前言
Forward

當國內各界對海軍是否購買紀德級驅逐艦爭論不休之際，民進黨國防小組提出對「海軍陸戰隊角色任務不明」疑慮的說法時，相對地未受到台灣戰略社群應有的關切與重視。事實上，有關海軍陸戰隊存廢的爭議絕非始至今日，當我國的軍事戰略指導由「攻勢」轉為「守勢」後，海軍陸戰隊的任務與角色即已成為國防研究者關注的焦點。主張裁減海軍陸戰隊的人士認為，在毋須執行「反攻大陸」的戰略需求下，兩棲部隊的存在無疑地將造成國防資源的不當投資，並對其他軍種的預算取得形成排擠。在這種情況下，與其對陸戰隊做不切實際的投資，還不如將這筆經費用以發展台灣亟須的防空及反封鎖能力。這種觀點並非全然錯誤，然而卻忽略了一項事實，那就是台灣係一海洋國家同時又擁有數個遠離本島的重要島嶼，海軍陸戰隊的存在具有特定的戰略價值以及戰術意涵。
While the nation debated the Navy’s plans for procuring the Kidd-class destroyers, little attention has been paid to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) National Defense Committee’s questioning of the mission role(s) of the ROC Marine Corps. As a matter of fact, the controversy over the necessity of ROCMC has been an issue ever since Taiwan’s military strategy shifted from an offensive posture to a defensive one. Those advocating elimination of the Marine Corps believe that the continued existence of amphibious forces in the absence of the strategic mission of liberating the Chinese mainland would be a poor investment of national defense resources that would disrupt budget programming for the other military services. It would be more advisable, these critics argue, to use the funds to develop Taiwan’s urgently-needed air defense and anti-blockade capabilities. Such views are not entirely erroneous, but they ignore an important fact. That is, Taiwan is a maritime nation that also controls a number of important offshore islands, and for such a nation, the continued existence of a marine corps has specific strategic value and tactical significance.

因此，本文討論海軍陸戰隊裁減與否問題時，不單單討論海軍陸戰隊在中華民國國家軍事戰略中的定位，亦須就海軍陸戰隊對海洋國家的重要性、兩棲作戰的未來發展以及海軍陸戰隊的嶄新任務與角色進行說明。如此，方能協助讀者對海軍陸戰隊裁減與否議題能有宏觀考量，而不致流於偏狹或想當然耳的認知，若在未經深思熟慮情況下，貿然裁減這支具有強大戰力的部隊，喪失了不僅係必須長期累積方能建立的兩棲作戰技術，亦使海洋國家不再擁有影響陸上事件後續發展的有力工具。因此，對海洋國家而言，海軍陸戰隊的裁減與否絕非單純的軍事組織重組，而必須放在國家戰略階層進行長遠的前瞻。
This article will, therefore, not only address the proper place for the marine corps in Taiwan’s national military strategy, but will also attempt to articulate the importance of the marine corps to maritime nations, the future of amphibious wa rfare, and the new role and missions for the marines. It is hoped that a broad-spectrum view can help avoid an insular or overly intuitive understanding of the issues that may call for an undue reduction or de-activation of a force with significant combat capabilities. This would not only cause Taiwan to lose the amphibious warfare skills that can only be accrued over a long period of time, but would also deny this maritime nation a powerful instrument with which to influence events on land. For a maritime nation like Taiwan, the fate of its marine corps is not purely a matter of military organizational restructure. Instead, it must be considered with foresight at the level of national strategy.

海軍陸戰隊對海洋國家的重要性
Importance of Marine Corps to Maritime Nations

向岸遂行兵力投射係海軍陸戰隊的主要任務，其採行的方式則是藉艦岸運動突穿敵人灘頭進而侵入敵人的領土。對此，海軍戰略家柯白闡釋如下：
Power projection ashore is the principal mission of the Marine Corps, conducted through ship-to-shore movements to penetrate the beachheads into enemy-controlled territory. On this, Sir Julian Corbett had the following thought:

單獨的海軍行動幾乎不可能決定戰爭的勝負，若無外力協助，海軍對敵人的施壓僅能以消耗方式進行，其產生的效果通常緩不濟急，… …若欲定出勝負必須對敵施以迅速而猛烈的壓力，由於人類生活於陸上而非海上，除了極少的例子外，交戰雙方的最後結果通常係以兩種方式予以決定，其一係陸軍進佔敵國的領土，其次係海軍使陸軍能夠有此可能。1 “for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow,… … For a firm decision a quicker and more drastic form of pressure is requited. Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided— except in the rarest cases— either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.” 1

就柯白的觀點而論，向岸遂行兵力投射係海軍戰略的重要任務，亦係海權國家對陸上作戰建立控制的重要手段。換言之，艦隊的運用通常係來達成海洋戰略的目標，而非海軍作戰的目標。在此必須重申的，當敵人具有爭奪制海的能力與意志時，海軍戰略可以視為一個獨立概念；若非如此，艦隊的行動將是從屬的，它的主要目標係支援陸上作戰。2就廣義的權力面向言，海權的主要任務在向岸遂行兵力投射，由於全世界四分之三的人口與百分之八十的城市與工業中心集中於沿海地區，3倘若欲藉軍事力量影響他國政府，能在敵人不同灘頭登陸遂行境外突襲任務的海軍陸戰隊，不證自明地，將成為海洋國家最重要的戰略資產。
In Corbett’s view, projecting power ashore is an important part of naval strategy and an important means by which the maritime powers can establish control over combat operations on land. In other words, fleet deployment is often conducted to facilitate the objectives of the maritime strategy, rather than those of naval operations alone. It must be emphasized that, when the enemy possesses the means and the will to contest sea control, naval strategy can be seen as an independent concept. Otherwise, fleet action shall be subordinate to the goals of supporting the war on land.2 In a general sense, the major mission of sea power is to project power ashore. Because three quarters of the earth’s population and 80% of the cities and industrial centers are concentrated alone the littoral regions of the world,3 the ability to carry out landing assaults on disparate enemy beaches, embodied in the marine corps, undoubtedly will become the most important strategic asset to a maritime nation.

尤其重要的，當海洋國家擁有一支中等規模的海軍陸戰隊後，將使其敵國或潛在競爭者如芒刺在背般的痛苦難耐，同時必須將此可能出現的兩棲入侵納入軍事或國家安全戰略考量。柯白在《海洋戰略基本原理》一書中，曾以英國對抗拿破崙的戰爭為例闡釋此一概念：
Of particular importance is that the possession of a medium-sized marine corps by a maritime power could cause its enemies or potential rivals considerable distress, as they would have to factor the eventuality of an amphibious invasion into their respective military or national security strategies. In his Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett had illustrated this concept using Britain’s war against Napolean as an example:

英國以當斯運輸船團上的三萬人，迫使拿破崙由國民兵團中抽調三十萬的兵力，用以防禦法國的海岸線。拿破崙寫道：「以當斯運輸船團的三萬人，英國可以牽制法國的三十萬軍隊，且使法國成為一個二等國家」。4 “called upon to work out a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than 300,000 men from the National Guard to defend the French coasts. ‘With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs,’ the Emperor wrote, ‘the English can paralyse 300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class Power.’” 4

更確切地說，由於英國擁有兩棲進犯能力，它可以小規模的分遣隊入侵歐洲大陸，迫使英國的敵人必須抽調大量兵力防守其逶邐的海岸線。對此，柯白進一步地予以闡釋：
More precisely, because Britain possessed the ability to mount an amphibious invasion, she could deploy small contingents in incursions into the European continent, forcing Britain’s enemies to divert large amounts of forces to defend their extended coastline. Corbett further explains:

英國入侵歐陸的兵力雖較後者部隊的數量為少，卻可產生不成比例的效果… … 這支部隊的價值在於能牽制遠較其本身數量為多的敵方部隊。5 “So long as such intervention took an amphibious form they knew its disturbing effect upon a European situation was always out of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the positive results it could give… … Its value lay in its power of containing force greater than its own.” 5

藉由先前分析，讀者不難發現一支兩棲兵力對於海洋國家的重大戰略意涵，即令這支兵力規模不大，敵對一方仍須正視這支部隊的存在及其背後潛藏未露的戰略價值。檢證海軍史不難發現，有一個事實會令潛在敵人惴惴不安，此即世界上沒有任何地點可以免於來自海上的攻擊。6由於兩棲部隊具有高度的機動性，敵人必須處處設防方能防範對其進行快速襲擊。台灣是一個典型的海洋國家，無論基於「境外決戰」戰略考量，或係執行外島增援作戰或對中國大陸發起兩棲襲擊，必須保有一支相當規模的海軍陸戰隊方能執行上述各項任務。
From the preceding analysis, it is not difficult to realize the tremendous strategic significance an amphibious force represents to the maritime power. The adversary must heed the existence of such a force and the strategic potential thereof, even if such a force were of only limited scale. Naval history holds one fact that could render a potential enemy restless. That is, there is no place in the world that could be invulnerable to attacks from the sea.6 Because of the high degree of mobility of amphibious forces, the enemy must maintain extensive defenses in order to protect against rapid assault by
such forces. Taiwan is a typical maritime nation and, therefore, must maintain a marine corps of significant scale in order to fulfill its mission needs, whether out of considerations for “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” strategy, reinforcement of offshore islands, or an amphibious incursion against the Chinese Mainland.

值得一提的，台灣所處的位置恰居中國大陸海岸線的中央，若我方擁有一支戰力強大的兩棲部隊，兩天內可對中國大陸沿海任何地方遂行兩棲襲擊。7就當前國防戰略考量，我國應建立一支能將戰力有效投射至中國大陸沿海的兵力，方能增加「有效嚇阻」軍事戰略的可信度。因此，在中共積極建設海軍陸戰隊的同時，裁減我國海軍陸戰隊的數量不僅有違軍事戰略的指導，亦將導致「我消彼長」的不利戰略態勢。或許在討論海軍陸戰隊是否裁減這個議題上，不妨聽聽美國前兩棲訓練司令麥克林少將的一席話，他剴切地指出：
It should be noted that Taiwan’s central location along the Chinese coastline allows a powerful amphibious force the ability to launch an amphibious assault against any point alone the China coast within two days.7 Given current strategic considerations, Taiwan should establish a force capable of projecting combat power to the littoral regions of China, so as to enhance the credibility of its military deterrent. Therefore, reducing its marine corps at a time when China is aggressively building up her naval infantry not only runs out of compliance with Taiwan’s strategic guideline but would also adversely affect the military balance in the Taiwan Straits. On this issue, it is perhaps worthwhile to remember the sobering words of RADM. John S. McClain, Jr., former commanding officer of the U.S. Amphibious Training Command:

當前，我們（美國）的國策應是要求海軍能夠具有將陸戰隊送往任何地點遂行登陸的能力。海軍兩棲部隊的任務，便是要在接到命令時，能在指定的時間與地點完成此項使命。8 “Presently, our policy should be to require that the Navy possess the capability to transport the Marines to any location to conduct landing operations. The mission of amphibious naval forces is to complete this task at the appointed time and place, when ordered.” 8

基於當前我國軍事戰略需要，海軍陸戰隊是一支無可替代的國防武力，麥克林少將的一席話，值得國防計畫者與戰略研究者深思。對於力主裁減海軍陸戰隊的人士，相信亦可從中獲得若干啟示。
Taiwan’s present military needs dictate that the ROC Marine Corps is an irreplaceable force. McClain’s statement ought to be sobering for Taiwan’s defense planners and students of strategy alike, as well as for the proponents of deep cuts in the ROCMC.

兩棲作戰的未來發展
The Future of Amphibious Warfare

兩棲作戰曾成功地運用於二次大戰的太平洋戰區，美軍利用兩棲部隊的機動性與強大火力，得能選擇打擊日軍脆弱之處，對戰爭的勝利做出了決定性的貢獻。9然而，原子彈的問世結束了二次世界大戰，亦使許多將領認為兩棲作戰在未來將走入歷史。10就當前而言，監偵科技的不斷進步，水雷、攻船飛彈與各式武器威力日增，兩棲作戰的發起似乎更是難上加難，因此海軍陸戰隊在現代戰爭中的角色將日漸式微。這種說法並非全然正確，因為科技的進步固然增加了兩棲作戰的挑戰，但亦使兩棲作戰的型式發生了根本性轉變。
Amphibious warfare was successfully conducted in the Pacific Theater during World War II, whereby the U.S., by employing the mobility and fire power of its amphibious forces to exploit Japanese weaknesses, made decisive contributions to successful prosecution of the war.9 However, with the advent of the atomic bomb that ended WWII, many military leaders had thought that amphibious warfare would become history. 10 The rapid advances in surveillance and reconnaissance technology, coupled with the improving effectiveness of weapons such as mines and anti-ship missiles, now make amphibious operations seem more difficult than ever. Some would even argue that the role of the Marine Corps is a steadily diminishing one. However, this is not entirely accurate, for while the technological advances have increased the challenges to the amphibious operations, technology has also caused a fundamental transformation in the conduct of amphibious warfare.

因此，討論海軍陸戰隊裁減問題時，必須對現行兩棲作戰的理論進行瞭解，方能對未來進行長遠的前瞻。若在未經深思熟慮情況下貿然裁減海軍陸戰隊，相關的灘勤技術必將隨著部隊撤廢逐漸式微，當有需要欲重新建立這項能力，必須再次耗費大量的資金與時間。11
A proper understanding of existing amphibious warfare theory is required, therefore, in order to develop relevant foresight and to avoid the enormous cost penalties associated with the rebuilding of important capabilities (such as beach support) that would be lost due to any rash decisions to dramatically restructure the ROC Marine Corps.11

明瞭了探討兩棲作戰理論的重要性後，本文將對現存的兩棲作戰理論進行扼要說明，此可做為我國未來決定海軍陸戰隊兵力結構的參考，亦能協助國防當局規劃一支能夠適應未來兩棲作戰的海軍陸戰隊。截至目前為止，兩棲作戰理論涵括下列四種不同型式，此即傳統登陸理論、兩棲機動戰理論、超視距兩棲突擊理論與海空一體兩棲作戰理論。12
This article will now proceed to briefly survey current amphibious theories, which, it is hoped, could help guide Taiwan’s defense authorities in their planning of the future of the ROCMC. Amphibious operations consist of four major types: conventional landing, amphibious maneuver warfare, over-the-horizon assault and combined (sea/air) operations. 12

傳統登陸理論
Conventional Landing

傳統兩棲作戰係一種典型的強渡海區與背水攻堅的作戰方式。一般而言，其實施方式係預先確定登陸地點與時間後，建立登陸部隊或是兩棲特遣部隊，集結裝載後由護航艦艇掩護載有登陸部隊的運輸船團航渡至目標區。其後，在強大海、空火力的支援下，將登陸部隊、裝備和物資換乘至登陸艇和兩棲登陸車編成舟波，強行突擊登陸灘頭。由於必須於敵人猛烈炮火下強行登陸灘頭，傳統兩棲作戰要求三至五倍的兵力與火力優勢，藉著大量的火力消耗來降低敵方的抗登陸能力。換言之，這是一種典型的消耗戰作為，其能達成的效果通常係與投入戰場的人力與物力成正比。因此，目前美國在內的許多國家，不時出現否定傳統登陸理論的文章和觀點，其認為傳統兩棲作戰的勝利很大程度上仰賴人員與裝備的整體優勢，而非良好的軍事才能。13
Conventional landing is the classic form of amphibious warfare, with forcible crossing of water bodies and assault on defended shores. Generally speaking, such operations requires pre-selection of landing zones and landing times; formation of landing forces or amphibious task groups, plus the embarkation and transportation of such forces to the target area using escorted transport vessels. This landing force is then transferred to landing craft or landing vehicles and ferried ashore in waves, under heavy air and naval fire support, to assault enemy beachheads. Because the landing has to be
conducted under heavy enemy fire, conventional amphibious warfare calls for a three-to-five times numerical advantage, as well as superior fire power to attrite enemy resistance. In other words, this is a classical form of attrition warfare, and its effectiveness is normally directly proportional to the manpower and material resources committed. For this reason, opinions refuting conventional landing theory occasionally appear in many countries (including the U.S.), arguing that such operations rely heavily on the superiority in man power and equipment, rather than sound military capability.13

兩棲機動戰理論
Amphibious Maneuver Warfare

兩棲機動戰理論係傳統登陸理論與機動作戰概念結合後的產物，其立論的基礎包括兩個部份：其一係「選擇論」，其二為「作戰周期」理論。由於「選擇論」概念的運用，兩棲機動戰理論將登陸方向、地點與時間的選擇視做一個博弈過程，強調在挑戰和反應、試探和反應的相互過程中尋求可能性的集合，進而在可能性集合中選擇出「期望可能性」，這是與傳統兩棲作戰理論的最大不同。「作戰周期」係將戰爭的進行分成周而復始的四個階段，此即「觀察─判斷─決策─行動」迴路。14依此理論，武裝衝突皆可視為敵對雙方較量誰先完成上述循環的競賽。周期短的一方，能超前對手完成此循環，掌握戰場的主動而戰勝對方。周期長的一方，基於判斷而採取行動時，對手已先行採取其他行動而使狀況出現徹底改變，因此無法適時因變，導致慌亂終致失敗。15
The theory of amphibious maneuver warfare is the product of combining conventional landing and maneuver warfare. It basic premises are two-prong: selection theory and operational cycle. Using Selection Theory, amphibious maneuver warfare treats the selection of landing axis, location, and time as a gaming process that emphasizes on finding a collection of possible outcomes through the interactive process between challenge/ reaction and probing/reaction. The Anticipated Possibility can then be selected from the collection of possible outcomes. The Operational Cycle divides the process of combat operations into four repeating phases known as the OODA Loop (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action).14 According to this theory, armed conflicts can be seen as a contest between the two sides to complete the cycle first. The side with the shorter cycle time can control the initiative on the battlefield and therefore secure victory. Because the opponent would have already taken a new action by the time it determined the significance of its observation of the enemy’s (previous) action, the side with the longer OODA cycle would not be able to adjust to the changing tactical situation, ultimately resulting in collapse.15

兩棲機動戰理論反對運用強大火力對敵人灘頭攻堅，其強調的重點係運用令人防不勝防的機動形成有利態勢，避實擊虛尋找敵人弱處遂行兩棲登陸。就理論而言，此一兩棲作戰方式可降低登陸部隊的數量與火力需求，亦可減少登陸部隊在敵方灘頭的大量傷亡。然而，兩棲機動戰理論存有相當的風險，當守方的作戰周期接近攻方，且火力或數量優於後者時，避實擊虛的戰術將喪失揮灑空間，要不放棄既定登陸計晝，就是必須與佔有優勢的守方進行背水一戰。16
Amphibious maneuver warfare is opposed to the use of massed firepower to attack enemy beachheads, but rather emphasizes the use of fluid maneuvers to create an advantage and to bypass or avoid the enemy’s strengths and conduct the landing at the enemy’s weak point(s). This concept promises to lower the force size and fire power requirements of amphibious operations, while also reducing casualties at the beachhead. Yet, considerable risks exist with amphibious maneuver warfare theory. When the defender’s OODA cycle is closely matched with that of the attacking side, or if the defender possesses superiority in fire power or numbers, the attacker’s ability to explore
enemy weaknesses through maneuvering will no longer be practical. At that point, the attacker must either abandon its original landing plans or fight a frontal assault with a numerically superior enemy. 16

超視距登陸理論
Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Amphibious Assault

超視距登陸理論又稱為超地平線登陸理論，此兩棲作戰主要特癥係人員換乘與舟波編成均在敵方岸上感測器可及範圍外的海區進行。相對的，傳統登陸理論主張的人員換乘與舟波編成係於距岸數浬進行。超視距登陸理論的出現係與超視距攻擊武器的發展息息相關，採行此種方式遂行兩棲登陸具有「安全性高」與「奇襲性佳」的雙重優點。即令如此，超視距登陸理論仍有其先天上的弱點，此即提供火力支援的海軍艦艇由於經常處於岸射攻船飛彈的射程內，因此必須承擔可能遭其中創或擊沉的高度風險。另一方面，即使兩棲登陸的發起遠在視距範圍外，但當兩棲突擊載具放出後，兩棲登陸艦的位置極可能很快地暴露，招致敵方空中兵力攻擊。17
The principal characteristic of Over-the-Horizon (OTH) landing is that the transfer of troops onto assault transports and the organization of the assault waves both take place at sea beyond the range of the enemy’s shore-based sensors. By contrast, conventional landing calls for the transfer and formation of assault waves just a few miles off shore. The emergence of OTH operations is closely related to the development of beyond-visual range weapons, such that conducting amphibious operations in this (OTH) manner holds the advantages of surprise and greater operational safety. Even so, OTH landing still has its inherent flaws. That is, the naval vessels that provide the necessary fire support often have to be within the range of shore-based anti-ship missiles and, therefore, potentially vulnerable. Moreover, even if the amphibious landing were launched from beyond the horizon, the positions of the landing ships could soon be compromised following the release of the assault vehicles, resulting in counter-attacks by enemy air assets.17