutting Force Deployment in the Border Areas. Saving Military Spending

一九五○年代末期，中國與蘇聯因為意識型態爭執，關係逐漸緊張。在一九六九年的邊界武裝衝突發生後，雙方開始加強邊境地區駐軍。到了一九七○年代中期，中蘇部署於邊境地區的兵力已超過北約與華沙集團在歐洲的建軍規模，成為世界上最軍事化的地區。在一九九○年代初期，地面部隊在三百萬的解放軍中占了二百三十萬，而地面部隊中約有四分之三部署於中蘇邊境，如此龐大的駐軍對中國的國防開銷構成沈重的負擔。5在一九九一年的波灣戰爭後，解放軍提出所謂「打贏高技術條件下有限戰爭」的軍事戰略。在這樣的戰略指導下，中國開始尋求裁減中俄邊境駐軍的可能性，以減少軍事開銷，並將國防資源投注於海空軍的現代化。
In late 1950s, political rifts led to the situation where the relationship between China and USSR became more and more tense. After the border clashes of 1969, both sides increased military build-up along their common border. By the mid 1970s, the Chinese-Soviet border area became the most militarized region in the world, exceeding the scale of the military build-up of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Europe. In the early 1990s, ground forces constituted 2.3 million out of 3 million in total PLA manpower, and three-quarters of the PLA’s ground troops were deployed along China’s border with Russia. This was a heavy burden in China’s defense spending.5 After the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA shifted its military strategy to one of “winning a limited war under hi-tech conditions”. Guided by this strategy, China sought to downsize troop deployment in the northern frontier so as to reduce military spending and concentrate defense resources on modernizing the air and naval forces.

（三）增加外交籌碼
(3) Increasing Diplomatic Leverage

冷戰結束後，中、美雙方在政治信仰、台灣問題、與人權等議題的爭議逐漸白熱化。在國際外交上，中國極力反對美國的霸權主義，並批評美國對其他國家內政的干涉。 當中國必須因應美國霸權之際，與俄國發展更緊密的關係包括軍事合作，基本上符合中國的外交與軍事利益。這樣的關係一方面可爭取俄國對反霸議題的外交聲援，增加中國對抗美國的政治籌碼；另一方面可防止美國打俄國牌，對中國進行外交孤立或軍事圍堵。6
Since the end of the Cold War, disputes between China and the U.S. on such issues as political belief, Taiwan problem, and human right have become more and more serious. In the field of international diplomacy, China strongly opposed American hegemony and criticized U.S. interference in other states’ internal affairs. As China has to deal with U.S. hegemony, it is in China’s diplomatic and military interests to develop closer relations with Russia, including military cooperation. On the one hand, such ties could rally Russia’s diplomatic support for China’s policy on anti-hegemony, increasing
China’s political leverage against the U.S.. On the other hand, they could prevent the U.S. from playing the “Russia card” to isolate China diplomatically or contain China militarily. 6

（四）採購俄製武器，加速解放軍現代化
(4) Purchasing Russian-made Weapons to Achieve PLA’s Modernization

中國軍方在一九九一年波灣戰爭後開始調整軍事戰略，並且積極尋求推動解放軍的軍備現代化。然而，在一九八九年的天安門事件後，中國便遭到西方國家的武器禁運，使得獲取先進武器的管道相當有限，於是中國開始轉向俄國採購武器。由於解放軍所使用的武器系統大部分為蘇聯在一九五○年代所設計與製造的裝備，因此對解放軍而言，俄製武器應較容易吸收整合。7其次，俄製武器在價格上比西方國家便宜，採購俄製武器來現代化解放軍的裝備可節省中國的軍備採購開銷。8再者，中國方面認為，俄國應該是個較穩定的武器供應來源，不至於因為人權問題中斷對中國的武器與技術供應。9
After the Gulf War of 1991, the Chinese military began to adjust its military strategy and speed up the pace of the PLA’s armament modernization. Since the Tiananmen events of 1989, however, China has been placed under a Western arms embargo, and has very limited sources for advanced weapons. This pushed China to purchase weapons from Russia. Given that most of Chinese military hardware was dominated by Soviet manufacture and design in the 1950s, Russian weapons might be easier for the PLA to absorb.7 Moreover, Russian weapons were comparatively cheaper than Western countries. Modernizing the PLA’s military hardware through imports from Russia could save
Chinese spending on purchases of arms.8 Furthermore, China maintained that Russia could be a source for the supply of weapons and technologies without the threat of sanctions over Chinese human right violations.9

俄國的政策考量
Explanation of Russia’s Policy

（一）穩定俄中關係
(1) Stabilizing Russia’s Relations with China

蘇聯瓦解後，俄國全力挽救國內經濟，同時十分重視與周邊國家關係的改善。有鑑於俄中共同邊界長達四千三百餘公里，俄國於是將與中國關係的提升視為重要外交任務。由於一個國家通常只將武器提供給友好的國家，俄國因此將軍售視為發展俄中友好關係的一項重要外交政策工具。一九九二年十二月葉爾欽訪問中國時，兩國曾簽署「軍事技術合作備忘錄」。當時葉爾欽便公開指稱，透過這項合作備忘錄，俄中關係的友好特質將獲得進一步強化。10在一九九七年簽署的聯合公報中，中俄重申軍事技術合作構成了兩國合作關係極為重要的部分。11這些外交宣示充分展現出俄國試圖利用武器銷售作為俄中關係友好表徵的政治意圖。
After the Soviet collapse, Russia made every effort to improve domestic economic hardship and develop friendly relations with neighboring countries. Given that Russia and China share 4,300 km common border, Russia has regarded it as a priority task to improve its relations with China. Under normal circumstance, a country only exports arms to friendly countries. Therefore, Russia has regarded arms sales as one of vital for eign policy tools for supporting a friendly relationship with China. During Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to China in December 1992, Russia and China signed the “Memorandum on the Principles of Military and Technical Cooperation”. Yeltsin
claimed that through this memorandum, the friendly character of Russian-Chinese relations would be strengthened.10 In their Joint Statement of 1997, China and Russia reaffirmed that the development of ties in the area of military technology was an important component of bilateral cooperation.11 These diplomatic declarations have showed Russia’s political intention of using its arms sales to China as a symbol of their friendly relations.

（二）縮減部隊規模，減輕財政負擔
(2) Downsizing Troop Manpower. Lightening Financial Burdens

由於經濟狀況持續惡化與軍事預算嚴重下滑，維持龐大部隊對俄國而言已成為一項沈重的財政負擔。經費的短缺已經導致俄國無力維持部隊正常運作。根據英國倫敦國際戰略研究所在一九九五年提出的估計報告，俄軍坦克部隊大約只有五分之一的坦克可正常操作使用。12即便當時俄國在俄中邊界駐有四十個師的兵力，但據指出部隊實際員額根本不及編制的四成。13由於國防經費不足，俄國不得不著手裁減軍隊數量，並於一九九六年宣布裁軍一百萬人。14在俄國看來，與中國進行邊界裁軍談判不僅符合俄國全面裁軍的國防政策規劃，也對降低邊境軍事緊張有所助益。
The maintenance of massive military forces was a heavy budgetary burden, as Russia continued to suffer economic downturn and its defense spending was drastically reduced. Due to profound reductions in military expenditures, Russia failed to maintain normal operation of troops. In 1995, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) assessed that only one-fifth of the Russian tank fleet was usable.12 Meanwhile, Russian forces facing China consisted of 40 divisions, with many of them reported to be at less than 40 per cent strength.13 Insufficient defense budget pushed Russia to reduce the number of troop. In 1996, the Russian government announced to reduce Russian armed forces by more than one million servicemen.14 From Russia’s point of view, the negotiations
with China on border troop reductions could not only coincide with Russia’s defense plans to conduct an overall reduction of its armed forces, but also contribute to the reduction of military tension in the border areas.

（三）挽救國防工業財務危機
(3) Resolving Financial Crisis of the Defense Industry

蘇聯解體後，俄國的軍工業面臨嚴重的生存挑戰。首先，來自於俄國軍方的武器訂單根本不及俄國國防工業生產能量的百分之十至百分之十五。其次，聯合國對伊拉克、利比亞、南斯拉夫等國家實施武器禁運，讓俄國喪失了許多過去的武器顧客。而北約東進後，原華沙集團國家也開始與北約進行政治與軍事合作，包括武器採購。由於重要武器市場的流失，俄國國防工業約有五分之一頻臨破產，四成以上面臨生存問題。15陷入財務危機的俄國國防工業於是積極尋找新的武器客戶，並將裝備陳舊且亟欲尋求國防現代化的中國視為一個極具潛力的軍火市場。
After the disintegration of the USSR, Russian defense enterprises suffered serious challenges to their survival. First, Russian military orders were fulfilled by no more than 10-15 % of the defense industry’s production capacities. Moreover, UN-sanctioned embargoes against Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia led to the loss of traditional Russian customers. With the disintegration of the WTO, the former customers of Russian defense industries in Eastern Europe turned to seek political and military cooperation with NATO, including arms purchases. Following the loss of traditional weapons customers, nearly 20 per cent of Russian defense enterprises stood on the verge of bankruptcy,
while 40 per cent would soon be classified as barely viable.15 Therefore, Russian defense industries have struggled to find new arms buyers and regarded China - a country which is eager to modernize its outdated armament - as a prosperous market for Russian weapons.