國防政策評論，第三卷，第一期，二○○二年秋季
Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol.3, No.1, Autumn 2002

變遷似乎是對作戰效能造成了一個不可接受的風險
Changes that Are very Likely to Pose an Unacceptable Risk
to Operational Effectiveness

在這裡將討論是否要給予女性更多擔任軍事戰鬥角色的工作機會問題——尤其是軍隊把「作戰」的準則視為其核心任務和認同的脈絡裡。
Here there is the question of whether to widen employment opportunities for women in army combat roles – especially in the context of the army’s commitment to the doctrine of war fighting as its core mission and identity.

與此相關的是，皇家海軍陸戰隊的安琪拉•塞達案例的意涵（一九九九年十月）：機會平等的原則在基於公共安全理由的基礎上，是可允許破例的；但是歐盟的會員國必須去建立公共安全的要件，以作為判別的標準及判別那些需要是合於比例原則的。歐洲法庭規定英國可以基於Article 2 (2) of Directive 76/207/EEC 的規定，於此規定中，英國明確地提出戰鬥效能的需求，規定所有陸戰隊員（即使是廚師）要能夠像前線突擊隊員般地作戰，這是基於作業互通性的要求。21
Of relevance here are the implications of the recent Angela Sirdar case in the Royal Marines (October 1999): Derogations are permissible from the principle of equal opportunity on the ground of public security but the member state of the European Union (EU) must establish the needs of public security justify the proposed measure and the measure is proportionate to those needs. The European Court of Justice ruled that the UK could rely on Article 2(2) of Directive 76/207/EEC that the UK had submitted evidence that the needs of combat effectiveness required all marines (even chefs) to be capable of operating as front line commandos: this is the principle of inter-operability.21

相當有趣地，在其他的案例（坦雅•克瑞兒）中，女性在德國國防軍中被排除於所有牽涉到使用武器的職務，法庭（在二○○一年一月）引用德國憲法的排除規定，認為適用於所有的軍事職務，在女性可能被要求使用武器一事上，是不能有例外規定的，因此德國的禁制並非是一個「合於比例原則的判決」。22 即使適用在皇家海軍陸戰隊突擊隊的作業互通性原則並不在同樣方式上被採納，我們能認為現在英國步兵以及裝甲戰鬥職務對於女性的排除，可被視為合理的或是合於比例原則的
嗎？
Interestingly, in another case (Tanja Kreil), concerning women being excluded from all posts involving use of arms in the Bundeswehr, the Court ruled (in January 2001) that the German constitutional exclusion, which applies to all military posts, could not justify the derogation, even though women may be called on to use force of arms. The German ban was not a proportional measure.22 Can one assume the current exclusion of women from UK infantry and armour combat posts would be seen as justified and proportionate, even if the principle of inter-operability does not apply in the same way as in Special Forces such as Royal Marine Commandos?

誠然，一些部隊的成員已經指出他們希望將這議題放在表單的第二條，舉例來說，就像上面所指出的，群體代表權自治模式的發展——或者是軍人工會。它也許就像在不同世代的不同個別軍種的人員之間，有著不同的觀點。
Indeed, some members of the armed services have indicated that they would wish to place this issue on the second list of items, indicated above, in place of, for example, the development of autonomous modes of group representation – or military unionism. It may well be that there are differences of view amongst personnel from different individual services as well as different age cohorts.

為形成政策，英國參考其他國家的經驗，亦即以色列國防軍。它之所以特別有趣在於，女性在擔任準軍事警察以及邊界戰鬥位置的禁令解除後（一九九五年），女性的地位立即延伸到以色列國防軍地面部隊的戰鬥核心——突擊隊伴隨著女性的飛行員或海軍女兵逐漸變成潮流。雖然目前戰爭威脅的可能性小上許多，但這危機似乎尚未完全結束，戰爭的可能性不能全然被排除。同時，一九九八年，形式上對女性排除於法國軍隊的禁令（事實上，是有節制的排除）完全解除。根據晚近發展所顯示，此一禁令的解除對於女性希望加入全為男性的傳統戰鬥部隊的態度並未有太大的變化。
In formulating policy the UK looks at experiences of other countries, e.g. Israeli Defence Forces. It will be especially interesting to observe how far the lifting of the formal ban on women in paramilitary police and combat positions in border guards (in 1995) will in practice, be extended to the fighting core of the Israeli Defence Force ground forces - assault troops and commandos to accompany female pilots and personnel in the Navy coming on stream. This seems for the moment unlikely, although with any further diminution of the threat of war, a ssuming an end to the current crisis, it cannot be ruled out altogether. Meanwhile, in 1998 the formal exclusion of women from remaining employments was lifted (de facto, with modest exceptions) in the French armed forces. Judging from recent developments this lifting of the formal exclusion has not, in fact, led to that much change in terms of women wishing to join the more traditional male combat arms.

無論如何，國外的發展——尤其是歐盟，特別是基於法律的理由——將會影響英國軍隊的思維與實踐。對現在而言，一個關鍵的議題是，最好是把禁制女性的形式排除，然後看看「市場力量」的結果（全部開放讓有意願者留著後，也許很少女性有意願去參與，就像筆者所言自一九九八年後的法國一般）；或者是在原則上保續一個排除政策。就像皇家海軍陸戰隊的瑟達案例，但這將需要在法庭有扎實的證據來辯護。在這裡，就像同性戀議題一般，不確定的證明與他們自己的專業判斷，對軍隊而言，是不足以在法庭上戰勝的。以現行社會和法律的趨勢為前提，筆者不認為對女性任何工作機會的「形式上」排除可以長久持續下去。真實的議題是戰術之一：軍隊是否應該在性別中立的判準基礎上（奠基於男性和女性都需要通過相同角色與任務的特殊測驗），去選擇在地面部隊應否包含女性﹖這將構作一個更可辯護、實用主義式對於當前社會常規和法律禁制的修正，而不是尋求回到某種以性別為規
範的系統（以法律的觀點來看，任何案例都難以再引進平等機會委員會於一九九八年所反對對男性的不平等之後）。23當然這將有待具體的實施。24
Whatever develops abroad - and especially in the EU, for legal reasons - will be influential on the thinking and practice of the British army. For now a key issue is whether it is best to lift the formal exclusion of women and then see what ‘market forces’ produce (perhaps very few women who desire to join, pass the entry standard and then desire to remain, as I suggested in France since 1998) or to continue with a policy for exclusion on principle. This would, as in the Sirdar case in the Royal Marines, require defending with sound evidence in a court of law. Here, as with the homosexuality issue, inconclusive evidence together with professional judgements on their own may be insufficient for the
armed forces to prevail in a court of law. Given current social and legal trends I cannot foresee the formal exclusion of women from any employments lasting very long. The real issue is one of tactics: should the army opt for inclusion of women in ground forces on the basis of gender neutral criteria (based on men and women having to pass the same role and task specific tests)? This would constitute a more defensible, pragmatic adjustment to current social norms and legal constraints than seeking to return to some kind of gender-normed system, (which, from a legal point of view, would in any case be difficult to reintroduce after the Equal Opportunities Commission objected in 1998 that it
was unfair to men).23 Of course this would still leave significant implementation issues to be resolved.24

所以，什麼可被置放在第三個表單？殘障者的工作機會相當多地受到了平民化和契約化的過程所限制，而需要在均一化的人事中找到最大的彈性，對殘障者而言，反而很容易在他們的軍事訓練「之後」於軍中找到工作機會。
So what else might be placed on the third list? Disabled employment possibilities are much limited by process of civilianisation and contractorisation and need for full flexibility amongst uniformed personnel, quite apart from the point that it is easier to find employment for people disabled in service after their military training.

以冒險、犧牲、勇氣和正直的需要為前提，存有一個需要比某些非軍方組織所要求的更高道德基準的基礎——此一觀點並非根基於道德優越性上，而是在難以言喻的作戰需求判斷上。回到少數族裔社群的議題，去要求軍隊反映出在更寬闊的機會平等上之價值是一回事，但對軍隊裡少數族裔社群的「統計式的代表性」（結果的平等）此一目標的追求是實在地或者是可接受的嗎？事實上相當可信的是，對於機會平等的追求將可能導致在社會中少數族裔人口和他們在軍中之間的比例長久的分歧。25
Given the need for risk-taking, sacrifice, and courage and integrity there is a basis for requirement of higher moral standards than might be asked in some non-military organisations – a view rooted not in sense of moral superiority but hard nosed judgement of an operational requirement. Turning back to the minority ethnic communities question, it is one thing to ask the service to reflect wider values of equal opportunity, but is it realistic and acceptable to pursue the objective of the statistical representation (equality of outcome) of minority ethnic communities in the armed services? It is quite
possible that the pursuit of equal opportunities might, in fact, lead to a persistent but justifiable divergence between proportion of minority ethnic populations in wider society and those in the armed services.25

最後，讓筆者提到在於指責和補償文化的社會文化傾向，這亦即是沒有自我責任之個人自由的信仰，一個逐漸增長、危險且令人嫌惡的文化。將會（A）腐蝕了在戰鬥精神的核心中，軍人自我犧牲的精神；（B）暗中破壞了了民間、軍事領袖以及公眾意願去接受在作戰中意外傷亡的基礎。
Lastly, let me mention the socio-cultural trend of the blame and compensation culture– that is the belief in individual freedom without self-responsibility; and an increasingly risk averse culture. Both are likely to (a) erode military self-sacrifice at the core of fighting spirit (b) undermine civilian and military leaders and public’s will to accept casualties in operations.

結論
Conclusion

什麼可能是我們在上面研究所勾勒出的東西﹖首先，我們要去想的，也許不只是在上面表單中的前三點所列出的東西，尤其是對「同性戀者」的解禁之後。無疑地它須要在軍事的範疇中多想想，。就像國防部長在二○○一年十一月所評論的，在軍中唯一「神聖而不可侵犯」的應該是作戰的效能。26
What may we draw from the above analysis? First, perhaps the list of items in the vital ground on the third of the above lists is not as long as one might think, especially after the lifting of the ban on ‘gays’. Certainly it has given pause for thought in military circles. As the Minister of State for the Armed Forces remarked in November 2001, the only ‘sacred cow’ in the armed services should be operational effectiveness.26

再者，有必要以權宜的途徑來檢討重大理由——舉例來說，戰鬥中的女性也許可被接受，但並非憑藉著性別規範（就像筆者在上述所觀察到，以法律的理由），尤其是如果我們嚴肅地用以作戰準則來看的話。
Second, there is a need to keep the vital ground under review by a pro-active approach- for example, women in combat might be acceptable but not via gender norming (for legal reasons as I observed above) especially if one takes seriously the doctrine of war fighting.

第三點，重大理由需要由「戰鬥效能」的概念來加以判別。至少有兩點現在在討論中：滿編的武力，這即是說，募兵與部隊維持到可欲的程度（現在，英國軍隊整體超過九千缺員，而陸軍有著超過六千缺員27）。其次則是應該有作戰能力，不管滿編的武力是否有裝備、準則、風氣，或者是「文化軟體」能在戰爭中發揮作戰效能。符合第一個定義，不必然就會符合第二個定義。的確，在兩者之間存有緊張。舉例來說，某些人將認為徵募更多的女性（尤其是經由性別規範的判準）可以減低尤其是步兵的缺員；其他人則建議就算使法律的反對可以被克服，強求滿編的武力也將會造成作戰能力上的減退。
Third, the vital ground needs to be informed by a concept of combat effectiv eness. At least two of these are in current circulation: a fully manned force, that is to say, one that is recruited and retained to desired levels. (Currently, the British Army is over 6000 personnel short while the figure for the armed services overall is over 9000 27.) Second there is operational capability, whether that fully manned force has the equipment, doctrine, the ethos or ‘cultural software’ to perform effectively in war. It is by no means evident that meeting the demands of the first definition will, ipso facto lead to meeting the second. Indeed, there may be tensions between the two. For example, some would argue recruiting more women (especially via gender normed criteria) could ease especially the
infantry shortfall; others would suggest that full manning would then be achieved at the cost of operational capability even if the legal objections could be overcome.

第四點，我們必須認知到，基於社會和法律的理由，舉證責任已經移轉到那些希望「為」有所不同的需要提出主張的人——這是在過去二十年來，一個在政治和法律上的關鍵變遷。
Fourth, we must recognise that the burden of proof has shifted for social and legal reasons to those who wish to argue for a need to be different – this is a key political and legal change over the past 20 years.

第五點也是最後一點，以模糊足跡或者是軍隊在社會中的存在為前提而言——在菁英與大眾的層次——對軍隊而言，強化軍民理解的連結以合法化他們有所不同的需要，是一個關鍵角色。去做到這一點，就像筆者認為蓋瑞將軍在他公開宣言所暗示的，他們需要落實影響；為了做到這個，他們必須小心地不要破壞文人領軍的規範，但並不是透過與政黨的政治結盟的方式。對英國軍隊而言，為了捍衛他們專有的利益，而變得和某一個政黨有著公開地交往，就像美軍所做的一樣，這將是不明智的。
Fifth and finally, given the fainter footprint or presence of the military in wider society at the level of elite and mass public - there is a need for the armed services to play a key role in reinforcing bonds of civil-military understanding in order to legitimise their need to be different. To do this, as I think General Guthrie implied in his public pronouncements, they need to exercise influence but not in a party political partisan way, and in doing so they must be careful not to break the norms of civilian control of military affairs. It would be most unwise for the British armed services, in the defence of their professional interests, to become publicly associated with one political party, which some fear their counterparts have already done in the United States.

註釋
Reference