不論這場戰爭是以任何意圖和目的而發起的，「第二次波斯灣戰爭」終究於二○○三年四月底正式結束了。海珊政權垮台後，駐守在伊拉克的聯軍為的任務有二：為這個破碎國家的重建提供法律和秩序的基本形式；再者，繼續追緝伊拉克所被懷疑擁有的大規模毀滅性武器的下落。無庸置疑的是伊拉克在這場與英美領導的聯軍對抗過程，打的是一場非常粗糙的戰爭，其作戰計劃層次也非常的糟糕。當然，這並不是否定聯軍軍事計畫的技術和創造力，因為，顯而易見的是與一九九一年的波斯灣戰爭相比，聯軍的軍事實力確實提昇了許多，因此，聯軍們可以運用其極具優勢的科技和戰略來打擊伊拉克幾乎沒有任何進步的軍力。
To all intents and purposes, by the end of April 2003, Gulf War II was over. The Saddam Hussein regime had already collapsed, and the Coalition forces remaining in Iraq have two main functions – to provide some semblance of law and order and help in the rebuilding of the shattered country, and to hunt down the suspected Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It can hardly be disputed that Iraq waged an extremely poor war against the Coalition led by the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK), and that the level of its operational planning was extremely low. Of course, this is not to detract from the skill and imagination of Coalition military planning, which was able to exploit its overwhelming technological and strategic advantages against an Iraqi military that was basically frozen in time, possessing military capabilities parallel to what it had prior to the first Gulf War in 1991.

這篇文章試圖評估在此次與聯軍的對抗行動中之戰略部署（但需假定伊拉克在一開始就有大戰略架構）。我認為：伊拉克缺乏一個全盤連貫的大戰略架構以使之具一定的外交影響力來對抗由美國領軍的聯軍。如果伊拉克有一個更為周延的大戰略的話，她將會有在第一時間辨認出交戰雙方能力上的優劣，且可打擊對方的劣勢，進而彌補自己的不足。誠如本文所將陳述的，聯軍的確有其劣勢，而伊拉克應可對此加以運用，以增進世界輿論對其持較正面的態度。
This paper seeks to assess the grand strategies that Iraq employed – assuming it had any grand strategy in the first place – in its conflict against the Coalition. It will make the argument that Iraq ultimately lacked a coherent grand strategy that might have given it some diplomatic leverage over the US-led Coalition. A more coherent Iraqi grand strategy would have been one that was first able to identify the strengths and wea knesses of each side’s position, and seek to attack those weaknesses of the enemy, while seeking to redress its own weaknesses. And there were weaknesses in the Coalition’s position, as this paper will seek to demonstrate, which could have galvanised world opinion much better had the Iraqis exploited it.

然而，在行文之先，筆者要提出三件需注意的事情：第一，雖然這篇文章主張「如果伊拉克擁有一個更為有條理的大戰略，可能會讓聯軍推進過程更為困難」，但這並不是說這兩方衝突的結果會因此而有任何的改變。聯軍所擁有的軍力和科技優勢極具壓倒性，因此即使事後來看，伊拉克依然無法避免終遭挫敗的命運。簡而言之，聯軍的軍事勝利是無可避免的結果；但伊軍至少能讓聯軍所持的立場更為薄弱。第二，本文的論述乃建立在所能蒐集到之公開資訊上。機密的資料或許更可以（或不行）呈現兩方所被宣稱擁有的大規模毀滅性武器計畫；然而，因為這些機密資訊的本質，它很難加以獨立進行分析和證實。最後，由於不斷有更新的衝突，且缺乏相關之清楚資訊，所以，任何結論是必然是薄弱的。
However, three caveats need to be stated upfront. One, while this paper contends that a more coherent Iraqi grand strategy could have made things more difficult for the Coalition, this is not to say that the outcome of the conflict would have been any different. The Coalition’s military and technological advantages were simply too great, even without the benefit of hindsight, for Iraq to have staved off military defeat. The Coalition’s military victory was in other words inevitable; but Iraq could have at least made the position of the coalition much more tenuous than it appeared. Two, this paper relies exclusively on evidence that is in the public domain. Classified information may (or may not) present a clearer picture of the alleged WMD programmes in both states. The nature of such classified information, however, makes it difficult for independent analysis and verification. Finally, given the recent vintage of the conflict and the corresponding lack of clear information, any conclusions drawn here are necessarily tenuous.

伊拉克的大戰略
Iraqi Grand Strategy

伊拉克大戰略之解釋
Explaining Iraqi Grand Strategy

顯而易見的，伊拉克在戰場衝突中的大戰略主要是維護海珊政權。從「聯合國特別委員會」到「聯合國監督、查證暨調查委員會」在武檢過程中，有一項關於海珊行為的有趣討論：他們認為伊拉克試圖尋求某種程度的聯合國制裁，但不致使其軍備過於脆弱。伊拉克為達其目的，她盡可能地阻礙並延遲武檢的進行，同時，她想盡辦法破壞國際區域間對其採取制裁和武檢的支持。1 就大範圍來說，伊拉克此般戰略——拖延並阻礙由聯軍及聯合國安全理事會第一四四一號決議文所要求組成的武檢，的確得到了證實。如同美英所聲明，在敵意昇高至衝突之前，伊拉克的確有履行一四四一號決議文的高度意願。而伊拉克的行動主要是藉由製造對聯軍聲明的質疑，從而破壞聯軍在國際間的外交立場；藉由聯軍應稱伊拉克希冀可對聯軍任何軍事計畫採取先發制人的行動；更者，伊拉克同時尋求能操縱泛阿拉伯和穆斯林的輿論。2 但是，尋求宗教支持的行動可謂徹底地失敗，一方面是因為海珊政權自始便
不被視為一個虔誠的伊斯蘭政權，另一方面，他也一直在對抗阿拉伯民族主義（此為因應泛阿拉伯主義的離散趨勢而起的向心趨勢）。3
At the risk of stating the obvious, the grand strategy of Iraq in this conflict was aimed at the preservation of the Saddam Hussein regime. An interesting discussion of Saddam Hussein’s behaviour throughout the inspections process from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) suggests that Iraq had sought to bring to an end the United Nations (UN) sanctions without leaving itself militarily vulnerable. It sought this end by obstructing and delaying inspections processes where and when possible, while attempting to undermine international and regional support and opinion in favour of sanctions and the inspections processes.1 To a large extent, this strategy was manifested in the attempts by Iraq to delay or obstruct the inspections process that the Coalition had demanded as reflected in the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1441. As the tone of US and UK declarations prior to the outbreak of hostilities became increasingly strident, Iraqi behaviour manifested a greater willingness to comply with the terms of Resolution 1441. The aim of Iraqi action was to try to undermine the international diplomatic position of the Coalition, by creating as much doubt about Coalition claims as possible. Through the creation of doubt about the Coalition’s allegations of Iraqi WMD ambitions, Iraq hoped to forestall any Coalition military plans. Later on, Iraq would also seek to mobilise Arab and Muslim opinion.2 However, such attempts at invoking religion failed badly, partly because Saddam Hussein’s credentials as a devout Islamic political figure were always wafer -thin to begin with, and it also went against the centripetal tendencies of Arab nationalism that always counterbalanced the centrifugal tendencies of pan-Arabism.3

因此，吾人可以很明確地這樣說：在二○○三年二月底之前，伊拉克所採用的策略是失敗的。而事實顯示，軍事行動是不可避免的。由於軍事行動的逼近和聯軍在軍備上的絕對優勢，海珊政權勢必遭到挫敗；換句話說，一旦聯軍展開軍事行動，海珊政權不可能不瓦解，伊拉克的軍事潰敗是可預見的。海珊大戰略的失敗及如同伊拉克無法避免聯軍軍事行動來罷免海珊。
However, it was clear that by the end of February 2003 Iraqi strategy had failed. It was evident even then that military conflict was inevitable. Inasmuch as military action was imminent, and inasmuch as there was no doubt that the Coalition would prevail in a military conflict against Iraq, then Saddam Hussein’s regime would fall. In other words, once military action erupted, there was virtually impossible to envisage a way in which Saddam Hussein could emerge from it with his power still intact. Military defeat was all but guaranteed. The failure of his grand strategy was therefore in Iraq’s inability to stave off the inevitability of coalition military action to depose Saddam.

此外伊拉克的大戰略也無法意識到，由美國領導之聯軍大戰略的重要缺失。誠如史帝芬．布蘭克所言：關於這場戰爭，國際間在公眾和政府間都有相當廣泛的反對聲浪。4 由於布希政府已經下定決心要入侵伊拉克，伊拉克的確無法避免此由美國領軍的侵略。若伊拉克尋求破壞聯軍所斷言「伊拉克擁有大規模毀滅性武器」的意圖之真實性，這樣一個完整連貫的大戰略將能讓美國在國際輿論和法律立場上遭受到更多的質疑，然此一戰略顯然並未成功。伊拉克的大戰略採取了訴諸誇大不實和充滿唬弄意味的自我攻擊方式，在其整個發言裡充斥著誇張的言論，最明顯的例子便是伊拉克新聞部長夏哈夫於戰爭爆發前和交戰過程中，在記者會上發表的滑稽言論。下一段的討論，吾人將檢視為什麼這個例子是整個問題的關鍵。
Moreover, Iraqi grand strategy failed to take into account the fundamental weaknesses of the US-led coalition’s grand strategy. As Stephen Blank pointed out, there was “widespread international public and governmental opposition to this war.”4 It is probably foolish to assume that Iraq could ever have hoped to stave off a US -led invasion. It seems clear that the Bush administration had made up its mind about invading Iraq. Nevertheless, a more coherent grand strategy could have made the US position in international opinion and legal circles much more problematic and uncomfortable. If Iraq sought to undermine the veracity of Coalition allegations concerning Iraqi WMD ambitions, clearly this had not been successful. Instead, Iraqi grand strategy undertook a more self-defeating approach of resorting to bluster and bluff, of grand statements replete with hyperbole – witness the buffoonery of the Iraqi Information Minister, Mohammed Saeed Sahhaf’s press conferences before and throughout the war. Why this was the case is an issue that will be examined next.

伊拉克大戰略的文化根基
Cultural Roots of Iraqi Grand Strategy

在此必須承認，用文化觀點來解釋戰略可能遭到質疑。有些關於戰略文化理論的批判論述認為：戰略文化只不過是一種用來強化政策制定者之權責及合法性的語言工具，而戰略文化並不能在不同國家間被量化處理，甚至戰略文化本身並不能對戰略行為做充分的解釋。5然而，儘管如此，為尋求對此次伊拉克衝突中之戰略行為的了解，而採用「阿拉伯式一般性戰略行為」的文化解釋似乎有其可取之處。
Admittedly, the idea of explaining strategy through cultural perspectives is problematic. Some of critiques of strategic culture theory suggest that strategic culture is nothing more than a linguistic device used to reinforce the appearance of competence and legitimacy in policy-makers, or that strategic culture does not have a measurable difference in the behaviour of states, or that strategic culture is in itself not a sufficient explanation for strategic behaviour.5 This concern notwithstanding, cultural explanations of general Arab strategic behaviour appears to have some resonance when seeking an understanding of Iraqi strategic behaviour during this conflict.

對於阿拉伯式戰略文化的主要論述是其「傾向於虛張聲勢、恫嚇和誇大其軍事能力」。6 此外，對阿拉伯戰略文化的評論則認為：一般來講，阿拉伯式的防禦戰略，無法與以西方文化思想為根基的防禦戰略相調和，因為對於在溝通和判讀防禦訊息上，可能產生跨文化價值混亂的問題。7而這種戰略文化上的意象對抗，在戰爭之前和整個戰爭過程伊拉克所採取的行為中，似乎可以找到二者相連之處。諸多混亂的伊拉克官方聲明，其中所運用的虛張聲勢和恫嚇的習慣伎倆並不足以反映出這場戰爭的本質。8但在這場戰爭中所呈現的，如同其中所伴隨之混亂和缺乏清晰資訊的情況般，伊拉克官員們也盡可能地發表一些讓外人無法得知真實情勢的言論聲明。
The main allegation made about Arab strategic culture is the tendency towards bluff, bluster and bravado, of sabre rattling and nothing more.6 Another critique of Arab strategic culture suggests that Arabs in general are incompatible with Western-based deterrence strategies, because of cross-cultural confusion about values to be targeted and problems in communicating and deciphering deterrent messages.7 When this strategic cultural image is juxtaposed against the evidence of Iraqi strategic behaviour prior to and throughout the war, there appears to be some conjunction between the two. The tendency towards bluff and bravado was manifested in bizarre Iraqi statements that appeared to bear no correspondence with the reality of the war.8 Even at that stage of the war, and given the necessary confusion and lack of clear information that accompanies all wars, it was patently clear that such statements by Iraqi officials were absolutely out of touch with what was actually happening.

質疑美方聲明
Problematising US Allegations

如同前述，伊拉克的大戰略無法利用聯軍大戰略的缺失。而文章的這個部分將檢視這些缺失並探索伊拉克可以攻擊聯軍大戰略的方式，或者至少能進一步破壞聯軍在法律和道德上已經遭受頗多質疑的立場。
As noted earlier, Iraqi grand strategy failed to capitalise on weaknesses within the Coalition’s grand strategy. This section examines these weaknesses and explores ways by which Iraq could have attacked Coalition grand strategy to at least further undermine what was already a problematic Coalition legal and moral position.

破壞聯軍所宣稱的伊拉克大規模毀滅性武器的計畫
Undermining Coalition Claims of Iraqi WMD Programmes

伊拉克擁有發展大規模毀滅性武器能力的具體計畫是國際間一致公認的事實。根據聯合國安全理事會在一九九一年做出的第六八七號決議文，成立一個聯合國特別委員會，其目的便是要去查證伊拉克是否依聯合國所決議的要求，摧毀其化學、生物和彈道飛彈計畫。除了特別委員會的調查，國際原子能總署亦同樣被授權執行相似的調查，並著眼於伊拉克核武計畫的證據蒐集。一九九九年，根據聯合國安全委員會第一二八四號決議文成立了聯合國監督、查證暨調查委員會，其任務為查證伊拉克是否確實銷毀其大規模毀滅性武器計畫和射程超過一五○公里的彈道飛彈。雖然很難去精確證實伊拉克大規模毀滅性武器計畫銷毀的真實程度，但可以清楚的知道這一系列的武檢查證已銷毀伊拉克大部分，甚至幾乎全部的大規模毀滅性武器和導彈系統。9
This much is clear – Iraq had a concerted programme aimed at developing its own WMD capabilities. Following the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687 in 1991, UNSCOM was established to verify that Iraq had destroyed its chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes as the Resolution had ordered. In addition to the UNSCOM inspections, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was authorised to carry out similar inspections, specifically on evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. In 1999, UNSC Resolution 1284 authorised the creation of UNMOVIC, tasked with verifying that Iraqi WMD programmes and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km were destroyed. It seems clear that these series of inspections managed
to detect and destroy a large part, possibly even the majority of Iraqi WMD and ballistic missile programmes, although it is difficult to ascertain accurately the extent to which these Iraqi programmes were destroyed.9

聯合國監督、查證暨調查委員會達成了什麼目標？10 在武檢任期結束之前，聯合國監督、查證暨調查委員承認它對伊拉克的大規模毀滅性武器計畫仍有力有未逮之處，它無法找出伊拉克所有關於大規模毀滅性武器的計畫。聯合國監督、查證暨調查委員似乎得到了遠超過聯合國原先所預期的鐵證和其他足以證實伊拉克的大規模毀滅性武器計畫之規模的相關資訊。伊拉克化學武器計畫中很大一部份已被摧毀——其中包括了三八、五三七個裝置完成和未裝置完成的彈藥，六九○噸的彈藥發展計畫和三、○○○噸的化學武器計畫之半成品——但仍有許多問題未獲得解答。特別是在聯合國特別委員會武檢人員達到之前，伊拉克已將其化學武器裝備和材料從阿姆? 瑪省移動到其他地方，且伊拉克單方面宣稱他銷毀了一五、六二○個化學裝備並棄置另外一六、○三八個化學裝備；但令人最為憂心的是，聯合國特別委員會的武檢人員在整個武檢行動停止前並未能接近被認為具生產神經性毒氣裝置的設施。至於伊拉克的生物武器計畫，聯合國特別委員會的武檢人員認為相較於它的化學武器發展計畫，此計畫是較為不健全的；但其仍有許多令人驚異之處，例如一項對於黃麴毒素11 的研究計畫。然而，聯合國特別委員會仍具有銷毀伊拉克所發展的生物武器計畫和部隊砲彈、炸彈及彈道飛彈彈頭的能力。
What did UNSCOM achieve?10 By the end of its tenure, UNSCOM had determined that while it had uncovered a significant part of Iraq’s WMD programmes, it was unable to find out the full extent of these WMD programmes. UNSCOM had hard evidence as well as circumstantial information that the Iraqi WMD programmes were rather more extensive than previously thought. A significant part of Iraq’s chemical weapons (CW) programmes was destroyed – 38 537 filled and unfilled munitions, 690 tonnes of agents, 3 000 tonnes of precursor chemicals to produce CW agents – but there were many unanswered questions that remained. In particular, Iraq had removed CW equipment and materials from its al-Muthanna State Establishment before the UNSCOM inspectors had arrived, it declared (without third party verification) that it had unilaterally destroyed 15620 and had discarded another 16 038 of chemical munitions, and most worryingly, UNSCOM inspectors were unable to close in on reported VX production facilities before the inspections ceased. As for its biological weapons (BW) programmes, UNSCOM inspections showed that these were generally of a more rudimentary level of development than its CW programmes. There were some surprises, such as the discovery of an
aflatoxin11 research programme. Nevertheless, UNSCOM was able to destroy the BW agents being developed by Iraq, including artillery shells and aircraft bombs and warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missiles.

然而，對於聯軍和伊拉克來說，其問題出自於一九九八年十二月沙漠之狐的武裝行動結束之後，伊拉克拒絕讓聯合國的武檢人員回到伊拉克去恢復其檢驗和查證的行動。雖然伊拉克想恢復其具備大規模毀滅性武器能力的企圖是無庸置疑的，但不確定的是伊拉克是否具有恢復該計畫的能力。在聯合國安全理事會提供更為清楚的證據之前，美國國務卿鮑威爾即發表伊拉克不顧這些年的武檢和制裁，仍持續發展其大規模毀滅性武器計畫。不論鮑威爾的演說提供了顯示伊拉克擁有大規模毀滅性武器的能力「熱騰騰」的證據，在聯合國安全理事會中各成員，尤其是法國和俄羅斯對此證據則意見分歧。12 根據一項由葛蘭．萊格瓦拉的研究顯示，美、英兩國對於伊拉克擁有大規模毀滅性武器的意圖和既存能力的言論是高度存疑的。13 甚至就一系列過去英、美官員針對此議題所發表的言論，與現今他們所持立場亦有所衝突。例如，研究顯示，美國和英國聯合聲明對於近期內伊拉克將計畫取得神經毒性的武器發展，便和其他美國官員的言論相矛盾；他同時舉出美國國防部的官方文件中亦在爭論：因為伊拉克官員們體認到這些早期發展神經毒劑的計畫已不再重要，14 而是否繼續發展神經毒劑計畫，是個重要的議題，卻被國際社會給遺忘了，因而，這也顯示出國際間對伊拉克在這方面缺乏清晰的大戰略思考。
The problem for both the Coalition and Iraq, however, was that after Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq refused to allow UN inspectors back to resume the process of inspection and verification. Iraq’s ambitions for WMD capabilities can be little doubted, but there was some uncertainty as to whether or not Iraq could have resurrected its WMD programmes during this interim period. United States Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech before the UNSC provides clear evidence that Iraqi WMD ambitions have remained unbridled despite years of inspections and sanctions. Opinion remains mixed, however, as to whether or not Powell’s speech presented the so-called ‘smoking gun’ evidence of Iraqi WMD capabilities, judging from the responses of the other members of the UNSC, in particular the French and Russians.12 One study, by Glen Rangwala, shows how US and UK claims about Iraqi WMD ambitions and existing capabilities were highly tenuous.13 It attempts to show, with some degree of success, how past statements by US or UK officials concerning this issue have contradicted with the current stand. For instance, the study shows that US and UK claims about current Iraqi programmes to acquire nerve agents contradicts statements by other US officials. It cites a US Department of Defense document that argues that Iraq has been cooperative with declarations concerning these nerve agents precisely because Iraqi officials realised that these nerve agents produced earlier were no longer viable.14 This is an important issue that has largely escaped international attention, and an indication of the lack of clear grand strategic thinking on the part of Iraq.

這篇文章認為鮑威爾的演講雖呈現了伊拉克野心的證據，但卻未能精確地呈現伊拉克是否具部署大規模毀性武器的能力。鮑威爾所提出的證據，頂多道出伊拉克的行為未能符合聯合國第一四四一號決議文而已。其實，伊拉克是否具有部署大規模毀滅性武器的能力根本不重要。她一再阻撓武檢的行為態度，基本上即可視為對聯合國第一四四一號決議文本質上的違反；伊拉克持續製造鋁管便是其具備核武野心極為明顯的證據。鮑威爾這個案例顯示——詳述這些鋁管的生產是如何適用於製造核武，將較鮑威爾所述關於飛彈的部分更具可信度。萊格瓦拉的研究並不是駁斥這些論述，而是建議用另外的詮釋方式可能較為可行。在美方這邊最主要的缺失即為缺少伊拉克核武計劃設施的確切證據，其實要隱藏一個核武計劃是很困難的，因為它需要大量資金挹注於基本設施，如：核子反應爐和種種加工設備；生物或化學武器之設施很容易移動，但核武設施卻不易移動。因此照片證據對於伊拉克化學武器計劃的舉證是非常有力的，或許對伊拉克發展大規模毀滅性武器的企圖較為確鑿的證據在於攔截到伊官員們的電話內容，其內容包含：他們有一項移動其大規模毀滅性武器以逃避聯合國武檢人員的具體行動。而這些電話似乎又不像有什麼須在武檢人員面前隱藏起來的東西。但重點並不是伊拉克是否有什麼可部署的大規模毀滅性武器，他們的確有獲得這些大規模毀滅性武器的意圖，且他們也確實嘗試阻礙聯合國武檢程序。這些行為僅能解釋成：其已實質違反聯合國第一四四一號決議文。而開戰與否是否為解決此問題的答案，仍舊值得商榷。15
This paper suggests that Powell’s speech presented clear evidence of Iraqi ambitions, but failed to conclusively show that Iraq had deployable WMD capabilities. What Powell’s speech provided was evidence that the Iraqis were not complying with UN Resolution 1441. Whether or not Iraq actually had deployable WMD was therefore irrelevant. Its obstructionist behaviour could be seen as placing it in material breach of Resolution 1441. The clearest evidence of Iraq’s continuing nuclear ambitions came in the form of the aluminium tubes. Powell’s case – that the high specifications to which these tubes were manufactured makes them more suited for a nuclear weapons programme than as missile parts is convincing. Rangwala’s study mentioned earlier does not refute these claims, but suggests that alternative interpretations are possible. The major weakness in the US case was the total lack of evidence of an Iraqi nuclear programme infrastructure. Simply put, it is difficult to hide a nuclear programme, since it requires major investments in infrastructure like nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities. It may indeed be possible for a CW or BW programme to be mobile, but the same cannot apply to a nuclear programme. The photographic evidence supporting US claims of an Iraqi CW programme was similarly strong. Perhaps the most damning evidence of Iraqi WMD ambitions are the intercepted telephone calls between Iraqi officials, which suggest very strongly that there was a concerted effort by Iraq to move its WMD programmes from location to location in an attempt to hide them from the UN inspectors. Such telephone calls would likely not have been made were there not something they needed to hide from the inspectors. The point, therefore, is not whether or not the Iraqis actually have something to hide in terms of deployable WMD; they clearly have the ambitions to acquire these WMD, and they clearly tried to obstruct the UN inspections process. This alone provides the material breach of UN Resolution 1441. Whether war is the solution to this problem, however, remains a contested issue.15