引言
Introduction

現代傳統戰爭中，空權對任何地面與水面作戰之遂行至為重要。對台灣的國防規畫人員而言，歷來與中共的軍事衝突顯示，如果沒有空中掩護，肯定要限於困殆。一九五五年一月，孤懸海外的一江山島陷共，七百餘名守軍全滅；同年二月，我軍撤出大陳島。其原因均在我空軍限於距離無法持續對該二地提供制空保護。一九五八年八月二十三日，中共以火砲急襲金門，第二次台海危機爆發。而此次，我空軍充分掌握制空。自八月到十月，雙方爆發不下七次的大型空戰，我空軍在空戰中擊落中共米格機計三○架，而我方在空戰中僅損失一架戰機。1 無論中共砲襲金門的目的在取下金門或只是給台灣與美國一個下馬威，制空權的掌握對金門防衛作戰有明顯的貢獻，也間接地支撐了蔣介石高風險的政治謀略。
Airpower is a leverage of critical importance for the conduct of ground or naval operations in modern conventional warfare. For Taiwan’s defense planners, there are ample lessons from previous conflicts with People’s Republic of China (PRC) that without air cover the defender would be left vulnerable and stranded. Both the loss of Ichiangshan Island with some seven hundred defenders slaughtered in January 1955 and the unwilling withdrawal from Tachen Island the following February were due to the fact that the ROC Air Force (ROCAF) could not provide and sustain air protection over the two distant islands. On 23rd August 1958, the PRC shelled Kinmen Islands and the second Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. This time, the ROCAF controlled the air over the theater of operations. From August to October, there were no less than seven major air engagements; the ROCAF shot down thirty Chinese MIGs while only lost one F-86 in air-to-air combat.1 No matter what aims the PRC had in shelling the Kinmen Islands, whether it was to take the islands or merely to intimidate the Taiwanese and Americans, the ROCAF’s firm control of the air made a significant contribution to the Islands’ defense and indirectly supported President Chiang Kai-sheck’s risky political stratagem.

另一方面，制空權的掌握程度為台灣整體軍事戰略的規劃核心。同時，許多有關陸、海軍在台灣防衛作戰中角色之重大辯論，無不回到一個基本的議題，那便是：制空權。舉例來說，在海軍建軍的「近岸水域派」與「遠洋水域派」的爭論中，兩者一致認為台海上空或是艦隊上空的制空對於海軍的行動至為重要，但不同的是，前者認為我空軍將無法持續對艦隊提供制空保護，因此小型艦隻在此一可能的惡劣環境下存活的機率較高；而後者則認為透過防空能力的提昇——如採購配備有標準二型飛彈與較佳防空作戰系統的紀德艦，海軍艦隊可以從被保護者的地位轉變成空軍在防空任務上的主動伙伴。2前者是目前海軍主流思想，強調「空岸配合」，海軍行動以近海為有利，不宜實施遠程邀擊。3 後者成為《海軍願景》的骨幹，強調擴大艦隊作戰半徑，防空與空管能力大增的海軍艦隊將期待成為空軍在空戰機的浮動空中作戰中心，導引戰機實施視距外攻擊，向前延伸武力投射能力。4
From another perspective, the degree of control of the air lies at the core of Taiwan’s overall defense planning. Many, if not all, of the crucial debates over the roles that the ROC Army (ROCA) or the ROC Navy (ROCN) would perform in defending Taiwan inevitably touch the basic issue: control of the air. For example, in the debate between the “Grey Water School” and the “Blue Water School” concerning the ROCN’s future forceplanning, both schools agree that Taiwan’s air superiority over the Taiwan Strait or, at least, the capability of the ROCAF to cover ROCN operations is critical. Where they differ is in the former’s skepticism that the ROCAF’s air cover would last for very long and
therefore, by this reasoning, smaller vessels might have a better chance of survival in the face of a PRC offensive. By contrast, the latter argues that, through increasing air defense capabilities – such as to obtain the Kidd class destroyers equipped with Standard II surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and better air defense combat systems – the ROC’s naval fleet could be relieved of being the protege of air pow er to becoming an active partner of the ROCAF in providing for the air defense of Taiwan.2 For the “Grey Water School”, the mainstream of the ROCN’s operational concepts emphases the concept of “Cooperation between Land and Naval Forces” and inshore naval operations and discourages actively engaging with the enemy in distant waters.3 For the latter, engaging with the enemy some distance from Taiwan is the backbones of the Navy Vision. By increasing the
ROCN’s operational radius, as well as improving air defense and battle ma nagement (BM) capabilities, the fleet could become floating Air Operation Centers (AOC). It could thus guide the ROCAF’s aircraft in over-the-horizon attacks and also extend Taiwan’s capability for force projection.4

因此，作者主張：任何對台灣軍事戰略形成過程的論述，不能低估台灣本身對於制空權是否可能取得與如何取得的主觀認知所扮演的關鍵角色。因此，本文在素材上特別重視我國軍方內部的論述。作者認為：外在軍事威脅的認知是主觀的，對於威脅的回應也深受軍種認同的影響與軍種間權力分配的結果。而在我國目前的環境下，要判別特定威脅對於我國國防規劃的影響，不能不去瞭解國防主要規劃者——專業軍人——是如何詮釋與回應這些威脅。為此，本文部份引用台灣軍方的準則論述，部份引用了台灣現役或退役軍方人員的在相關軍方發行刊物上的著作。關於前者，作者必須先提到引用軍方準則上的限制：首先，在目前的保密規定下，我國所有的軍事準則受到密級以上的保護，這使得像作者一般的民間文人要對軍事準則有全面的瞭解與深入的討論幾乎是不可能的，這與先進民主國家準則公開化並鼓勵民間加入精進準則的作法是大相逕庭的。本文所使用的準則資料，均從已發表的公開
著作中再度引用，而非原件，所引用的準則有業已被汰換的可能。其次，每個國家的軍隊對於準則的態度差異度很大，由準則去瞭解一個軍事組織，有可能造成誇大，因為「縱使軍事組織在準則上有所變化，但其組織的主要運作也許毫未改變」；或者「準則的公開與發展可能基於戰略或作戰的考量，但也有可能是基於政治上的原因。」5因此，本文也以國軍軍事刊物上的著作作為素材之一。在與台灣制空權的論述上，國防大學發行的《國防雜誌》與空軍總部所發行的《空軍學術月刊》是主要引用的來源，這些著作雖然未必反映出官方立場，但依軍事刊物的編審作業，它們在一定程度上反映出若干軍隊智識份子的想法。
Thus, the author argues that any literature concerning the formulation of Taiwan’s military strategy should not underestimate the weight of subjective perceptions regarding whether or not air superiority is attainable and how it could be achieved. Particular attention should therefore be given to Taiwanese military writings and debates. The perception of an external military threat is by no means neutral and the feasible solutions to given military threats are subject to the stimulus of Service interests and identities and are invariably the outcome of the power distribution among and between the three Services. Under the present civil-military relations in Taiwan, it is impossible to judge the impact of any given threats upon Taiwan’s defense planning without first considering how the major players in defense planning process and the professional soldiers, sailors and airmen, interpret and respond these threats. In so doing, the many Taiwan’s military doctrines as well as some published articles written by active or retired officers are cited. Regarding the former, there are some caveats to be borne in mind when referring to military doctrinal writings and documents. First, under the current security regulations of Ministry of National Defense (MND), all military doctrines are strictly protected; that is to say they are classified secret and above. This effectively, if not totally, rules out any access for civilian defense analysts to have access to such documents and thereby are hindered in their attempts to gain a comprehensive understanding of and engage in a meaningful discussion on Taiwan’s military doctrines. This situation differs greatly from the practices of the Western Democracies, where the authorities publish most their strategic and military doctrines and encourage their civilians to engage with them in doctrinal debates. As a consequence, no doctrinal referenc e in this article is directly quoted from original documentary sources but are re-quoted from other published materials. The doctrines to which reference may be made may, if fact, be no longer in effect. Furthermore, not all militaries have the same attitude toward their own doctrines. It may risk exaggeration to judge the performance of a military organization solely by their formal doctrines either because “changes in the formal doctrine of a military organization may leave the essential workings of organization unaltered,” or “doctrine may be informed by and developed as much for political as for strategic or operational reasons.” 5 It has therefore been necessary to refer to some articles published in military journals, such as National Defense Magazine (published by National Defense University) and Air Force Academic Monthly (published by ROCAF HQ) as major sources. These articles may not necessarily reflect official positions, but, considering the reviewing and editing process of Taiwan’s military journals, these articles, to some degree, do provide an insight as to what Taiwan’s military intellectuals think about the issues of air superiority.

本文發現：對於制空權的重要性、中國空中及飛彈威脅的程度與我國空軍兵力居於相對劣勢這幾點上，國軍內部較無歧異。唯對於空軍如何因應中國空中及飛彈威脅，則顯然有兩派截然不同意見。主張「存在空軍」者與主張「積極反制」者在如何運用我劣勢空軍兵力上有歧異的見解，特別是在投入決戰的兵力數量（「力」）、決戰的時點（「時」）與決戰的地點（「空」）上。而在這三點的歧異，對於整體國防規劃將產生深遠的意涵。
This article identifies that there are fewer contradictions within Taiwan military circles regarding the importance of air superiority, the extent and degree of the Chinese air and missile threats, and of the ROCAF’s relative inferiority. However, there are sharp differences concerning how the ROCAF should respond these Chinese air and missile threats. Those who argue ‘wings in being’ have very different views from the advocates of ‘active countermeasure’ concerning how the ROCAF should employ its inferior force, especially in terms of the possible force size needed to engage in the decisive battle (Li –“Capabilities”), the possible timing for the decisive battle (Shih – “Timing”), and the possible location for the decisive battle (Kung – “Space”). Arguably, these differences in capability, timing, and space would produce profound implications on overall defense planning.

制空的概念與內涵
The Concepts and Contents of Air Superiority

制空就像海軍制海的概念一般，吾人無法實質加以佔領天空。理解制空權的方式是以天空為我所用與拒敵所用的程度，將掌控空中的程度分為三種層次：第一層次為無人掌握制空，雙方的空中、地面或海面行動均會冒著遭到另一方空軍或飛彈所阻止的危險。第二層次為制空，敵方空軍或飛彈無法有效阻止我方空中、地面或海面行動。此一層次的制空，通常有時間與地面上的限制，例如局部制空。第三層為空優，敵方空軍或飛彈無法有效干擾我方空中、地面或海面行動。6 易言之，制空所提供的軍事優勢，在於提供我方的空中、地面或海軍行動有免於受到敵方空軍或飛彈發現與攻擊的「行動自由」。7
As one cannot occupy the air, the concept of control of the air is akin to that of command the sea. One way of coming to grips with the concept of control of the air is to measure the degree to which one’s forces are able to use the air and correspondingly deprive enemy from doing likewise. This can be classified in terms of three different levels of control. Air neutrality, the lowest level of control of the air, suggests that neither side is able to claim air superiority and be able to conduct freely air, land, and naval operations without running the risk of encountering enemy air or missile prohibitive interception. Air superiority means the situation in which one can conduct air, land, and naval operations without enemy air and missile prohibitive interference. Air superiority is usually confined to a limited area for a finite period time. A case in point is local air superiority. Air supremacy, the highest level of control of the air, means that the enemy’s air and missile forces cannot effectively interfere with one’s air, land, and naval operations.6 In other words, the military advantage that air superiority would provide is
“freedom of action” which enables air, land, and naval operations to be conducted without being vulnerable to detection and attacks of enemy’s defensive air and missile forces.7

制空權的掌握向被視為空軍戰略中的核心，如非基於其他逼不得已的事態——如以色列空軍在一九七三年贖罪日戰爭為阻擋敘利亞地面部隊在戈蘭高地的進攻，在尚未取得戰區制空權之前，即進行密接支援的任務——制空作戰應為空軍首要任務。戰史顯示，當敵方所擁有的空軍越強大，制空越為必要。因此，至少在衝突伊始時，制空作戰的重要性應高於其他任務而成為空戰的核心。8
The core of air strategy is the ability to attain air superiority. Unless for some other urgent priorities, such as when the Israeli Air Force (IAF) immediately implemented close air support, before it had achieved air superiority attained, to block a Syrian military advance on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, counter-air operation should be the primary mission of all air forces. Experience in wartime indicates that the more formidable the opposing air power, the more pressing counte-air operations become. Thus, the counter-air campaign will invariably be the primary air
campaign; all others will be subordinate in importance, at least at the outset of a conflict. 8

我國空軍準則完全領悟到制空權與制空作戰的重要性。我國空軍認為：「空權為對所望空域作有效控制與運用。」9 我空軍戰略以「擊滅敵空軍為第一要義。」10空軍作戰，以「爭取並保持空優為首要，縱使兵力居於劣勢，亦應於所望時空，勉力爭取局部空優，以利全般作戰。」11
The ROCAF’s doctrines fully recognize the importance of air superiority and counte-rair operations. For the ROCAF, “air power is the effective control and use of the desired airspace.” 9 TheROCAF air strategy regards “the destruction of enemy air force as the top pirority.” 10 The conduct of air operations “should first fight for and secure the air superiority. Even our force is inferior, we also need to strive for local air superiority at the desired space and timing in order to benefit the overall operation.” 11

制空作戰分為兩類，一是攻勢性制空作戰，二是守勢性制空作戰。攻勢性制空作戰「包含以攻勢作戰來摧毀、阻擾與降低敵人的空中與飛彈威脅。」理想中的攻勢性制空作戰「藉由在地面摧毀敵方戰機、飛彈或其支援設備，以阻止敵戰機或飛彈升空。」攻勢性制空的攻擊目標為敵人空防系統（戰機、防砲與地對空飛彈）、機場、戰區飛彈與其發射載台、支援的基礎設施與指管通電情節點。12 攻勢性制空本質上為源頭打擊。
Counter-air operations consists are both offensive and defensive. Offensive counter-air (OCA) consists of, “offensive operations aimed at destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air and missile threats.” Ideally, OCA operations “seek to prevent the launch of aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their supporting systems on the ground.” OCA targets enemy air defense systems (aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to–air missiles), airfields, theater missiles and their platforms, supporting infrastructures, as well as command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence
(C4I) nodes.12 Therefore, OCA, by nature, is an attack on enemy capabilities at source.

守勢性制空作戰「即為防空，其目標在保護我方部隊與重要利益免受敵方空中與飛彈之攻擊」。守勢性制空復分為積極性防空與消極性防空。積極性防空指「摧毀敵方進犯的空中與飛彈威脅或降低其對我打擊之效能的直接防禦行動。」以戰機或地對空飛彈攔截來犯敵機或飛彈是標準的積極性防空作為。消極性防空指「主動防空以外，用以降低敵方來犯空中與飛彈攻擊效能或降低其打擊效果之其他作為。」凡偽裝、隱匿、欺敵、疏散、強化保護等措施皆屬之。13
Defensive counter-air (DCA) is, “to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air and missile attacks and is synonymous with air defense.” DCA consists of both active and passive air defense. Active air defense is, “to direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking air and missile threats or to reduce their effectiveness against friendly forces and assets.” Engaging attacking enemy aircraft and missiles with manned aircraft and SAMs is an example of an active air defense measure. Passive air defense, “includes all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks or measures used to minimize the effectiveness of enemy attacks.” Camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersal and some hardening protection
are examples of passive air defense measures. 13

傳統上，西方的空權理論鼓吹者認為空軍為攻勢軍種，強調戰略轟炸與攻勢性制空作戰。如果，限於戰略環境無法進行源頭打擊，他們也傾向以戰機而非地對空飛彈擔任守勢性制空的要角。換言之，西方的空權理論趨向以戰機的空對地、空對空作戰來獲致制空。以美軍為例，在二次世界大戰之後的重大軍事衝突中，幾乎很少以地對空飛彈來接戰來襲的敵機。
Traditionally, Western airpower advocates assert that an air force, by its nature, is an offensive Service. Air operations should concentrated on strategic bombing as well as OCA. If the strategic environment prohibits from attacking at source, they still prefer to use aircraft than SAMs to execute DCA. In other words, Western airpower theories tend toward using air-to-air or air-to-ground combat to achieve air superiority. For example, the US forces scarcely launched a single SAM against enemy invading aircraft in major conflicts after WW II.

台海制空一般態勢
The General Air Situation cross Strait

本地大部份的軍文作者認為我國空軍儘管在裝備與飛行員的質量上佔有上風，但由於戰略縱深不足、戰機數量上差距太大、政治上的限制與中共空軍現代化的進展，我國空軍整體上是處於劣勢。14
Although the ROCAF enjoys the edge on equipment and pilots over the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), most local military or civilian authors believe that, taking all things into account, the former is inferior relative to the latter because: 1) Taiwan lacks sufficient strategic depth; 2) the wide gap of aircraft number; 3) there are political constraints on the ROCAF; and 4) the progress of PLAAF’s modernization programme. 14

台海海峽寬約七十至一四○浬，可供預警時間相當短促。中共戰機起飛以○•九馬赫飛行約八至十五分鐘即可飛臨台灣本島上空。15 而比起中空空軍空襲更令台灣防衛規劃者頭痛的是：中共二砲部隊的導彈奇襲，目前還沒有有效的方式能夠加以防禦。根據中國導彈突擊戰術教則，一個完成精良訓練的戰術導彈部隊進入發射陣地，完成射擊準備時間約須三○分鐘，加上飛彈發射後所需的飛行時間（七至十分鐘），即令我方能在中國導彈部隊進入發射陣地後即偵知其意圖，則反應時間，也不多於三七分鐘至四○分鐘。16 如果國軍只能在飛彈發射後才能偵測到，以目前國軍所有的長白預警雷達，在解算出飛彈可能落點後，地區野戰指揮官所能有的預警時間將只剩下三、四分鐘。17
The width of the Taiwan Straitis between 70 to 140 nautical miles and works to Taiwan’s disadvantage with regard to early warning of a PLA air or missile attack. PLAAF aircraft could fly into Taiwan’s air space within eight to fifteen minutes (at speeds of Mach 0.9) after take-off.15 Pressing even more severely on Taiwanese defense planning than the PLAAF’s air strikes is the fact that there is no effective means of defense against the PLA Second Artillery’s missile attacks. A well-trained PLA tactical missile unit, according their missile raid tactical manual, could complete its launch preparation within some thirty minutes of moving to its launch site. With a flight time of between seven and ten minutes and the ability to detect Chinese intentions once their missile units had moved to their launch sites, the time available for the Taiwanese to respond would be no more than thirty-seven to forty minutes.16 If Taiwan radar could only detect the invading missiles after launch and after the Taiwanese Chang Bai medium-range radars had calculate their possible points of impact, the available warningtime for local field commanders would be sharply decreased to a mere three to four minutes. 17

中共方面自一九七二年後，逐漸確立奪取制空權的使用方法，包括：壓制敵防空系統、攻擊敵空軍基地與機場、空戰摧毀敵機、攻擊敵軍機生產廠與飛行訓練基地、攻擊敵石油工業等。可動用的武力除空軍戰機外，尚包括導彈、空降部隊、地面部隊、特戰部隊等。18 考慮到爭奪制空權所需成本與風險，飛彈突襲無疑是極具吸引力的選項：

「共軍戰術導彈部隊主要任務在開戰之初奪取制空權。故共軍必運用大量戰術導彈猛烈攻擊，來撕裂我軍嚴密的防空網，導彈攻擊首要目標當為我空軍各處機場、陸基防空飛彈陣地、管報雷達站、指管通信中心等。雖然以上目標有相當的掩護，但只要有一枚導彈發生破壞作用，就可造成我空防上一個空隙，共軍航空兵就利用我空防間隙，採多空層、多批次不間斷猛烈攻擊擴大我空防上間隙成為防空大洞，....導致我整體防空網的崩潰。」19

Since 1972, the measures that the PLA needed to employ to attain the desired air superiority has gradually taken shape. These measures have included: 1) the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD); 2) to strike enemy airbases and airfields; 3) to destroy enemy aircraft in the air; 4) to attack enemy aircraft production factories and training bases; and (5) to bomb enemy petroleum industries. The possible forces deployed to achieve these objectives would include, in addition to PLAAF aircraft, missiles, paratroopers, land forces, and special forces.18 Considering the cost and risk involved in
attaining the desired air superiority over Taiwan, missile raids inevitably become an attractive option:

The main task of the PLA tactical missile forces is to gain air superiority at the outset of war. Therefore, the PLA would definitely launch a huge number of missiles to attack us, to tear up our concentrated air defense net-work. The most likely targets would be our airfields, land -based SAMs, radar sites, and C4I centers. These targets may have been well-protected, but if one enemy missile scores a direct hit, it could break a hole in our air defense network. The PLAAF aircraft would immediately exploit that hole and, by continuous intense air strikes, tear it up into a huge gap .... and cause our overall air defense network to collapse.19

我空軍在本島西岸的機場對於中共的飛彈突擊尤其敏感，而承平時，在這些機場駐有我空軍將近百分之六十的兵力（見表一與文後圖一）。
The ROCAF airfields locate on the Western coast of Taiwan are especially sensitive to possible PLAAF missile raids. In peacetime, approximately 60% of the ROCAF aircraft are stationed at these airfields (see table-1 and figure-1 at the end of the article).

表一：中華民國空軍戰鬥序列
Table-1: Order of Battle of the ROCAF

Air Bases	Squadron	Planes	Total
Taoyuan	4th TRS	RF-5Es	24
	15th, 16th TFS	F-5E/F	48
Hsinchu	41st, 42nd, 48th TFS	Mirage2000s	60
Ching Chuan Kang	7th, 8th, 28th TFS	FCK-1s (IDF)	60
Chiayi	14th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd TFS	F-16s	80
Tainan Pengtung	1st, 3rd, 9th TFS 2nd 6th 101st, 102nd, 103rd	FCK-1s (IDF) E2Ts C130Hes C-130	60
Taitung	44th, 45th, 46th TFS	F-5E/Fs	72
Hualien	17th, 26th, 27th TFS	F-16s	60

資料出處：http://www.fas.org，並承舒孝煌先生代為修正
Source: http://www.fas.org, and corrected by Mr. Stellar Shu