前言
Introduction

由於兩岸長期敵對，台海地區一直被視為亞太地區最危險的「熱點」之一。當一九九六年三月台灣舉行首度總統大選之際，中國在台灣附近水域進行軍事演習與飛彈試射，意圖脅迫台灣領導人與一般選民放棄台獨立場。這次事件讓國際社會更認真地看待台海地區爆發戰爭的可能性。許多文獻已經探討了中國武力攻台可能的軍事選項。1一般咸信，若台海發生軍事衝突，中國欲對台灣進行任何有效的脅迫或入侵戰略，其先決條件將是爭取制空。2對中國而言，爭取空優的首要考量，在於確保各種對台方案行動的自由度，並防止台灣空軍對中國大陸沿海精華地區進行軍事報復。因此，一旦發生衝突，中國人民解放軍極可能對台灣的空軍基地發動奇襲，以在戰爭初期瓦解台灣空軍軍力。
Due to the enduring confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, this area has been regarded as one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region. When the Taiwanese had their first-ever presidential elections in March 1996, China carried out military exercises and tested missiles within the vicinity of Taiwan’s territorial waters, thereby attempting to coerce Taiwanese leaders and the general electorate to abandon their independence stance. This incident led the international community to take potential war across the Taiwan Strait more seriously. Consequently, a great deal of the literature
has examined the potential military options that China would use to invade Taiwan.1 It is believed that were military conflict to break out in the Taiwan Strait, the absolute prerequisites for China to conduct any successful coercion or invasion strategy would be through the c ontrol of the air.2 To China, the first consideration in establishing air superiority is to ensure freedom of actions to conduct various operations against Taiwan and to protect the Chinese prosperous coastal areas from the Taiwanese airforce’s retaliation. Therefore, in the event of a conflict, it is highly likely that Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would mount surprise assaults against Taiwan’s airbases, in an effort to neutralize Taiwan ’s air force at the very beginning of a war.

中國可以透過地面或空中攻擊的方式，對台灣空軍基地發動奇襲。但欲對台灣空軍基地發動任何大規模地面軍事攻擊，很難達到完全的奇襲效果。畢竟，台灣可經由各種情報管道，得知解放軍地面部隊的部署行動。台灣空軍基地遭遇的地面威脅也可能包括小型的襲擾攻擊，例如恐怖攻擊與特種武力攻擊。但反制這類地面威脅的難度不高，最有效的方法便是建立具備高度機動性與偵察能力的安全部隊。整體而言，台灣空軍基地面臨的最大威脅，主要來自於解放軍的空中攻擊，尤其是彈道飛彈與巡弋飛彈攻擊。此類攻擊的預警時間短，而且能重創台灣空軍武力。
China may give Taiwan’s air bases a surprise strike through ground or air attacks.However, any large-scale ground attack against Taiwan’s airbases is unlikely to come as a complete surprise. After all, the presence of PLA ground forces should be made known to Taiwan through various intelligence channels. The ground threat encountered by Taiwan’s airbases may also include small-scale harassment attacks, such as terrorist and special operations force (SOF) attacks. To counter such ground threats is not that difficult; the most effective best way would be to build highly mobile security forces with robust detection capabilities. On the whole, the most serious threat to Taiwan’s airbases
would be from the PLA’s air assaults, especially the employment of ballistic and cruise missile attacks. It is envisaged that these strikes would come at short notice and could seriously disrupt Taiwan’s air force.

本文建議，對於台灣空軍基地面對的解放軍飛彈威脅，應給予高度重視。文章的研究焦點集中以下幾個問題：（一）解放軍如何運用已具備的飛彈武力攻擊台灣機場？（二）面對中國飛彈攻擊，台灣空軍基地主要弱點為何？（三）台灣可採取哪些防禦措施，降低中國飛彈攻擊對基地造成之衝擊？本文認為，解放軍已將掌握制空權視為執行任何對台軍事選項的先決條件。同時，解放軍已將飛彈武力的研發與部署，視為本世紀軍事建設的優先任務。面對中國飛彈威脅，台灣必須強化主被動防禦能力，降低空軍基地的戰損程度，並設法維持空軍有效運作，以防止中國取得制空權，嚇阻中國的全面入侵行動。
This study would argue that the threat posed to Taiwan’s airbases by PLA missiles is something that deserves increased attention. It has narrowed the scope of this study to focus on the following questions: (1) How could China readily use available missiles to effectively attack Taiwan’s airfields? (2) What are the major vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s air bases against China’s missile attacks? And (3) What defensive options could Taiwan take to minimize the impact of Chinese missile attacks on operating airbases? This study suggests that the PLA has seen the control of the air as the prerequisite for any military options against Taiwan. Meanwhile, the PLA has given top priority to the improvement and deployment of missiles in the new century. In the face of the threat arising out of the
PLA’s missile systems, Taiwan needs to bolster the active and passive defense capabilities to reduce air bases’ losses, and make every effort to keep its air force operable, so as to deny China’s command of the air, and to deter China’s overall invasion.

解放軍的飛彈威脅
Threat from PLA’s Missiles

一九九一年的波灣戰爭使中國領導人警覺到引進先進軍事科技的重要性。美軍在戰爭期間發動的空中攻擊行動，包括運用先進戰機、制導武器與具精準打擊能力的巡弋飛彈，讓中國大開眼界。因此，中國在波灣戰後便開始針對關鍵技術領域進行重點投資，包括研發新式飛彈、戰機與C4I 系統，以因應未來的台海衝突。3 隨著軍力的成長，中國至少可透過四種方式，對台灣進行武力脅迫或實際攻擊：（一）透過低強度脅迫，包括軍事演習、武器展示、海上或空中對峙；（二）進行海上的封鎖或限制措施；（三）對台灣領土或重要戰略目標進行飛彈或空中攻擊；（四）發動全面攻擊。4 中國欲對台進行脅迫或實際攻擊，在作戰階段上與時間安排上，或許有許多的運作選項。但未來任何針對台灣的軍事行動都必須有爭取空優的措施；一旦喪失空優，解放軍地面、海上及空中部隊的傷亡，勢必大幅攀升。
The Gulf War of 1991 added to Chinese leaders’ sense of urgency in obtaining advanced technology for military use. The U.S. capabilities in offensive air operations in the war, including its utilities of advanced fighters, precision-guided munitions, and cruise missiles for precision strikes, impressed the PLA. Thus, since the Gulf War, China has increased investment in developing key technology fields, including new types of missiles, fighter aircraft, and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems, for future contingencies in the Taiwan Strait.3 With its growing
military capabilities, China could pose a potential threat of armed coercion or actual assault on Ta iwan in at least four major ways: (1) via low-level intimidation, including military exercise, weapons displays, and confrontations at sea or in the air; (2) via naval blockade or interdiction efforts; (3) via a missile and/or air attack again Taiwan territory or strategic targets; and (4) via a full-scale attack. 4 China may have a number of operation alternatives as to the phasing and timing of a coercion strategy or actual attack on Taiwan. Nevertheless, any military options against Taiwan would require a measure of air superiority; if air supremacy is lost, the cost in casualties to PLA on the ground, at sea, and in the air will rise dramatically.

掌握空中優勢之基本戰略在於爭取主動，將戰爭帶進敵境，瓦解敵人空軍武力，掌握制空權，為下一波攻擊爭取更大的行動自由度。5一旦台海情勢升高，解放軍的優先任務將是率先採取有效的手段，瓦解台灣空軍武力。一九九五至一九九六年北京在台海進行飛彈試射後，已逐漸將彈道飛彈武力視為脅迫台灣最有效的工具。解放軍強調，對敵人的重要目標進行飛彈攻擊，可掌握戰場主動、威懾敵人心理，並縮短戰爭過程。6未來中國的侵略行動，極可能以大規模飛彈攻擊台灣重要軍事目標掀起序幕。隨著中國對新式飛彈的研發與部署，台灣空軍基地在戰時勢將面臨高度威脅。
For the command of air superiority, the main strategy is to seize the initiative, by carrying the war into enemy territory, neutralizing air power, and thereby establishing control of the air to provide freedom of actions for the attacker’s next actions.5 In the event of the situation becoming tense, the PLA’s priority would be to conduct effective ways to neutralize the Taiwanese air force. Since China’s 1995 and 1996 missile tests, Beijing’s arsenal of ballistic missiles has figured prominently as a major coercive instrument vis-a-vis Taiwan. The PLA has emphasized that missile attacks on important enemy assets could seize battlefield initiative, frighten the enemy’s psychology, and accelerate the progress of the battle.6 Any future Chinese invasion scenario is likely to begin with a ba rrage of Chinese missiles raining down on key military targets on Taiwan. With Chinese development and deployment of new missile systems, Taiwan’s air bases would be greatly endangered during wartime.

短程彈道飛彈
Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)

中國目前正致力於兩種戰區短程彈道飛彈的研發，即東風十五型與東風十一型飛彈。（參見表一）東風十五型短程彈道飛彈使用固態燃料，射程約為六○○公里。該飛彈的圓週誤差公算在一○○公尺以內。此型飛彈據稱擁有飛行高度控制功能，可在發射到擊中目標的過程中修正路徑；這種飛行操控性能增加了防禦雷達予以偵蒐及攔截的難度。7東風十一型飛彈亦為固態燃料推進、可進行道路機動發射的短程彈道飛彈，射程約為三○○公里。較之東風十五型飛彈，東風十一型飛彈的優點在於載彈量更大。某些情報顯示，射程三○○公里的東風十一型飛彈可攜帶八○○公斤彈頭，圓周誤差公算約在一五○公尺以內。8 中國部署在台灣對岸的東風十五型與東風十一型飛彈只需六到八分鐘便能飛抵台灣。由於這些彈道飛彈發射後的預警時間極短，因此很難防禦。
China is concentrating on the development of two theater SRBM systems: the DF-15 and the DF-11. (See Table 1) The DF-15 is a solid propellant and has a range of 600 km. The missile has a 100-meter circular error of probability (CEP). The DF-15 has an attitude control mechanism that permits steering corrections from launch to impact; its potential maneuverability would complicate missile defense radar’s tracking and interception. 7 The DF-11 is also a solid propellant and road-mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300 km. The main advantage of the DF-11 over the DF-15 is its ability to carry a larger payload. Some sources credit the 300-km version with an 800-kilogram warhead and a 150-meter CEP.8 The DF-15 and the DF-11 deployed opposite Taiwan require only six to eight minutes to reach Taiwan. Given that the missiles would be launched with little prior warning, they would be hard to engage.

《表一》 解放軍短程彈道飛彈
Table 1 PLA’s SRBMs

飛彈系統 System	射程 Range	載重 Payload	燃料 Fuel	最初部署 Initial Deployment
DF-15/M-9 SRBM	600 km	500 kg	固態（Solid/TEL）	1990
DF-11/M-11 SRBM	300 km	800 kg	固態（Solid/TEL）	1990

資料來源：作者自製

目前中國已在台海對岸部署超過四○○枚可用以攻擊台灣的東風十五與東風十一短程彈道飛彈。這些飛彈主要部署在浙江江山；福建的永安、仙遊、南平；與江西樂平等地。（參見《圖一》）同時，中國正以每年增加五○枚的速度持續部署新飛彈。新近部署的飛彈有些已被證實為射程更遠、發射時間更短的東風十五二型飛彈。9據指出，中國有能力在二○一○年之前生產一、○○○枚短程彈道飛彈。以每枚單價五○萬美金計算，中國製造一、○○○枚短程彈道飛彈的總價約為五億美金。10依據中華民國國防部的估計，一枚配備五○○公斤彈頭的M族飛彈擊中地面後，能造成一個深十公尺，寬二○公尺的大洞。依此推算，中國將必須發射至少五○枚的飛彈才能摧毀一個台灣空軍基地。11但其他資料來源指出，若東風十五型飛彈裝配高爆彈頭，將可在地面上炸出一個直徑約三○至五○公尺的大洞。12值得注意的是，一旦中國強化彈頭爆破力，並成功引進全球衛星定位系統或全球導航衛星系統
提升飛彈性能，則用來摧毀台灣空軍基地的飛彈數量，將可大幅減少至十枚彈道飛彈左右。13
So far China has deployed more than 400 DF-15 and DF-11 SRBM able to target Taiwan. These missiles are deployed in such areas as Jiangshan (Zhejiang Province), Yongan, Xianyou, Nanping (Fujiang Province), and Leping (Jiangxi Province). (See Map 1) Meanwhile, China has stepped up the pace by adding 50 new missiles a year. Some of the new missiles have been identified as DF-15 Mod 2s that have a longer range and can be launched sooner than its original version.9 It was reported that China would have the capacity to produce as many as 1,000 SRBMs before 2010. At an estimated cost of U.S. $500,000, China could produce up to 1,000 SRBMs at a total cost of $500 million.10 According to the assessment of ROC Ministry of National Defense, an M-family missile with a 500 kg warhead would create a hole 10 meters in depth and 20 meters in width after hitting the ground. If this were the case, it would take at least 50 missiles to destroy a military airport.11 But other sources have pointed out that the DF-15 armed with a highly explosive warhead could create a crater on the ground as large as 30-50 meters in diameter.12 It is worth noting that if China increases warhead efficiency, and upgrades the performance of these missiles with global positioning system (GPS) or global navigation satellite system (GLONASS), it would decrease the number of missiles required to destroy Taiwan’s airfields with as few as ten ballistic missiles.13

巡弋飛彈
Cruise Missiles

中國除了彈道飛彈外，也積極發展巡弋飛彈。中國的巡弋飛彈計畫包括兩個系列，即海鷹飛彈與鷹擊飛彈。海鷹飛彈系列起源於蘇聯的冥河飛彈。空射型海鷹二A型飛彈射程為一○八公里，已部署在解放軍海軍的轟六轟炸機上。加大射程的「海鷹二型飛彈射程可達一三四公里，飛行速度○•八馬赫，使用主動導引雷達，可攜帶五○○公斤彈頭。陸上發射的海鷹三型飛彈可攜帶五一○公斤的彈頭，射程約一三○公里，使用主動雷達導引。繼海鷹之後，中國以法國飛魚飛彈為基礎，發展出鷹擊飛彈。鷹擊一型飛彈在一九八五年服役，射程只有四○公里，但中國已將之裝配在漢級核子攻擊潛艇，只是須浮出水面才能發射。鷹擊二型飛彈使用主動雷達導引系統，巡航速度○•九馬赫，射程一二○公里，可攜帶一六五公斤重的彈頭。14
Apart from ballistic missiles, China is also developing its own cruise missiles. The programs are grouped into two families: the Hai-Ying (HY - Sea Eagle) and Ying-Ji (YJ - Eagle Strike) series. The HY-1 series are derived from the Soviet Styx. The air-launched version of the HY-2A has a range of 108km and is already deployed on PLA Navy H-6D bombers. An extended-range version of the HY-2 can reach out 134 km, cruising at Mach .8 using active radar guidance and carrying a 500-kg warhead. The ground-launched HY-3 carries a 510-kg 130 km using active radar guidance. China's follow- on generation of cruise missiles, the YJ series, is based on the French Exocet. The YJ-1 entered service in 1985; although limited in the range of 40 km, it has been deployed on the Han-class nuclear attack submarine, but it must come to the surface to fire the missile. The YJ-2 uses active radar guidance and cruises at Mach .9 with a range of 120 km carrying a 165-kg warhead.14

相較於彈道飛彈與戰機，巡弋飛彈至少具有兩項優點。首先，巡弋飛彈造價便宜，大約只有彈道飛彈三分之一的價格；假設短程彈道飛彈的單位成本為五○萬美元，巡弋飛彈只需一七萬五千美元。再者，由於重量較輕，巡弋飛彈比彈道飛彈容易運送。但是不像彈道飛彈飛行時間只須幾分鐘，長程巡弋飛彈一般必須花上幾個小時的時間才能擊中目標。在大氣中長時間的飛行，使其飛行路徑易受風的干擾，因此必須透過全球衛星定位系統或全球導航衛星系統來降低飛行時的誤差。15目前中國已經加速鷹擊八A型飛彈的研發，此型飛彈據信是中國第一枚試圖整合全球衛星定位系統或全球導航衛星系統系統的武器。16
Cruise missiles have at least two advantages over ballistic missiles and aircraft fighters. Cruise missiles are cheaper to produce - generally one-third the cost of ballistic missiles. Assuming an SRBM unit has a cost of $500,000, then the unit cost of an LACM could be as little as $175,000. Moreover, with a low weight, they tend to be more easily transportable than ballistic missiles. However, unlike ballistic missiles whose flight time is only minutes, long-range cruise missiles can take several hours to reach their targets. Long flight times within the atmosphere enable unpredictable winds to impact on the missile’s course; this results in the need to depend on global positioning system (GPS) or global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) guidance to reduce missile route navigation errors.15 So far the PLA has sought acceleration of the YJ-8A LACM development program. This weapon is believed to be the first in which China is seeking to incorporate GPS/GLONASS into its missiles.16