前言
Introduction

《中華民國九十一年國防報告書》言明：「國軍貫徹精兵政策，在建立精、小、強之現代化部隊??運用空軍捍衛國家領空，並聯合陸、海軍共同維護國家領土、領海及主權之完整。空軍在平時加強戰備，維護領空；戰時全力爭取制空，並與陸、海軍遂行聯合作戰」。要維護領土、領海及主權之完整，勢必擴及具主權爭議之釣魚台與南沙，尤其後者已遠遠超出空軍現有之作戰半徑，十分不務實。我空軍能在「台灣防空識別區」範圍內1有效遂行「捍衛國家領空」、「戰時全力爭取制空」，才是名實相符的任務目標。
According to the recent Defense White Paper, the downsized Air Force of the Republic of China (ROCAF) “shall defend the airspace over land, territorial water, and protect the sovereignty together with army and navy through joint operation.” To protect the national sovereignty, the ROCAF has to flex its muscle to the sovereignty-disputable islets of Senkaku Retto and Spratly, in particular the latter is too far to be reached. The more practical mission for ROCAF is to protect the airspace within Taiwan-ADIZ (21oN to 27oN and 117.5oE to 123oE),1 to acquire air superiority wherein at time of crisis.

美國智庫評估在公元二○○五年以後，面對共軍加快加重建軍力道，國軍將喪失優勢；國軍將領則自詡即使到了公元二五○○年，空軍仍在台海佔有優勢，2不論是旁觀者的憂心忡忡，或是當局者的自信滿滿，精實、精進後「精、小、強」的國軍，特別是「量小、質精、戰力強」的空軍，不也說明了「以質勝量」的空軍建軍目標？問題是：在量不如人的困局中，如何在質上超敵勝敵？
Four years ago, the net assessment by USDOD gave stern warning that the fighting capability of Taiwan’s armed forces will be falling behind the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by 2005. Despite the recently sentimental speech delivered by the C-in-C of ROCAF that the PLA will never match the fighting capability of the ROCAF, even by 2500,2 everyone noticed that the ROCAF should have better quality in order to balance off the inferior quantity, comparing to the counterpart of the PLA’s Air Force (PLAAF) across the Strait. The question is how? It becomes the focal point of this conference.

武裝部隊的戰力，概分有形戰力（武器裝備與整後支援以量為主）、無形戰力（人員素質與教育訓練以質為先）及戰力綜合運用（指揮官個人特質與用兵決心質量兼具）。本次研討會多著墨於有形戰力（如戰機數量）及戰力綜合運用（如用兵型態），探討「量」較多但「質」較少；而本文則聚焦在一些與無形戰力及空軍再造的微觀議題，它包括了空軍文化、組織精進與凝聚團結等「質」方面的子題。提報人基於愛護國軍、支持空軍的前提，在文中提出一些「提質」的策進作為，提供相關單位作為空軍再造之參考。
The fighting capability of any armed forces consists of three parts: military hardware, software, and leadership. Military hardware reflects the quantity (such as “bean count” of aircraft), military software is a mixture of both quantity (e.g., joint operation and C4ISR) and quality (e.g., morale), leadership reveals primarily the quality. The quantity of ROCAF and PLAAF are discussed thoroughly in this conference, hence, this report diagnoses microscopically the quality of ROCAF, in particular focusing on military culture leading to the suggestions for force restructure.

空軍文化
Unique Culture

文化是一個國家、政黨、軍隊、企業或組織長年累積下來的一種傳統、一種習慣與一種特質；文化深受領導人風格的影響，文化更與民族性、習性與倫理道德觀密不可分。文化的變遷是漸進式，而非躍進式，因此，它永遠追不上時代快速的脈動。文化無所謂好壞優劣，只有是否適合潮流的問題。既然文化不能作躍進式的突變，當然也就不可以有文化「大革命」；文化的變遷（或變革），只能漸進地作觀念的改變，進而轉化成政策及作為上的革新。
Military culture is a tradition, a habit, and unique character, usually dominated and heavily influenced by moral standard, race identity, and heritage. Air force culture is a sub-culture of military or even national culture. In order to cope with the rapid change of outside world, culture (and sub-culture) is evolutionized, not revolutionized. The culture and subculture, which cannot evolutionize timely, will be extinct by nature.

空軍文化是我空軍建軍以來累積的傳統、習慣與特質（筧橋精神就是其中最重要的特色），空軍文化有一部份是空軍獨有的特質，但空軍文化大部份都是我陸海空三軍共通的特色，甚至也是軍民共有全國性民族文化的特質。今天談空軍文化，不是探討它的對與錯、好與壞、優與劣，而是研究它是否適合（或不適合）未來戰爭的規模與型態。謹將提報人在空軍基層單位見、聽、聞到的空軍十項適應性有反差之傳統、習慣與特質條列如下，這些文化特質必須「革新」，以跟上快速變遷的外在衝擊：
The ROCAF’s culture consists of heritage dated back to Sino-Japanese War in 1937, there are at least ten characteristics of air force culture which need to be evolutionized in order to cope with the rapid changing world:

(一) 戰力靠經驗、膽識及同袍默契凝結而成。前座與後座、全機組員、長機與僚機間生死與共的緊密關係，空勤與技勤人員間的配合，形成空軍僚屬袍澤特有的互助扶持向心力與內聚力；無論平時與戰時，這種由極少數菁英群聚的向心力與內聚力均遠較其它軍種強烈。但是，它也形成區隔性強烈的特殊階級。
(二) 飛行線上永遠第一，空勤當然最優先。事實上，這也是全球各國飛行部隊共通具有優越感的文化特質。儘管我空軍軍內空、地勤人員的相處共事大體上還算融洽，但不可否認的，小至空勤地勤餐飲的區隔，大至各兵科重要軍職的潛佔、空勤與地勤的待遇津貼、工作環境與生活設施明顯的反差，甚至飛行單位遠較修補單位、基勤單位及聯隊所配屬各單位享有撥補器材料件更大的優先度，這往往造成非空勤人員有不受重視、被遺忘的感受。3
(三) 空軍建軍的過程內，長年受美軍顧問與外軍技代的影響與制約。美軍對海峽兩岸對峙及軍力平衡的認知，是站在美國的全球戰略利益著想；因此，長年以來，空軍的軍種戰略受當年美軍顧問的影響，是制約性消極的海島型防空以對耗換取時間待外援之戰略，好讓美軍及時馳援擊滅損耗過鉅的來犯之敵，而非我們所亟需積極主動的制空戰略。如何跳脫美軍當年設定的框架，用新思維、新觀念去迎接未來的挑戰，應算是空軍文化的一大考驗。
(四) 講出身、談背景、找靠山、跟對人，是我國文武體制特有的傳統。空軍也許沒這麼嚴重，但空軍卻是個大熔爐，僅軍官的養成教育就有空官、通校與機校（現已併編為航技學校）、陸官、國防大學管院及中正理工與政戰學校的正期班與專科班，現在更有男性與女性軍官共事共處。如何在論資排輩的前提下公平、公正、公開地完整規劃人事經管調配以拔擢提攜優秀軍官，特別是女性軍士官的人事經管規劃，是件十分精緻的人事大工程。
(五) 憑記憶而非憑技令、照習慣而非照程序、靠態度而非靠制度、講人治而非講法制。這也是我國文武體制特有的傳統，空軍是專業程度高的軍種，在執行標準作業程序與緊急應變程序上的教育、訓練與實作經驗遠較其它軍種為優－但還不夠好，特別要持續推動自律性高、制度完備、分層負責現代化的管理體系。
(六) 上級對下級永遠是督導心態，官大學問當然大。其實這都沒錯，上級督導是責任所趨，官大見多識廣也是當然；不過，上級也可以被用來主動服務的，官大更是用來解決問題的。如果能換個心態，下情就能上達、問題當能找出、困擾就可解決。
(七) 重罰輕賞，只懲不獎。幹軍人是個高風險的行業，當軍人也被要求應俱備高道德標準，特別是飛行線上沒有犯錯的本錢，因此，對飛行官的自律性，要求得比誰都嚴謹。惟賞罰要與權責相符，獎懲也要均衡公允；有責無權挨罰受懲是冤，有權無責獲賞得獎更有失公平。如果一出事就調(撤)職加上三級連坐嚴懲重罰（不問肇因如權責是否相符），只會造成凡事「不做不錯、少做少錯、多做多錯」的消沉惰性。
(八) 報喜不報憂：沒有做到儘快說、誠實說、搶先說、一次說明白清楚。「隱惡揚善」是固有的美德，但以多（少）報少（多）、隱真示假，在資訊發達、傳媒狗仔隊無孔不入的今天，早就該調整心態面對長官、面對國人。
(九) 保養重於修護，修護重於採購。價值上億元的重要武器裝備及零附件本該如此，但它如輔戰裝備（消防車）與生活設施（辦公室事務用品）如果也是這樣「克勤克儉」，逾齡都還在保養維持堪用，是否合乎成本效益，是否能激勵士氣與維持戰力，恐應仔細量化評估這樣做值不值得。
(十) 幾乎所有的規定與法條和政戰制度的推行，其精神是防弊、防變、防賊、防逃。立法的本意無可挑剔，政戰制絕對有存在的必要，但受法令規章約束的官兵心中感受，卻乏人問津。
(1) Fighting capability is accumulated from experience, courage, and teamwork, rather than systematic way by theory, doctrine, experiment, training, and quality assurance. In addition, the pilotship in air force formed a life-and-death relationship among aircrew, rather than among all air force personnel.
(2) Pilots are the focal point, others in the ROCAF are always defocused. Pilots, in particular the fighter pilots, attract most attention, assimilate most resource, despite the fact that fighter pilots numbered only 0.9% of the total personnel. Following a global tradition, pilots and their dependents are segregated from other colleagues in all aspects: cafeteria, housing, excursion trip for “pilots only”. That makes others demoralized.3
(3) The US military advisors laid out the strategic plan of ROCAF half a century ago. This obsolete plan called for a passive air defense operation with high attrition rate to dissolve invader’s air strength (in order to allow the US has enough time for rescuing Taiwan by a easy kill). Today, defending Taiwan by allies (if there are any) is uncertain and unrealistic, the strategic plan of the ROCAF has to be overhauled, the war of attrition with PLAAF can only delay the dooms’ day.
(4) “A powerful father and an influential wife worth a gold mine” is a tradition in China for thousands years. The ROCAF is a melting pot, its commissioned officers, male as well as female, are graduated from academies of various disciplines, hence a fair, open human resource system should be established to avoid interference from those who have connection.
(5) The concept of quality assurance, following the book, and law enforcement are loosely bounded in the ROCAF. In some cases, mission can only be completed by habit, memory, attitude, and friendship. In fact, any world- class Air Force with “zero fault” must be strictly “by the book”.
(6) Instead of serving and listening to his men, the superior officer always points his finger toward his men. This is a general character throughout business, industry, bureaucratic system and military communities. If the superior officer can change his attitude to serve and to listen to his men, he can run the team more smoothly.
(7) Any wrongdoing in the ROCAF is a life-and-death matter; heavy penalty up to dishonorable discharge makes officers and men reluctant soldiers. Carrot should accompany with stick all the time.
(8) “Hiding the evil and promoting the good” is a tradition in family and country as well. However, information age allows the media to dig dirty news faster than ever. The ROCAF should officially make press release at the very beginning before the situation is getting out of control.
(9) “Maintenance, repair, and procurement” in that preference order. Keep obsolete equipment in combat readiness is a must when there is no other way to acquire modernized substitute. However, keep this habit on everything, aircraft and office chair as well, is over-reacted.
(10) Political warfare and political system in the ROCAF are indispensable, however, the system should transform to serve, rather than to shadow the air force. Defecting to enemy is already history, pilots, ground crew, supporting personnel, and political officers ride the same boat, hence the code of discipline should respect all ROCAF personnel.