前言
Introduction

今年（二○○二）三月二十日《中國時報》以頭版轉內頁的方式，報導國安局「奉天」、「當陽」專案的新聞。同一天發行的《壹週刊》三月二十一日這一期，以國安局絕密文件曝光為題，以十四頁的篇幅，大肆報導李登輝非法挪用三十五億、明德小組買通美日、以及卡西迪、台綜院A走不少孳息。接著香港親共媒體《星島日報》持續戰火，連續多天報導所謂國安局非法行為。在這一波的媒體
戰中，打擊對象台灣國內包括李前總統登輝先生、以及本土派的官員、學者。國外對象主要為親台灣的美、日官員、學者。親中國的台灣、美、日官員、學者無一波及，選擇性的被忽略。這次媒體戰顯然與北京脫不了關係，且與過去中國文攻或武嚇的方式略有不同。一九九六年三月台灣總統大選與一九九九年七月兩國論期間，中國武嚇與文攻並重，以軍事演習配合官方或親共香港媒體大肆渲染，
再經過台灣媒體的轉載，進行打擊台灣民心士氣的心理戰。二○○○年台灣總統大選，中國改以文攻為主，除了發表《一個中國原則與台灣問題》白皮書，中國官員不斷喊話，再經香港、台灣媒體的傳播，進行另一波心理戰。這一波媒體戰，直接利用國安局財務官員劉冠軍的貪污弊案，透過台灣、香港媒體接力聯手打擊特定人物。
The China Times had reported the “Fengtien” and “Dangyang” secret projects of the National Security Bureau and this article appeared on the newspaper's front page as well as on its second and third pages on 20th March 2002. On the same day, the Next Magazine also highlighted that the former president Lee Teng-Hui embezzles $3.5 billion, the “Mingde” project attempts to influence on the Taiwan policies of the United State and Japan with illegal bribes, and the Cassidy Associates and Taiwan Research Institute embezzles the interests revenue of the secret fund, as the issues of disclosing of the classified documents of the National Security Bureau with 14 pages stories. Later, a
pro-China Hong Kong newspaper - the Shin Tao Daily continuously reported the so-called illegally activities of the National Security Bureau. In this propaganda war, the persons being attacked include the former president Lee Teng-hui and the pro-localization officers and scholars; the oversea persons being attacked include pro-Taiwan American and Japanese officers and scholars. Pro-China Taiwanese, American and Japanese officers and scholars were deliberately ignored to be involving in this matter. This is an obvious suggestion that the Beijing brings about this media smear campaign, which is slightly different from what China had done by political intimidation or military coercion. In the duration from the presidential election of Taiwan in March 1996 to the appeals of “ special state-to-state” which presented by Lee Teng-hui in July 1997, China both opted political intimidation and military coercion as a strategy of psychological warfare, i.e. by staging the military exercise and its related exaggerate articles reported by the Chinese state-run newspaper or the pro-China Hong Kong media and then transferred the reports to Taiwan media, to disrupt the Taiwan civilians’ morale. In the presidential election in 2000, China had altered its strategy and mainly focused on political intimidation, i.e. China had not only published The One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue, but also declared its principle through the Hong Kong and Taiwan media and then started this wave of psychological warfare. In this media campaign, China has directly adopted the embezzlement scandal of former National Security Bureau chief cashier, Colonel Liu Kuan-Chun to assault on some specific persons through the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.

本文研究目的以一九九六年三月台灣總統大選與一九九九年七月兩國論期間，二○○○年三月台灣總統大選期間，以及今年三月的國安局貪污弊案為三個階段，以分析媒體報導內容為工具，企圖解釋北京對台媒體戰如何從文攻武嚇，逐漸調整為文攻，再改以利用內部矛盾，統戰分化台灣社會，以及離間台灣與美、日國家的關係。只有了解中國對台媒體戰的本質與策略應用，台灣才能有效對抗中國的統戰攻勢，鞏固全民心防。
This paper is divided into three periods to discuss the China’s psychological warfare against Taiwan: (1) The period of the presidential election of Taiwan in March 1996 to the appeals of special state-to-state, which presented by Lee Teng-hui in July 1997; (2) The period of the presidential election of Taiwan in 2000; (3) The period of the embezzlement scandal of the National Security Bureau. In addition, this paper analyzes the report contents as a tool to interpret the Beijing’s psychological warfare strategies which changed form the modes of equivalent proportion of political intimidation and military coercion gradually to the modes of emphasis of the former, and finally swift to the modes of using the internal conflict and the distraction of Taiwan through the psychological warfare to disrupt the Taiwanese society and to alienate Taiwan form United State and Japan. Only to realize entirely the essence and the application of the China’s media campaign against Taiwan, Taiwan can resist China’s psychological warfare efficiently to solidify its psychological defense.

心理戰不可避免戰爭樣式
The Psychological Warfare:
An Inevitable Mode of Warfare

中國一向注重心理戰，其最高境界是不戰而屈人之兵。尤其台灣國家定位不明，不知為何而戰，為誰而戰，更是對台發動心理戰的最佳溫床。心理戰是利用心理學原理，採用各種手段，對人的認知、情感與意志施加影響，瓦解敵人，保護自己，以最小的代價換取最大的勝利和利益。心理戰包括攻擊戰與防禦戰。攻擊戰以攻擊敵方的心理為主要作戰目標，通過改變態度、產生錯覺、摧毀意志、動搖信心達到瓦解民心士氣，削弱戰鬥力的目的。防禦戰則是鞏固己方的心理防線，預防與化解消極心理現象，堅定勝利信念，保持高昂士氣。以高科技手段為媒介的心理戰，在現代戰爭占有越來越突出的地位，成為一種獨立的戰爭樣式。並以驚人的威力對戰爭的進程與結局發揮重大的影響。因此繼陸戰、海戰、空戰，可稱為第四種戰爭。近來因信息戰的出現，也有人將心理戰稱為第五種戰爭。1
The psychological warfare has been emphasized by China and its best effects would lead the enemy surrender without real use of force. It is also the best strategy to invade Taiwan, especially when Taiwanese has no clear national identity and the reasons to fight for. The psychological warfare is based on the psychological theory and adopted various methods to influence human beings’ perception, feelings and wills, and sequentially disrupt the foe and protect itself. This kind of warfare only needs little cost and may gains huge benefits and victory. The psychological warfare includes the offensive and defensive. The main aims of the offensive are assaulting on the enemy’s psychology
by changing attitudes, bring illusions, eliminating determinations, weakening the confidence to disrupt the morale of the foe and eclipsing the combat capacity. The defensive is to solidify the psychological defense, to prevent and eliminate the passive psychological phenomenon, to convince the faith of victory and sustain the morale. Adopting the high-tech as a medium of the psychological warfare becomes more and more important. It has turned into an independent mode of warfare and its power has been importantly affected the conduct and outcome of the war. Therefore, the psychological warfare could be the fourth warfare, after the land warfare, naval warfare, and air warfare. Some people also named the psychological warfare as the fifth warfare due to the appearance of the information warfare.1

心理戰作為一種獨立的戰爭樣式，它作用於戰爭的全部過程，即戰前、戰時、戰後。多維度，即軍事、政治、經濟、外交、文化、宗教等。多層次，即敵方、盟友、民心、帥志、士氣等。採用多手段，如宣傳、恐嚇、脅迫、欺騙、誘惑、襲擾、詭詐、分化、收買等。運用多形式，如傳單、廣播、報紙、書籍、電視、互聯網等。心理戰不僅服務於戰爭，同時廣泛用於和平時期。服務本國的政治、經濟、外交需要，為在國際競爭中壯大自己、鞏固同盟、孤立對手，贏得支持與掌握主動，使形勢朝著有利於己方的方向發展。2
The psychological warfare as an independent warfare, it can be utilized in then whole conduct of the war i.e. before, during and after war. It is multidimensional i.e. it includes the military, politics, economics, diplomacy, culture and religions dimensions. It is multilevel i.e. the enemy, enemy’s alliance, enemy’s public, enemy’s leadership and morale. Moreover, it has a variety of methods such as propaganda, threats, coercions, deception, inducement, harassment, craftiness, distractions and bribe. It can also be used through different platforms e.g. leaflets, broadcasting, newspapers, books, televisions, and inter-networks. The psychological warfare is adopted not only in the wartime but also in the peacetime, furthermore, it also satisfies the domestic political, diplomatic and economic needs to enlarge itself, solidifies the alliance, isolates the enemy, to gather around the support, and to direct the situation favorable to us.2

波灣戰爭中，中國對美軍利用現代化心理戰手段，不斷瓦解伊拉克軍隊官兵士氣的印象非常深刻。一九九一年一月十八日開戰第一天，美國一新聞媒體大肆造謠沙丹胡笙總統已被打死。接著又報導沙丹胡笙全家逃到國外。這些媒體欺騙如重型炸彈一般，在伊軍官兵的心靈裡爆炸。削弱伊軍的作戰意志，許多伊軍的思想因此產生動搖。3裝備許多中國製造武器裝備的伊軍如此不堪一擊，使中國警惕現代化心理戰的威力。
China has a strong impression of USA adopting the modern psychological warfare to continuously disrupt the morale of the Iraqi’s troops in the Persian Gulf War. 18th January 1991, the first day of the Persian Gulf War, one of the USA newspapers had exaggeratedly started a rumor, which reported the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had been killed. Later, it reported that the family of Saddam Hussein had escaped to abroad. This disinformation was like a heavy bomb, explored inside the Iraqi troops’ minds and weaken the Iraqi troops’ determinations of fighting.3 The Iraqi army who equipped many weapons, which are made in China, could not stand this attack and this led China be aware of the power of the modern psychological warfare.

中國師承前蘇聯，以宣傳起家，特別是新聞欺騙。加上現代化戰爭重視心理戰，更由於兩岸新聞傳播媒體結構性的差異，使得中國立於媒體戰的有利的地位。台灣與中國媒體結構性不同主要有：（一）台灣多元化、自由開放。中國媒體一元化、嚴格控制。（二）台灣媒體擁有自主性。中國媒體沒有自主性。（三）台灣媒體商業競爭性強，百家爭鳴。中國媒體大都屬於黨政軍機關，為黨的喉舌。4在
這種不對稱結構下，有關中國對台灣文攻武嚇或統戰分化的新聞報導，不論是官方統一口徑的新華社、《人民日報》或《解放軍報》，或是親共的香港《文匯報》、《星島日報》，均具有主動攻擊的心理威懾作用。相對地，台灣只能扮演被動防禦的角色。中國善於利用媒體，從事各種新聞欺騙的行為。台灣媒體卻競相加以轉載，自覺或不自覺成為其傳聲筒。形成台灣媒體反過來幫中國恐嚇或打擊台灣的奇怪現象。
China has followed the Soviet government’s steps, which is proficient in propaganda warfare in particular disinformation strategies. Moreover, the emphasized psychological warfare in the modern hostilities and the different media structures between China and Taiwan has resulted in the fact that China has the advantages on the propaganda campaign. There are several differences of the media between Taiwan and China: (1) Media in Taiwan enjoys considerable freedom and openness; conversely, many of Chinese media is controlled strictly. (2) Taiwan’s media enjoys considerable autonomy in decision-making while their Chinese counterparts do not. (3) Taiwan’s media are commercial based, which have serious competitions, but most China’s media are sate-run or belong to the party and serve for state or party.4 Thus, under the asymmetric media structure, any reports concerned about China’s strategies of political intimidation or military coercion by Chinese media e.g. Xinhua Agency, People’s Daily and the Liberation Army daily or by pro-China Hong Kong newspapers Wen-Wei Po and Shi-Tao Daily have the aggressively coercive effects. On the contrary, Taiwan only can act as defensive in this regard. China is proficient in various disinformation strategies through the media; however, Taiwan ‘s media has no intelligence to recognize China’s strategies and even facilitates China to report the incorrect information, which greatly helps China to intimidate or coerce Taiwan via Taiwan’s own media.

中國的新聞欺騙除了混淆視聽外，同時間接挑起台灣內部矛盾，達到分化團結，以台制台的目的。中國方面認為，台灣社會有八大主要矛盾。這些矛盾有統一與獨立的矛盾。執政黨與在野黨的矛盾。泛藍軍內部的矛盾。執政黨內部的矛盾。內政與兩岸關係的矛盾。經濟發展與環境保護的矛盾。勞工與資方的矛盾。南北地域差距的矛盾。5這些台灣內部矛盾，提供了中國媒體文攻武嚇或統戰分化的有利條件。
Chinese disinformation strategies not only confuse the truth, but also provoke Taiwan’s internal conflict to achieve the goals of distracting Taiwan and using Taiwanese to fight against Taiwanese. China considers that there are eight major conflicts within the Taiwanese society i.e. the conflict between pro-unification and pro-independence, the conflict between the governing party and the opposition parties, the conflict within the opposition parties (pan-blue camp), the conflict within the governing party, the conflict between the cross strait relationships and the interior affairs, the conflict between the economic developments and the environmental protections, the conflict between the labors and employers and the conflict in north-south regional development difference.5 The above conflicts provide China a good opportunity to implement the strategies of intimidation and propaganda campaign to distract Taiwan.

九六年飛彈危機文攻武嚇並重
1996 Missile Crisis in 1996, China’s Political Intimidation
and Military Coercion Strategies

在台海關係上，中國提出在一個中國原則下進行和平談判，但不放棄對台使用武力。根據中國二○○○年十月所發表的《二○○○年中國的國防》白皮書，中國對台用武包括三個如果。三個如果指：如果台灣從中國分割出去、如果外國侵佔台灣、如果台灣無限期拒絕和平統一談判，中國將採取包括用武在內的措施。中國的《一九九八年的國防白皮書》則宣稱，中國謀求以和平方式實現統一，但不承諾放棄用武。比較之下，中國對台動武已從模糊的不放棄用武，轉為有條件用武。6不管是模糊的不放棄用武，或者是有條件用武，文攻或武嚇都是中國對台政策硬的一手。
In the cross-strait relationships, China propose that it would negotiate peacefully with Taiwan under the “One China” principal, hoverer; China would not renounce the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. According to the China National Defense Year 2000, which published by China in October 2000, there are three “ifs” that China would resort the military force to invade Taiwan i.e. if Taiwan declares independence, if foreign powers interfere in Taiwan issue and if Taiwan refuses indefinitely to negotiate over the unification. In China’s China National Defense White Paper in 1998, it had announced that China seeks for peaceful means of unification, but would not give up resort the military force to invade Taiwan. Currently, China has altered its ambiguous policy of refusal no-use-force against Taiwan to the policy of conditional use of force.6 No matter the ambiguous policy of refusal no-use-force against Taiwan or the policy of conditional use of force, the strategies of political intimidation and military coercion remain the hard hand of China’s Taiwan policy.

中國對台軍事恫嚇的利器，是其部署在台海對岸三五○到四○○枚東風十一與東風十五導彈。7在中國向俄羅斯大規模引進海空武器的同時，唯一例外的是地對地導彈。中國早期全力投入「兩彈一星」計劃，使解放軍擁有完整的各類地對地導彈。為抗議李前總統訪問美國，一九九五年七月解放軍發射六枚M族導彈，讓世人見識到中國的導彈威力。導彈不僅象徵中國的大國地位，更是威嚇台灣的利器。
為影響台灣總統大選，解放軍在一九九六年三月發動三波演習，更以發射導彈封鎖台灣南北港口展開演習的序幕（見附件一）。演習期間，新華社、《人民日報》、《解放軍報》首先發難，香港《文匯報》、《大公報》、《星島日報》跟進，不斷為演習造勢。台灣各大媒體接著競相報導演習的信息，對台灣民心士氣形成一波比一波強的心理威懾壓力，成為中國文攻武嚇台灣的典型。
The means of China’s military coercions against Taiwan are 300 to 400 DF-11 and DF-15 missiles deployed opposite Taiwan.7 China has imported massive naval and army items from Russia but it is not the case of surface-to-surface missiles. This is because that China made a lot of efforts on the “two-missile-one satellite [liang-dan-yi-xing]” programs in earlier time, which results in that China possessed the various types of surface-to-surface missiles. In order to blast the former president Lee Teng-hui visiting US, the PLA had launched 6 M-series missiles to demonstrate China’s missile capabilities. The missiles not only represent the China’s status as a great power, but also are the
critical weapons of coercing Taiwan. With the purpose of affecting the presidential election in Taiwan the PLA had staged three rounds of military exercises, and also launched the missile test which attempting to block the south and north ports of Taiwan as the beginning of these military drills (see appendix I). During the period that China launched the military exercises, Xinhua Agency, People’s Daily and the Liberation Army Daily has waged propaganda campaign as well. Later pro-China Hong Kong newspapers, such as Wen-Wei Po, Ta Kung Po and Shi-Tao Daily followed up and highlighted the reports of China’s military exercises. Taiwan’s media also released the related reports of the military exercise, which clearly formed wave-by-wave psychological pressure against Taiwan. This is the typical style of Chin’s strategies of political intimidation and military coercion.

一九九九年七月九日李前總統登輝先生，將兩岸關係重新定位為特殊國與國關係。中國對台又展開另一波的文攻武嚇，與一九九六年不同的是：（一）由香港親共媒體擔綱，官方媒體退出一線（見：附件二）。（二）在浙東、粵南進行諸軍兵種渡海登陸演習，不再試射導彈，降低對台針對性。（三）武嚇對象包括美國。中國主動公布擁有中子彈，以及試射東風三十一洲際導彈，嚇阻美軍介入台海。
這次文攻武嚇渲染成份過多。8除了中國扣押台灣貨船新華輪，以實際行動騷擾台灣外，甚有中國最新研製的巡弋飛彈，可以直搗李總統的辦公室，而且誤差不超過五公尺的報導出現。
The former president Lee Teng-Hui had identified the cross-straits relationships as the “state-to state” relationships on 9th July 1999. As a consequence, China had launched another political intimidation and military coercion against Taiwan. Compared with China’s tactics in 1996, there are three differences: (1) Instead of China’s state-run media, pro-China Hong Kong media became the first wave to launch smear campaign (see appendix II). (2) The amphibious exercise staged by the PLA’s combined arms in Chekiang and Guangdong excluded missile tests and the perceived degree in term of against Taiwan is decreased. (3) The target that China’s coercion included the USA. China announced that it owns neutron bombs and tested DF-31 ICBMs in order to deter America intervene in the Taiwan Strait. Most in this intimidation are exaggerated. 8 Besides China withheld Taiwan’s ship Shin Hua Lun to harass Taiwan by real actions, there are even a report stated that China has invented the latest cruise missile which could directly hit president Lee Teng-hui‘s office within 5 meters error.

兩千年總統大選文攻為主
China’s Emphasis on Intimidation
in Taiwan’s Presidential Campaign 2000

中國文攻武嚇模式的負面效果過大，不僅李前總統順利當選，同時將兩艘美國航空母艦引招到台海附近，大挫解放軍士氣。在兩國論緊張期間，中國將文攻武嚇模式稍做調整。即武嚇成分減少而文攻的成分增加，且官方媒體退居第二線。二○○○年台灣總統大選又進一步調整，改以文攻為主。二月二十一日北京發表《一個中國原則與台灣問題》白皮書，強調不放棄武力統一立場。且將對台動武從過去如果有外國勢力介入、台灣發生內亂、宣布獨立三條件，再增加如果台灣無限期拒絕通過談判和平解決兩岸統一問題的新條件。9在三月三日到十一日全國人民代表大會召開會議期間，中共中央軍委副主席張萬年揚言，如台灣從中國分裂出去，以及外國侵佔台灣與台灣無限期拒絕統一，只能採取一切斷然措施。中國總理朱鎔基更表示，誰要搞台灣，誰就沒有好下場。10
The China’s strategies of political intimidation and military coercion resulted in too many negative consequences i.e. the former president Lee Teng-hui has been elected to be the president again, meanwhile, the USA has sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to Taiwan Strait, which has frustrated the PLA’s morale. During the tension period of the appeals of “State-to-State” presented by Lee Teng-hui, China had shifted slightly its political intimidation and military coercion to emphasis of intimidation more and to decrease the role of China’s state-run media. There are further adjustments during Taiwan’s presidential election in year 2000, which mainly are focus on intimidation. On the 21st February, China has published the One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue. It still rejects the renounce of use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. In addition, it states the fourth condition of resorting the military forces, if Taiwan refuses indefinitely to negotiate over unification, besides the previous three conditions -- if foreign power intervene, internal revolt in Taiwan, and Taiwan declares independence.9 During the meeting of the National People’s Congress from 3rd to 11th March, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, Zhang Wan-nian, declared that if Taiwan proclaim independence or foreign power intervene in Taiwan issue and Taiwan refuse negotiate over unification indefinitely, China would use all necessary means ruthlessly. China’s Premier Zhu Ron-gji also stated that one will pay the cost if dare to play Taiwan issue.10

大選結果出現中國最不喜歡的結果，由民進黨陳水扁先生贏得總統大選。北京以「觀其言察其行」冷處理收場。稍後解放軍進行以登陸作戰為主的海上練兵活動，持續對台施加壓力。四月各軍區調部隊到福建進行輪戰演訓。八月南京軍區號稱十一萬官兵結集黃海、東海，參與突擊、搶灘等演練。二○○一年五月到八月解放軍舉行東山島「解放一號」（正確代號為「東海六號」）大演習。11香港親共媒體渲染性地報導演習目地在模擬攻佔澎湖與台灣本島，以及對抗美國航空母艦。倫敦國際戰略研究所表示，在台灣準備迎接年底立委與縣市長選舉之際，北京可能在試圖以類似動武的威脅或軍事演習等方式，嚇阻台灣選民不要支持傾向台獨的候選人。12港媒在「解放一號」演習後報導，解放軍將於十一月底在廣東及浙江沿海，舉行「解放二號」大演習。13中國以演習向台灣施壓與與美國示警的
意味非常明顯。然而這項被認為針對台灣選舉的演習卻無任何後續報導，顯示中國改變對台戰略，以低調對應台灣的立委與縣市長選舉。
The result of the presidential election in 2000 was against China’s expectation. China’s least favorite DPP’s candidate Chen Sui-Bain won the election. Beijing calmly responded “listen what he says, observe what he does [ting chi yan guan chi hsing]”. Later the PLA had conducted the amphibious landing exercises, continued to step up psychological pressures on Taiwan. In April, each of the military regions had transferred the troops to Fujian Province to implement relay training. In August, Nanjing military region had involved 110,000 troops in assault landing exercise in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. From May to August 2001, the PLA conducted the Liberation [Jie-Fang] No.1 military exercise (the correct name shall be East Sea [Dong-Hai] No.6 exercise) on the Dongshan Island.11 The pro-China Hong Kong media exaggeratedly reported that the aims of the military exercise intended to simulate an invasion of Taiwan and Penghu Islands and also to focus on repulsing US intervention over Taiwan. London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies stated that China might opt the warning of invading Taiwan or staging the military drills to intimidate Taiwanese people not voting to the pro -independence candidates in the coming legislators and local governors elections.12 After the Liberation No. 1 military exercise, Hong Kong newspaper reported
that the PLA was going to launch the Liberation No.2 massive military exercises off Chekiang and Guangdong.13 It is obvious that China would adopt the military exercise to step up pressure on Taiwan and to warn USA. Nevertheless, no follow-on reports concerning these military exercises, which is considered targeting against Taiwan, showed that China had altered its tactics and adopt a low-profile attitude on Taiwan legislators and local governors elections.

中國對台選舉採取低調自制的原因在於：（一）過去二次總統大選，不管解放軍以導彈與演習的武嚇方式，或親共媒體的文攻渲染，結果卻與預期相反，因此有必要改變策略。（二）文攻武嚇反而促成台美兩國軍事交流與合作。北京軍事戰略界認為，美國新一輪對台軍售重點，已從幫助台灣防禦與穩定台海軍力平衡，轉移到美國對北京積極防禦部署。14（三）因應中國非理性軍事挑釁，美國派遣航
空母艦到台海已成慣例。尤其去年八月中旬解放軍舉行「解放一號」演習期間，美國〈星座〉號與〈卡爾文森〉號兩艘航母在南海舉行交會演習。此舉意在向中國展示美國壓倒性的軍力，並表明支持台灣。15（四）目前正在進行的美國反恐怖戰爭，也是中國在台海問題短期自我克制的因素。如果此時解放軍在台海演習，美國會認為北京刻意在美國危機時扯後腿，將破壞美中關係。16
The reasons of Beijing low-profile and self-constrained attitude for Taiwan election were: (1) No matter the PLA’s missile tests or military exercises or the pro-China media’s smear campaign, the results of the past two elections were not as China’s expectation eventually. (2) China’s political intimidation and military coercion stimulated the military cooperation between USA and Taiwan. Beijing’s strategists considered that the meanings of the new US arms sales to Taiwan has changed from assisting Taipei to establish the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to a forward posture against Beijing.14 (3) In order to deal with China’s irrational military provocation, USA sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits had become a regular practice. Especially when the PLA launched the Liberation No.1 military exercise last August, the USSN Carl Vinson met with the USSN Constellation and launched an exercise together in the South China Sea, which showed USA’s overwhelming military capacity to China and the apparent support for Taiwan.15 (4) Due to that USA is implementing the anti-terrorism war, China has been self-controlled temporary on Taiwan issue. This is mainly resulting form that if the PLA launched the military exercises in the Taiwan Strait currently, and sequentially USA would consider that China is pulling USA’s leg and then devastate the relationships between USA and China.16