中國先制攻擊是可能的，但不太像會這麼做
A Chinese Preemptive Strike Is Possible, But not Likely

預防性戰爭是當前國際政治的一項議題。這是美國第一次採用先發性軍事攻擊的國家安全政策，來對抗那些目前與她尚未處於戰爭狀況的國家。布希政府的官員倡議用這種政策來對付伊拉克以及任何其他被他們所認定的「流氓國家」。1
Preventive war is now a live issue in international politics. For the first time, the United States has adopted a national security policy that calls for premeditated military attacks against countries who are not currently at war against the United State. Bush administration officials advocate this game plan for Iraq, and any other country they determine to be a “rogue state.” 1

新的布希主義以及它攻擊伊拉克的可能，是具有爭議性的，因為許多人擔心布希主義會鼓勵其他國家去發動預防性戰爭。如果美國要其他強權支持美國發動預防性戰爭的話，布希主義直接可能會引發第三者的先制戰爭，或者如果美國在一個先制戰爭中陷入泥淖的話，美國將會間接地讓人覺得她沒有能力去防衛一個脆弱的盟邦。2
The new Bush doctrine and its possible application against Iraq are controversial, not least because many fear that the Bush doctrine will encourage other states to launch preventive wars of their own. The Bush doctrine could trigger 3rd party preventive wars either directly – if the United States were to cut a deal with other major powers to gain their support for the preventive wars America wants to fight – or indirectly – if the United States becomes so bogged down in a preventive war that it appears to lose its ability to defend vulnerable allies. 2

在台北所舉辦的這場研討會正反映了一個事實：關於中國對台灣發動先制攻擊的可能性，證明了大家非常關切布希主義所帶來的刺激。在台灣的案例，不太需要去擔心美國會為了爭取中國的支持以對抗支持伊拉克或其他的流氓國家而放棄台灣。藉由用詞與舉止，布希政府將會繼續維持對台灣的安全承諾。新的國家安全戰略增強了布希政府去觀察中國是否接受美軍在亞洲優勢地位的決心。雖然伊拉克、北韓與其他流氓國家仍然是布希主義的焦點，新的國家安全戰略所使用的語言也警告中國：「因為中國的領導人在關於他們國家的角色上，尚未做出基本決擇。為了要追求先進的軍力，中國已經威脅其在亞太地區的鄰國，中國正採取一個過時的途徑，這最終將會阻礙他自己國家的成就。」
The very fact of a conference in Taipei about the possibility of a Chinese preemptive strike against Taiwan is testimony to the broad concerns that the Bush doctrine is stimulating. In this case, there is little reason to fear that the United States would abandon Taiwan to gain China’s support for war against Iraq or other rogue states. By rhetoric and deed, the Bush administration remains committed to Taiwan’s security and, if anything, the new national sec urity strategy reinforces the Bush administration’s determination to see China accept American military superiority in Asia. Although Iraq, North Korea and other “rogue states” are the focus of the Bush doctrine, the new national security strategy uses language that puts China on notice: “China’s leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness.”

各界所關心的是美國無法集中心力，而不應該是言行不一致。美國可能因為對伊拉克（或是另一個流氓國家）的戰爭而變得分身乏術，以至於製造了中國對台發動戰爭的機會之窗。
Instead, the basis for concern is the distraction of America, not double-dealing. The United States might become preoccupied by waging preventive war against Iraq (or another rogue state) and so create a window of opportunity for China to jump into a war against Taiwan.

這樣的想定，儘管不太可能，但不能說不會出現。它之所以不太可能的原因是因為：中國在與台灣發展長期關係的軌道上有所進展後，展開一場毫無理由的戰爭，將會導致嚴重的國際後果而傷害到中國成長。然而，這樣的想定之所以不能說不會出現的原因，因為美國對伊拉克的戰爭，如同美國在其邊境所進行的戰略佈署情勢一般，耗盡了美國在政治與軍事的關切。3 在這些環境下，中國可能認知到機會之窗出現，而台灣與美國其他的盟邦將則必然擔憂美國對他們安全承諾的可信度。
This scenario is unlikely, but not far fetched. It is unlikely because China is already on a trajectory to improve its position relative to Taiwan over the long run, and starting an unprovoked war could trigger international consequences that would harm China’s future growth. However, it is not far fetched because an American war against Iraq would consume the attention of American political and military leaders as well as a vast fraction of the force posture that the US could deploy beyond its borders.3 Under these circumstances, China could perceive a window of opportunity and Taiwan and other US
allies will inevitably worry about the credibility of American guarantees of their security.

如何考量中國對台灣的威脅
How to Think About China’s Threat to Taiwan

先制威脅的本質
The Nature of the Preemptive Threat

中國能夠對台灣造成三種主要的軍事威脅。第一個是侵略台灣：目標是取得對領土的實質控制。第二個是封鎖台灣：藉由封鎖台灣海峽與南中國海的海上交通線，切斷台灣石油進口與海外貿易的管道。第三則是飛彈攻擊：藉由摧毀目標或是威脅台灣政治、經濟、民眾或軍事目標。在這些情況裡，這些攻擊的政治目的都是一樣：亦即去強迫台灣去放棄它政治實體的地位，而使其成為中國不可或缺的一部份，並接受中國政府在國際事務上的主權。
China can pose three main military threats to Taiwan. The first is an invasion of Taiwan, with the goal of gaining physical control of the territory. The second is a blockade of Taiwan, with the aim to block the sea lines of communication in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and thereby cutting off Taiwan’s access to oil imports and other overseas commerce. The third is missile attack, with the objective of destroying or placing at risk political, economic, population, or military targets. In all cases, the political purpose of the attack would be the same: to compel Taiwan to abandon its status as an independent political entity and to become an integral part of China, accepting the sovereignty of the Chinese government in international, if not domestic affairs.

然而，這三種軍事威脅的操作其實是根據不同的脅迫機制。這些脅迫機制的重要性在於他們決定了政治上成敗的軍事需求，但它們通常很難去觀察，因為他們會與狹義的軍事上成敗相混淆。為了釐清中國對台灣邁向獨立所施加的相關脅迫機制，我們準備發展出一個來評量脅迫行動是否成功的基本架構。
However, these three military threats operate according to different coercive mechanisms. These coercive mechanisms are important because they determine the military requirements of political success and failure, but they are often difficult to observe because they can become confused with strictly military mea sures of success. To clarify the coercive mechanisms involved in the threats China poses to Taiwan’s independence, it is helpful to begin with a simple framework for measuring the success of a coercive campaign.

評量強迫戰爭的成功
Measuring the Success of A Coercive Campaign

一般而言，軍事行動的效度是可以從兩個方面來評量的：戰鬥效度與戰略效度。第一，戰鬥效度考量炸彈如何有效摧毀目標；至於戰略效度所關切的是所摧毀的目標是否達成了政治目的。
In general, the effectiveness of military operations can be measured in either of two ways -- combat effectiveness or strategic effectiveness. The first, combat effectiveness, concerns how well bombs destroy targets, while the second, strategic effectiveness, focuses on whether the destruction of target sets attains political goals.

舉例而言，用來測量空軍戰力效度最常見的方式是戰鬥效度，通常用一既定的武力如何有效摧毀一個既定目標來描述。常見的指標是需要多少架次以投擲足夠炸彈去摧毀特定目標的數字，這通常是顯而易見的。當人們今天開始思考一九九一年波斯灣戰爭的空軍戰力，他們將會想到什麼呢？他們幾乎總是想起一幅一顆炸彈能打擊到建築物某一特定點的畫面，好像空權的力量可以充分反應在能以炸彈攻擊天井的能力。
For instance, the most common way to measure the effectiveness of air power is combat effectiveness, which describes how efficiently a given force destroys a given target set. The usual index is the number of sorties needed to deliver enough bombs to cripple a specific target, which is usually measured in terms of visible destruction. When people today think of air power in the Gulf War in 1991, what do they think of? They almost always remember picture after picture of single bombs hitting specific spots on buildings, as if the power of air power is fully represented by the ability of a bomb to hit an air shaft.

當科技提升了炸彈的準確性，空權必然也變成更有戰鬥效度，因為不需要動用太多架次就可以摧毀目標。在過去的十年之中，美國空軍軍官和大眾傾向用實質破壞作為衡量空權整體效度的關鍵。透過這樣的定義，空權當然變得比過去更有效力了。在第二次世界大戰期間，即使是美國人所稱的晝間準確攻擊，也只有百分之十八到二十五的炸彈能被投擲進目標區的一千碼之內。今天，現代精確導引武器有百分之八十是可以投擲入目標區的三到十碼之內，即使是在夜間多雲的天氣，使用全球定位系統科技也可以辦到。
As technology improves bombing accuracy, air power necessarily becomes more combat effective, because fewer sorties are necessary to destroy targets. Over the past decade, officers in the US Air Force as well as the public have been easily swayed into thinking that measures of physical destruction are the key to measuring the overall effectiveness of air power. Of course, by this definition, air power has become more effective over time. In WWII, only 18-25% of bombs fell within 1000 feet of target, even during American so-called “precision” raids which were conducted in daylight. Today, modern precision guided munitions routinely fall within 3-10 feet of target about 80% of the time, even during cloudy weather at night if Global Positioning System technology is used.

然而，衡量空戰整體成功只用戰鬥效度指標並非是一個衡量脅迫性空戰的好方法。我們可以確定的是，對一個脅迫性空戰某種程度的效度是重要的，但重要的去記住戰鬥效度關切的是實質的摧毀效果大過於攻擊的政治效果，而一個脅迫性空戰的核心目標卻是在達成一個政治效果。因此若試圖透過戰鬥效度來測量脅迫性空戰的效度，會導致一個又一個無用的任務，而那些值得花時間的有價值的任務卻往往被忽略了。
However, measuring the overall success of an air campaign only in terms of combat effectiveness is not a good measure of the success of a coercive air campaign. To be sure, some degree of efficiency is usually important in a coercive air campaign, but it is important to remember that combat effectiveness measures physical destruction rather than the political effects of the attack, and the central aim of a coercive air campaign is to achieve a political effect. As a result, trying to measure the effectiveness of a coercive air campaign by measures of combat effectiveness can cause one futile mission to be swapped for another, while more worthwhile missions are neglected.

舉例而言，在一九四四年對於日本工廠的精確轟炸，被譴責為是一項失敗。因為那並未造成明顯可見的損害。而一九四五年三月美軍展開對日本城市的燃燒彈攻擊，則被歡呼為一個重大的成功。因為燒毀的地方是易於觀察的，而且很快就累積出效果。但是轟炸對於戰爭只造成很小的影響，因為日本主要工廠早就因為海上封鎖而關閉。所以對其攻擊只不過炸出一堆殘磚破瓦，而且日本政府願意承擔因為空襲所造成的平民傷亡。轟炸機的確能夠對打擊日本經濟作出更多貢獻，如果他們被賦予第三個任務：在日本航道上佈置水雷。
For instance, precision bombing of Japanese industrial plants in 1944 was condemned as a failure because it produced no visible damage, while incendiary attacks against Japanese cities begin ning in March 1945 were hailed as a great success because burned acreage was easy to observe and quick to accumulate. Nonetheless, incendiary bombing ultimately made little difference to the war’s outcome because Japan’s main industries had already been shut down by the naval blockade, so their destruction merely made unused rubble bounce, and because the Japanese government was willing to countenance the civilian costs that the raids caused. Indeed, bombers could have contributed
more to the collapse of the Japanese economy had they been dedicated a third mission: mine laying along Japan’s shipping lanes.

不同的脅迫戰略
Alternative Coercive Strategies

相反的，評估脅迫性空權的關鍵是我所談到的戰略效度，因為脅迫的目標是政治上的改變，我現在將透過聚焦於戰略效度而非戰鬥效度來討論特定脅迫性空戰戰略。
Instead, the key to measuring the effectiveness of coercive air power is to assess what I called strategic effectiveness. Since the goal of coercion is political change, I will now discuss specific coercive air strategies by focusing on strategic effectiveness, not combat effectiveness.

一般說來，有三種脅迫戰略：懲罰、斬首（失去作用）與阻卻。每一種都有不同的攻擊主要目標，而摧毀這些目標也都藉不同機制來改變目標國政府的行為。
In general, there are three coercive strategies: Punishment, Decapitation, and Denial. Each attacks a different main target set and each has its own mechanism by which destruction of those targets is supposed to change the target government’s behavior.

懲罰：懲罰戰略試圖對對方的平民施加大過於所爭的領土利益的傷害，以導致民眾叛亂或是政府為了避免未來更大損失而投降。懲罰手段能藉由直接鎖定與殺害平民或是間接摧毀民間經濟造成嚴重的損失。在本文中，中國威脅去封鎖台灣就是一個懲罰性威脅。
Punishment strategies attempt to inflict enough pain on enemy civilians to overwhelm their territorial interests in the dispute and so cause the public to revolt or the government to surrender to avoid future costs. Punishment can impose terrible costs by directly targeting and killing civilians or indirectly by wrecking the civilian economy. In this case, China’s threat to blockade Taiwan is a punishment threat.

斬首（失去作用）：是第二種脅迫策略，而且成為今天許多美國空軍軍官與美國政治領導人的脅迫性戰略選項。從一九八○年代開始，精確導引彈藥的引進產生了一種新的脅迫戰略類型，其中空權將尋求使領導人失去作用。在這種斬首以失去作用的戰略中，施加脅迫者將只對大眾施以較輕微的懲罰，為的是增加人民去接受新領袖的意願，並且透過精確的攻擊去推翻體制，無論是透過直接暗殺或是鼓動軍事叛變。在本文中，中國的飛彈攻擊將涉及斬首以失去作用的戰略。
Decapitation is the second coercive strategy and has become the coercive strategy of choice for many American Air Force officers and American political leaders today. Starting in the 1980s, the coming of PGMs spawned a new type of coercive strategy in which air power would seek to decapitate leaders. In decapitation, the coercer only inflicts light punishment of the population, in order to increase the willingness of the population to accept a new leader, and uses precision strikes to change the regime, either directly by assassination, or indirectly by triggering a military coup. In this case, China’s missile threat could involve decapitation.

阻卻：是第三種脅迫戰略。藉由威脅敵方將會有軍事挫敗的前景，對其軍隊的阻卻打擊是希望導致其政府投降。如果這個國家知道他不能支撐或取得爭議的領土時，那麼他應該會放棄做繼續嘗試以免無謂的犧牲。在本文中，中國侵略台灣的威脅是一種是阻卻性的威脅。
Denial is the third coercive strategy. Denial strikes at an enemy’s military forces, seeking to cause a government to surrender by threatening it with the prospect of military failure. If the state knows it cannot hold or take the territory at issue, then it should give up trying so as not to expend costs pointlessly. In this case, China’s threat to invadeTaiwan is a denial threat.

為什麼「懲罰」與「斬首」很少成功，但是「阻卻」卻會
Why Punishment and Decapitation Rarely Succeed,
but Denial Does

在過去十年來的大多數時間裡，我曾經出版和教導關於空權的效果。我在空權高等研究所、在達特茅斯學院與芝加哥大學，講授有關美軍的空權戰略。許多我的想法已經在我所出版的書：《轟炸到贏：戰爭中的空權與脅迫》，以及在與約翰．華登與其他人在《安全研究》季刊的持續辯論中。
For much of the past decade, I have been publishing and teaching about the effects of air power. I have taught conventional air strategy for the US Air Force at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies as well as at Dartmouth College and the University of Chicago. Many of my ideas have also been published in my book, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War and in a sustained debate with John Warden and others in the journal Security Studies.

整體說來，我相信在主要爭端中要達到軍事脅迫的最佳方法大概得藉由「阻卻」，因為它可造成對手對其以軍事戰略取得或控有爭議領土的信心喪失。我在《轟炸到贏》這本書中，討論了數種脅迫性空戰戰略以及從第一次世界大戰到一九九一年波斯灣戰爭這段期間中所有空戰戰役記錄，這總共包含了三十三場空戰。我發現：到即使是科技已經大大改善了，對於敵人政府、經濟或公眾場的戰略轟炸，很少能達成強迫性的作用。空權必需結合地面攻擊的威脅，才能使得敵人就重要的領土作出投降。
In general, I believe that the best road to military coercion in major disputes is largely a function of denial, causing an opponent to lose confidence in his military strategy for taking or holding the territory in dispute. In Bombing to Win, I discussed the main alternative coercive air strategies and how their record of accomplishment in all the air campaigns from World War I through the Gulf War in 1991, a total of 33 air campaigns in all. I found that strategic bombing of an opponent’s government, economy or population centers rarely generates much coercive leverage and that even as technology has
improved, it has generally been necessary to combine air power with at least the threat of ground attack in order to cause an opponent to surrender important pieces of territory.

在這篇文章之中，我想要針對目前的情勢做出分析。我特別想要去討論主要的脅迫性空戰戰略以及在精確空權的第一個十年間的記錄。我集中討論在一九九一年伊拉克戰爭、一九九五年波士尼亞、一九九九年柯索沃戰爭以及二○○一年阿富汗戰爭中空權是怎麼樣有效運作。其次，我想要討論的是：在中國與台灣間未來任何可能的爭端中，脅迫性空權是怎麼樣可能達成或沒有達成。
In this paper, I want to bring my analysis up to the present. Specifically, I want to discuss the main competing coercive air strategies and their record of accomplishment in the first decade of precision air power, concentrating on what air power was effective in Iraq in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001. Second, I want to discuss what coercive air power is likely to achieve – and not achieve – in any future dispute between China and Taiwan.