台海的空權爭奪戰，不僅是台灣防衛能否成功的關鍵，也是影響西太平洋戰略前景的關鍵。空權概念自一九二○年代具體化以來，其在戰場上扮演的角色日益多元化，所謂的制空權已不僅是追求空域的掌握，更走向以空制海、以空制陸的境地。實際上，隨著軍事技術的進步，使得航空力量得以提供戰場管理者更為有效的側翼、後方打擊工具。藉由高機動的航空載具繞越正面打擊側翼，由戰線之後擊敗敵人，已成為可能，並將成為未來戰爭的常態。固守傳統線型防線的軍隊注定成為未來戰爭的犧牲者。筆者認為，台海戰爭在時程上也是不對稱的，事實上，空中戰役就決定了戰爭的結果。
To command the air power over the Taiwan Strait is the key to Taiwan’s defense, and it also influences the vision for the Pacific strategy. From 1920s on, the concept of air power has practically fulfilled and became more and more diversified in the battlefield. Air power means to command the air as well as the sea and the land from the air. In fact, with the improvement of military technique, the battlefield managers can use the aviation power more effectively to attack the flank and rear of the enemy. It has been possible to use high mobility fighters circling over the front line to attack the flank, and further to defeat the enemy. Such kind of idea will be common in the future warfare. In other words, troops that tenaciously comply with the traditional linear defense are destined to be the sacrifice of the future war. In my opinion, since the war over Taiwan Strait is asymmetry on timing, in fact, the war will be decided by the air campaign.

前言
Foreword

中國中央軍委會副主席以及中央對台工作領導小組副組長的張萬年，曾經在二○○○年十月上旬一項「解放軍全軍裝備工作會議」中表示，「十五期間（也就是第十個五年計劃，從二○○一年至二○○五年），台海必有一戰！」。無論他的說法算不算是「動武時間表」，一旦台海發生軍事衝突，在高強度戰場環境下，勝利女神會眷顧何方，將端視於誰能掌握天空。
ZhangWan-Nian, the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Deputy Director of the Central Working Group on Taiwan, once said that, “There would be war across Taiwan Strait in five years”. No matter whether or not his observation should be regarded as a timetable for war, once the military conflict occurs over the Taiwan Strait, given the high intensity of the battlefield environment, the final victory will belong to the side that gains command of the air.

台灣境內任一點距中國大陸都在三百公里以內，一旦戰爭發生，而台灣空軍喪失了台海制空權，中國空中兵力將使台灣的水面艦隊也隨之失去戰場行動自由﹔而陸軍的攻擊直升機也將遭到制壓，地面上則變成諾曼地的翻版，裝甲部隊聽任空中打擊的宰割，灘頭陣地無法固守。相反的，若解放軍空軍久久不能奪取台海制空權，則將難以有效地對台灣海岸進行砲火準備和輸送、支援地面部隊登陸，即使在蒙受重大損傷的情況下強行登陸，也將被台灣的空地火力釘死，難以從灘頭陣地展開和向縱深出擊。
Any point in Taiwan is within 300 kilometers of Mainland China. If a war occurs and Taiwan loses its command of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait, the PLA Air force (PLAAF) would immediately prevent Taiwan’s Navy from being able to put to sea in safety. Furthermore, the ROC Army’s attack helicopters would also be pinned down by the PLAAF ground attack aircraft and the land battle become another Dunkirk disaster for Taiwan’s troops. Taiwan’s armored tanks and vehicles would be destroyed from the air by China’s aircraft and be unable to give protection to the front line troops. Conversely, should the PLAAF expend time and effort and still be unable to gain air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait, the PLA forces would find it difficult hard to effectively prepare and bring to bear the necessary fire support for an amphibious landing on the shores of Taiwan. Even though the PLAAF would try to support an amphibious landing and be prepared to accept heavy casualties, the PLA’s ground forces would be held down by Taiwan’s firepower. This would make it very difficult, if not impossible, in such a situation for PLA forces to launch an attack in depth from their beachhead.

其實，「空權」的影響範圍已經牢牢的向海面、向地面延伸。其對海面的制壓自然是以艦艇為目標，無甚新奇之處。其對地面的影響力則不僅僅傳統上對敵軍正面部隊的攻擊而已，而是藉由各種長程精密武器將其打擊範圍延伸至敵軍後方的縱深，軍事上的目標為敵方的後援梯隊、以及各種支援體系的關鍵節點，以孤立第一線部隊為目的。政治上的目標則為敵方領導中心所在的處所，以及具有心理打擊效用的設施等。這種空權的擴張，使空軍除了傳統的制空能力外，也獲得了制海、制陸的戰力，特別是制陸能力的獲得，更代表著空軍獨立作戰能力的大幅提升。這種現象已經使得「空陸戰」的理論獲得更多人的重視。而在未來的戰場中，除了傳統的陸權、海權、空權的區分外，空權的觀念也可能擴張為「空地權」。制空權可說是台海防衛的關鍵要素，而空軍必然成為戰場中的主戰力量。
Air power covers both the sea and the land. The targets at sea would be the warships with which the ROC Navy (ROCN) would endeavor to assert maritime control; but control over land is much more complicated. Air power over land not only traditionally aims to attack the enemy’s front line, but also to extend the range of operations to attack the enemy’s rear and to support units by a combination of long range and precision weapons. The objective of air power is to control, or hold up, the enemy’s follow-up echelons, and destroy the key nodes of any logistic support system with the intention
of isolating his front line. Additionally, the political purpose of air power is to suppress the enemy’s headquarters and command and control facilities with the intention of inflicting not just physical, but more especially, psychological damage. The scope of air power means that an air force could potentially exercise command over both sea and land. More importantly, control over the land means that an air force has the ability to engage in conflict independently. This has meant that the doctrine of the “Air-Land Battle” has attracted wide attention. Indeed, the traditional distinctions between land
power, sea power and air power have arguably become anachronistic and, in future warfare, it becomes more meaningful to talk of “ air-land power”, instead. Consequently, command of the air would become the key factor in the defense of the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF) must focus its efforts on ensuring that it retains air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait and Island of Taiwan battlefield.

台海戰略遊戲
The Strategic Game Across the Taiwan Strait

除了台灣之外，持平說來，包括相關當事國在內，台海安全議題都可說是一種很微妙的戰略遊戲。因為東亞區域除了是地質學上的歐亞大陸板塊交接處，由地緣政治角度來看，其實也是陸海權兩股勢力衝突點。而台灣、中國、美國、日本，都在其中扮演重要角色。
Fairly speaking, for many countries, security of Taiwan Strait is really a delicate strategic game. Geologically, East Asia is the boundary of Eurasia mainland plate; geo-politically, it is also where the land power and the sea power meet. Taiwan, China, the United States, and Japan all play an important role there.

在冷戰時期的圍堵政策下，美國聯中制俄是海陸兩權聯手對抗另一個強大的陸權，那麼今日，美國與中共的潛在磨擦中，陸權與海權的競爭將是重要的潛在衝突原因之一。
Under the United States’ containment policy during the Cold War, one example of co-operation between sea power and land power was that of the United States alliance with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to oppose and contain another major land power, the USSR. Currently, the PRC has become an expanding power in the region, with the effect that the competition for the sea power and land power could possibly prove to be a latent source of conflict between the United States, essentially a maritime power, and the PRC, a continental land-based power.

美國與日本是目前東亞地區的兩個主要海權國家。美國本身的資源雖然足以自給自足，但由於區域貿易、資源輸送等都高度依賴海上運輸，一旦重要的海上航道落入潛在敵人或競爭者的手中，則美國的經濟、安全利益將受到重大威脅，因此海上的自由航行權一向被其視為基本的國家利益，1美國的軍事思想也是以維持海洋控制、全球性的兵力投射作為最重要的基礎之一。2而在日本部份，由於本國資源的缺乏與對海洋貿易的依賴，因此海上航線對於日本的國家安全而言更是居於關鍵地位。二戰後日本海上自衛隊的設立也遵循著此種原則。3
The United States and Japan are currently the principal maritime and naval powers in Western Pacific. Although the United States is nearly self-sufficient in natural resources, its regional trade and energy needs are still highly dependent on ocean shipping. Should any possible enemy gain control these crucially important sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the United States’ economy and security would be endangered. For this reason, the United Sates insists that the freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest.1 Besides which, the United States’ military strategy is also predicated on two
main themes: the maintenance of its control of the oceans - control of the sea - and the capability to project military force, globally. 2 Japan’s Self-Defense Force also followed the same strategic objectives after World War Two.3 It needed access to the world’s oceans to obtain the natural resources it lacked most, principally energy supplies of oil and gas. Keeping the world’s sea lines of communication open and secure was therefore a key factor in its nation security, and remains so today, though constitutionally and politically Japan harbors no ambitions to project military power.

客觀來說，地緣位置在西太平洋的確具有相當的重要性，然而其戰略價值則是由整個國際體系的大環境決定，在不同的國際環境戰略價值也呈現出不同的價值，因此所謂的戰略價值應是一種相對性的觀念。
Objectively, geographical location plays a very important part in the Western Pacific; however, but its strategic value is determined by the international system. Given different times and space, these locations have different strategic values. Their strategic value should therefore be seen in relative terms. For example, should Beijing decide to occupy Taiwan by armed force, there would be many risks involved. In the event that Taiwan withstood the attack, the Taiwanese government might well then declare independence and potentially win worldwide diplomatic recognition. The leaders in Beijing might then even be confronted with an internal ruling crisis.

站在北京的角度，一旦決定使用武力取得台灣，其風險在於若台灣能安然挺過中國所發動的戰役，不僅可能使台灣宣布獨立，贏得普遍的外交支持，更可能使中國的領導菁英產生執政危機。而在美、日方面，雖然不能明講，不過很明白的是，若一旦失去台灣，誰也難以想像由台灣起飛的解放軍軍機，將周邊八百海浬納為巡邏半徑，所有來往東北、東南亞的航道都將直接暴露在其空中武力之下所造成的影響；或是中國戰略核潛艦，可由台灣出發，直接溜進西太平洋甚至是中太平洋，對美國國家飛彈防禦系統系統所造成的衝擊。這對日、美兩國的區域安全將造成重大挑戰。
In the event of an attack on Taiwan, the US and Japan, though they have not made it public, would doubtless be very concerned. Were China to succeed in occupying Taiwan, PLAAF combat aircraft would be able to take off from Taiwan and patrol an area extending to a radius of 800 nautical miles around the island. All the sea lines of communication from the Northeast to the Southeast of the Western Pacific would thus be directly exposed to a threat from the PLA Air Force. Another possible scenario is that PLAN nuclear submarines could sail from Taiwan directly into the Western, or even the
Middle, Pacific Ocean and pose a challenge to the United States’ naval dominance in the area. For both the US and Japan, China’s control over Taiwan would constitute a serious threat to regional security. Defending Taiwan’s air space, therefore, not only is in the interest of the ROC’s survival, to a significant degree, but also decides whether or not China is restrained from gaining naval access to the Pacific Ocean. It also projects a future strategic vision of the Western Pacific Ocean.

換句話說，防衛台灣的空權，不僅只是決定中華民國的生存利益，在某個程度上，決定了封住或是開啟中國進出太平洋的大門，實際上也決定了未來西太平洋的戰略前景。
In other words, defending Taiwan’s air can not only protect the interest of ROC’s survival, to a certain degree, but also decide whether or not to lock China from getting into the Pacific Ocean. Actually, it also sets up the future strategic vision of the Western Pacific Ocean.

複合式空權
Complex Air Power

而在台海的戰場環境中，由於地緣特性以及軍事技術的發展使然，所謂的空權區分與取得，將更為細部而高度互動，空權成為複合式發展。現在除了掌握傳統認知上的「制空權」外，低空（樹梢）、太空、大氣邊緣、乃至無人機的出現與使用，都將對台海的空權掌握造成重大影響。
Due to geo-political characteristic s and a matured aerospace technology, the ability to exercise air power over the Taiwan Strait by either side has become more and more difficult to achieve. Air power itself is developing in a complex way. Today, the concept of air power includes not only the traditional perception of gaining air supremacy and controlling the air space, but also control over the whole spectrum of the atmosphere, from very low altitudes (treetop) to the very edge of the atmosphere and beyond into space, using both manned and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV ). The changing concept
of air power is having a significant impact on the exercise of air power over the Taiwan Strait.

在太空乃至大氣層邊緣，已成為爭奪制空權的新工具。依照中國的太空計畫，今年(二○○三)起至二○○五年的「十五計畫期間」，將發射三十多顆衛星，其中包括通信衛星、導航衛星、氣象衛星等。目前，中共基本完成六大衛星系列，包括返回式遙感衛星（俗稱的間諜衛星）、「東方紅」通信廣播衛星、「風雲」氣象衛星與「實踐」科學探測和技術試驗衛星等；4
The edge of the atmosphere and outer space have already become a new areas over which to compete for air power. According to its space plans from 2003 to 2005, which form part of the PLA’s 10th five-year planning period, China will launch more than 30 satellites, including those for intelligence, communications, navigation, and weather forecasting. Currently, the PRC has completed a series of six satellites, which include a re-entry sensor satellite (spy satellite), Dofanhon information satellites, Fonwun weather satellites, Xijan science exploration and experimental research satellites.4

另外二個也初步形成，涵蓋地球「資源」衛星和「北斗」導航定位衛星等，其中最重要的是，其自行研製的第一代導航定位衛星——「北斗導航試驗衛星」已部署至預定軌道。5這將使中共在遠程作戰上定位軍事目標，獲得極大助益。依照新華社的說法，「北斗導航試驗衛星」由中共航天科技集團空間技術研究院研製。將大大提高中共在衛星定位、追蹤方面的能力，針對軍事目標及本身的座標定位，將十分清楚，可隨時建立統制座標系統，不受國界和地球曲度限制，包括中共的導航飛彈和各種中長程飛彈的瞄準和發射，都將如虎添翼，中共的制導武器尤其將有一個更完整精確的操控系統。
Two further series of satellites have almost been completed, and include a resource satellite that covers most of the globe and a navigation satellite named Beiduo (Plough). Most importantly, the Beiduo navigation experimental satellite is a first-generation indigenous one to be deployed to an assigned orbit.5 It will certainly help the PRC to identify military targets. According to the Xinhua News Agency, the Beiduo experimental navigation satellite has been designed, developed and produced by the Technology Research Academy of China Aeropace Group. Since the satellite will have the ability to identify targets and survey the battlespace, the PRC is will be capable of setting up a command and control system that is independent of national boundaries and limits imposed by the curvature of the earth. It will also contribute significantly to the launch; guidance and targeting of middle-to-long range ballistic missiles. It represents a major advance in the PRC’s ability to deliver missile-launched, precision-guided munitions.

同時，工作高度接近大氣層邊緣的中國的M族彈道飛彈，也將在搭配全球衛星導航系統後，成為真正的破壞性武器。雖然依照軍方的分析，一枚M族飛彈若使用傳統彈頭，擊中目標後，會在地面造成深約十公尺，寬約二十公尺至三十公尺的大洞。因此若中共以M族飛彈來犯，需要五十至六十枚M 族飛彈，才能癱瘓我方一個機場。6
Meanwhile, once it has been upgraded with a Global Positioning System, the PLA’s M-family of ballistic missiles, which operate near the edge of the earth’s atmosphere, will become a major destructive weapon system. Although the ROC military have calculated that a M-type ballistic missile, armed with a traditional warhead, could cause a crater 10 meters deep and 30 meters wide, they have concluded that the PRC would need at least fifty to sixty such missiles to disable and paralyze one Taiwanese airfield. 6

但由於命中精度可望提高，加上其未來將裝上中國新研發出的油氣彈頭與子母彈頭，其對台灣的機場與地面後勤設施將造成重大威脅。嚴格說來，此一威脅並非來自於對戰機本身的直接破壞，相對的，主要是在於其發動攻擊後所可能造成的「遲滯」效應，使得台灣的戰機在中國以飛彈發動第一擊時，因為跑道受損或封鎖，而無法升空，或各基地難以採行協調性的有效應戰手段。
Meanwhile, on the one hand the PRC remains a major threat to Taiwan’s air bases and military ground facilities, especially once it has improved its offensive capability and added new variants of warheads in the future. Strictly speaking, however, the threat may not come from aircraft or missiles directly, but the delayed effect of a pre-emptive first strike against Taiwan’s airfields and logistic support which would prevent Taiwan’s fighter aircraft from taking off.

同時，超低空以及「樹梢空權」的掌握亦為關鍵。所謂的「樹梢空權」，意味著具備「貼地飛」能力的巡弋飛彈與直昇機，將以離地六至十公尺的樹梢高度進行地貌飛行。除了預警雷達難以發現外，由於地球曲率及地貌的隱蔽效應，低空防空火砲、飛彈都難以將其擊落，換句話說，除了具備「俯攻」能力的傳統戰機外，包含「刺針」飛彈在內的地面防空武器，並無法有效對抗。這將使採取攻擊行動的一方獲得戰場運動以及近接火力支援的優勢，也是掌握絕對制空權的原因。當然，以中共的目前發展來看，巡弋飛彈的發展前景要遠優於武裝直升機，因此巡弋飛彈便成為影響台灣的另一個重大威脅。
On the other hand, low altitude and treetop air power operations are also key considerations. “Treetop air power”, or ‘hedgehopping’, means the ability to fly close to the ground. For example, a terrain-following cruise missile, or a helicopter’s low-level operation, means the ability to fly between six to ten meters above the ground. Low-altitude combat aircraft however, are both difficult to pick up on defensive radar and are hard to intercept and shoot down by gun-fire or surface-to-air missiles (SAM)
because of the limits imposed by the curvature of the earth and the speeds at which such aircraft and missiles operate. Except against certain classes of fixed-wing fighter aircraft, most other ground-based anti-aircraft weapons, including the Stinger shoulder-launched missile, are largely ineffective. The side that makes the first strike will therefore probably have the advantage of surprise and momentum, as well as gain air supremacy. However, in the light of PRC’s current air power developments, it would seem that cruise missiles have more potential than military helicopters, and are likely emerge as the greater threat to Taiwan.

事實上，若掌握了被稱為「戰場第五度空間」或「樹梢空權」的超低空優勢，則台海制空權的爭奪，第一場戰役將發生在高高度或大氣邊緣、以及樹梢高度的超低空。
In order for either side to gain control of the air at low altitudes - the so-called “fifth-dimension of space”, or “treetop air power” - the first battles over the Taiwan Strait would be most likely be fought at high altitudes or on the edge of the atmosphere.

逐漸失衡的戰略天平
A Gradual Strategic Imbalance

對於北京有無能力以武力取得台灣，各界看法一直相當分歧。然而以往很多西方觀察家曾經認為中國人民解放軍無法攻克台灣，但這種觀點正逐漸改變。早在一九九九年美國國防部的評估報告便曾指出， 一旦中國決定對台開戰， 若採取第一擊手段可在四十五分鐘內奪取台海制空權。而近期出版的英國《空軍》月刊七月號刊出專文指出，隨著解放軍空軍現代化進程步伐加快，台海軍事天平正日漸傾斜，對台灣的戰略將構成重大挑戰。7
Although experts have not yet reached a consensus on whether Beijing would be able to acquire Taiwan by force or not, many Western observers have been gradually modifying their ideas and believe that the PLA may eventually be capable to invade and occupy Taiwan. A military review conducted by the US Defense Department in 1999 mentioned that once China decided to declare a war to Taiwan and initiated a first strike, it could gain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait within forty-five minutes. Moreover, an article in the British journal, AirForce, also indicated that the military balance has been gradually tilting in favor of the PLA for some time, and is now quickening its pace under the PRC’s extensive current military modernization program. This imbalance has become a major threat to Taiwan’s strategic development. 7

事實上，解放軍正快速加強它的太空、導彈、信息技術，海空力量，以及陸軍的「拳頭」部隊。二○○一年中國於東山島舉行的「解放一號」演習，可說是中國整合新戰力的第一次大規模聯合演習。其主要的演習課目，除了展示SU-27 戰機、大規模登陸等「傳統」項目外，最引人矚目的，要算是爭奪信息優勢的「電子牆」、以及防止外力介入的「打航艦」等課目了。
In fact, the PLA is accelerating the modernization of its Air Force, guided missiles, information technology, Navy and Naval Aviation, and Army Special Forces. “Liberation 1”, the military exercise held on the Dong Shan Island in 2001, marked China’s first large-scale joint exercise involving new integrated services and military equipment. The exercise revealed some conventional activities, such as the maneuvers by Su-27 fighters and a massive amphibious landing operation. But what was more important were the new activities, such as the so-called ‘digital wall’ that was used to gain intelligence advantage and actions against aircraft carriers that were obviously aimed at defending PLA forces against a foreign force’s (US) intervention.

美國國防部於二○○二年七月公布《中華人民共和國軍力報告》，便指出台海兩岸軍力顯示我消彼長的趨勢，台灣的優勢開始流失，目前共軍的訓練著重於海上及兩棲作戰，努力整合地面部隊、陸戰隊、空降部隊、以及特種作戰部隊戰力。中國在二○一○年以前要進行這種作戰，仍有重大困難，但除非第三國介入，同時如果北京願意承受各種政治、經濟、外交和軍事代價，則此舉仍可能成功。
The Review on the National Force of the People Republic of China , published by the US Defense Department in July 2002, indicated that, on the one hand, Taiwan has been losing its military advantages and, on the other hand, the PRC has obtained more and more advantages. PRC’s current training, however, has been emphasizing naval and amphibious warfare, and has been actively integrating a force made up of ground troops, marine corps, airborne troops and special forces. It is estimated that the PRC may well be able to overcome past difficulties and be able to conduct amphibious operations successfully before 2010. If, however, a third party is involved, and Beijing is prepared to meet the political, economic, diplomatic and military costs involved, the operation may
still prove successful.

同時，除了軍事攻擊外，中國還可以另外藉資訊手段來進行心理戰，利用電腦病毒之類破壞台灣的通訊與交通，瓦解台灣秩序與民心士氣，以削弱企業界對政府的支持。許多在台海兩岸均有投資的人士或許寧可在政治上有所妥協，也不願見到經濟凋零。退役的美國海軍將領，前駐北京大使館武官麥瓦頓說：「就算此一戰略無法奏效，北京方面也不會像採行其他方案一樣損兵折將，元氣大傷。」他認為，北京此一戰略最讓他憂心忡忡。但如果攻台之戰失敗，對大陸內部的影響可能極為深遠。
In addition to an armed amphibious attack, PRC could still employ every means of information technology at its disposal to engage in psychological warfare against Taiwan. For example, a computer virus could be used to destroy Taiwan’s information systems, bring chaos to its traffic systems, break down the social order and th e people’s morale, and weaken business enterprises’ confidence and their support for the Taiwan government. There are already many Taiwanese businessmen who invest in both China and Taiwan and who would be prepared to accept a political compromise with the PRC, rather than afford the economic depression. As Eric McVadon, a retired admiral from the US Navy and one-time attache accredited in Beijing, once said, “Even though information warfare does not work, Beijing would not choose other strategies that migh t lead to casualties and depress its military morale.” This strategy caused him considerable concern. However, if Beijing did not succeed in occupying Taiwan by force, it would face many incipient domestic problems.

持平的說，北京所建構的新一代軍事力量，並非光是針對台灣，其主要目的在於延伸其「戰略國境」，也就是在境外執行軍事行動的能力。因此對解放軍而言，發展以海空軍為主的長程投射能力，不僅可滿足未來因應海洋權益的挑戰，在必要時也可用來對付台灣，可說是一石二鳥。相對於北京，台灣目前對於未來的空軍兵力整建並無新計畫，在此一情形下，未來的台海戰略天平將逐步向北京的一端傾斜。
The new generation of military forces that Beijing is currently building does not just target Taiwan. Its main purpose is to extend China’s strategic borders as well as acquire the ability to project military power and to conduct a military invasion outside its territory. By developing a middle-to-long term military capability, the PLA is killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the plan is to deal with China’s right of access to the world’s oceans in the future and, on the other hand, to use these new military capabilities to attack Taiwan, if necessary. Compared with Beijing, Taiwan has no new plans
to enhance future ROC Air Force readiness. Under such circumstances, the air balance between the two sides will gradually tilt toward to Beijing.