二○○三年三月廿一日五時卅二分，美英聯軍以優勢軍力正式展開對伊拉克作戰行動。此以推翻伊拉克獨裁者海珊政權及其有生戰力為主目標之「伊拉克自由行動」，1直至四月十六日，美軍中央指揮部宣佈「軍事行動已告一段落」為止，除仍有小規模的游擊、騷擾外，歷時廿八天的正規戰鬥已基本結束並持續進行緩請任務。五月一日，美國布希總統於航空母艦林肯號飛行甲板上宣布對伊拉克的主要作戰任務已經獲勝結束。2
At 5: 32 in the early morning on March 21, 2003, the US-UK overwhelming allied forces stormed into Iraq in the name of Operation Iraqi Freedom vowing to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime and its combat tools.1 Perhaps predictably, the war did not last long. With 28 days lapse, the Central Command, on April 16, announced that military operation had phased out and formal battle finished, given scattered guerilla forces edging their effort to limited counter-attacks. On May 1, US President Bush claimed his victory on the Carrier Lincoln that the allied forces had won the war and the main combat mission had been achieved.2

自二○○二年十二月，美國即企圖運用軍事武力，終結伊拉克海珊政權，然而受限於國際社會輿論反對及所需兵力之集結調度，導致美軍一再延遲發動軍事行動的確切日期。期間，美國頻以政治外交協商，企圖獲得同一九九一年波斯灣戰爭之「師出有名」的國際共識與支持時，表明要求伊拉克海珊政權恪遵聯合國安理會所通過之「一四四一號決議案」，銷毀所擁有之大規模毀滅武器及解除軍備，軍事武力行動即是各種方案之最後選項。但由於海珊頻以詭詐欺騙伎倆，拖延遲滯聯合國武檢小組之檢查作業，導致最終美、英在耐心盡失的情境下，決定對伊拉克採取軍事行動，以強制更迭海珊政權。
In retrospect, ever since the end of 2002, the US had intended to topple Saddam’s regime with the resort of force. That the military plan had not been enacted could be attributed to opposition from the international society and lead-time needed to amass troops. Continuous diplomatic efforts taken by the US were impressive as well. The US political negotiations set the aim to garner international support as a resemblance to the undisputable position held before the 1991 Gulf War started. With this, the US, reserving military means as its last option, demanded Iraq to follow the UN Resolution 1441, destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, and disarm its teeth. Having not timely responded as required, Saddam instead toughened up his position by limiting of the return of UN inspectors, which in turn provided a casus belli to the US-led coalition. The final decision to a forceful removal of Saddam was thus made.

在近四個月的集結整備中，交戰雙方之美軍一直進行兵力的集結編組與部署調整，期在兵力有限態勢下，運用遠程打擊、快速機動、精準致命之優勢科技與火力，予敵以「斬首攻擊」，摧毀伊拉克指揮體系，瓦解伊軍戰鬥士氣，並在短時間內速戰速決，以臻全軍破敵之目標。另方之伊拉克亦持續不斷的進行各項防衛編組及戰備整備工作，並藉波斯灣戰爭經驗教訓為依據，企圖採取拖延持久戰略，除避免大軍於開闊地區正面接戰外，更以偽裝、欺敵、分散及機動部署方式保存戰力，並運用都市巷戰削弱美方科技裝備優勢，增加美英聯軍用兵顧忌及代價。
For four months before the commencement of the war, the US had continuously built upon its military strength by amassing units and pressing its deployment. With the operative concept of “decapitation”, which was substantiated by standoff attack, rapid mobility, precision strike through overwhelming technology and firepower, the allied force sought to defeat Iraq after destroying Iraq’s command structure and shattering its moral in a shortest time and with a minimum force level. In parallel, Iraq was reported to have reinforced its combat preparedness and re-organize its defensive units. With
lessons gained from its wars in the Gulf, it seemed that Saddam attempted to fight an attrition war. It was said that Iraq purposefully avoided an open engagement with the allied forces in spatial areas. Iraq instead sought an urban warfare to constrain US leverage on technologies though camouflage, deception, dispersion and mobile deployment. Preservation of combat force on the Iraqi side, as things stood, effectively elevated the US-UK suspicions and worries before the latter’s action was taken.

戰爭開打之前，諸多報導臆測美、英聯軍面對伊軍有以待之的防衛部署，要速戰速決達成攻佔伊拉克首都巴格達，擒拿海珊及所屬高層官員，勢難免要付出相當之兵力損傷。然從事實顯示，美英聯軍自三月廿一日發動「自由伊拉克行動」，至四月十七日結束正規作戰的廿九天中，僅一五二名陣亡，四三七名受傷，十一名失蹤，及戰甲車毀損二十餘輛，阿帕契攻擊直昇機戰折損六架。反觀伊軍則陣亡約四千餘人，遭聯軍俘獲約一萬三千八百餘人。3此一戰果非但打破美國五角大廈原先對「倫斯斐主義」的悲觀看法，更跌破多數軍事戰略專家對伊拉克所擁有利態勢的評析及戰況臆測。歷經兩伊八年戰爭及一九九一年波斯灣戰爭洗練的伊拉克軍隊，是那些原因導致如此出乎意料的快速潰敗，使海珊政權敗亡，本文試從下列幾個方面分述探討之。
Immediately before the war, many reports was of the view that, given Iraq’s defensive posture readily at hand, the allied force would suffer a considerable degree of casualties if it wanted to storm into Baghdad and seize Saddam’s senior officials. The reality, however, is to the contrary. From March 21 to April 17, the allied force claimed 152 dead, 473 injured, 11 missing with damaged armored vehicles totaled 20, and 6 Apaches choppers shut down. Iraq, by contrast, claimed more than 4,000 soldiers dead on the battlegrounds, and roughly about 13,800 POWs. 3The US stunning victory has not only
cast away the pessimistic views in the US against Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s concept of warfare, but also blown most experts’ analyses apart that observed Iraq to have the comparative advantage in the military balance. It is therefore worth pausing to ask why, bathed in Iran-Iraq war and 1991 Gulf conflict in the past 20 years, the seasoned Iraqi troops was roundly defeated, leading to the eventual downfall of Saddam’s regime. The paper is trying to explore this as follows.

高壓獨裁統治，民怨眾叛親離
Coercive Rules Giving Rise to Popular Discontent and Finally
Being Deserted by All

伊拉克前總統海珊自一九七九年初掌權，伊拉克正值國勢強盛，藉所擁僅次於沙烏地阿拉伯之油藏資源，和美國基於推翻反美的伊朗柯梅尼政府，而視伊拉克於戰略夥伴之外來支持，本具朝向中東區域強權發展之有利態勢。但事實卻是自一九八○起，海珊即接連對外發動戰爭，先與伊朗打了八年仗，後繼於一九九○年因入侵科威特，與昔日盟友美國反目成仇，兵戎相見。持續對外發動戰爭的結果，在兩伊戰爭導致石油生產不及戰前的五分之一，造成直接經濟損失達二千四百多億美元。4而在波斯灣戰爭所換取的代價則是長達十二年的聯合國經濟制裁及武器禁運，致使伊拉克人民雖坐擁世界第二的豐富油產，卻生活潦倒而困苦。
Saddam came to power in 1979. With oil reserve second to Saudi Arabia in the world and the US strategic support against Iran’s revolutionary regime under Ayatollah Khumeini, Iraq was wielding an ascending power in Middle East. Nonetheless, ever since the 1980s, it waged an 8-year war with Iran and followed by a military conflict with the previously important ally the US in 1990-91 when it invaded Kuwait. The constant war delivered a direct impact on its economies. With oil production plunged to
levels less than one fifth before the war, economic loss was estimated up to US$240 billion. 4 Worse still was 12 -year UN sanction and weapon embargo. For all Iraq has a huge oil reserve in the world, its people were suffering a daily life.

伊拉克的命運在海珊掌權十九年後，為何會有如此天壤之別，究其因全在海珊個人之所為而肇始。緣於自身內在個性粗暴，及成年後，加入「社會復興黨」所從事刺殺、奪權等政治鬥爭過程，當一九七九年推翻該時之伊拉克總統阿拔克將軍統攬政權後，基於過去鬥爭所產生缺乏安全感的經驗，即採取中央集權之獨裁政體，將黨、政、軍諸權力集於一身。5
Saddam’s 19- year ruling turned out to be a bitter pill for the Iraqi people to swallow could be, at least partially, traced back to his ruthless personality and to his experience that witnessed the process of physical political struggle after his joining the Ara Baath Socialist Party. In 1979, Saddam overturned General Al-Bakr, then president, and seized the ruling power, his adopting a central authoritarian regime style by amassing party caucus, political organs and military tools within one hand could be attributed to this past experience that, indeed, revealed his sense to insecurity.5

這種缺乏安全感所衍生的不理性行為，使海珊在維持其政治權力的手段運用上，即是採取整肅、謀殺等恐怖手段，排除異已以確保其領導地位。曾任海珊的御醫貝希爾表示，海珊的一生可以用「權力、金錢、戰爭與死亡」來形容，因其操有絕對的生殺大權，對任何可能威脅自己權勢的人，無論親疏或派系，一律殺無赦。因此，周遭的人對他相當畏懼，不敢有任何違逆。6諸如海珊因擔心被其長子烏岱奪權即安排暗殺其子，導致其癱瘓未死。
Saddam’s insecurity begot an irrational pattern of political behavior aimed at assuring his commandership. To exclude domestic oppositions, Saddam took varied brutal measures including purge, assassination and murder. According to Dr. Alaa Ei Besir, Saddam’s family doctor, Saddam’s philosophy as a whole consists of power, money, war and death. Among them, he grasped an absolute power of others’ lives. Anyone who might show a menace to Saddam’s authority, no matter which party he or she belonged to, was subject to sentence of death.6 To the extent that Saddam was skeptical of his eldest son

再者華盛頓喬治曼森大學任教的達維夏博士曾說道，哈珊的國際及外交政策簡言之即「嘗試極限」。7換言之，就是假借衝突、戰爭之名，行壓制國內反對勢力之實，這也就是海珊的治國之道。如什葉派穆斯林原佔伊國人口多數，但卻被人口居於少數的遜尼派所統治，因此，當伊朗柯梅尼向外輸出伊斯蘭教革命主張時，因海珊擔心國內什葉教派會順勢起來推翻其政權，此遂成為其對伊朗宣戰的主因之一。
Saddam’s strategy, in a word, was to suppress domestic opposition in the context of armed conflict and war.7 This indeed can be seen as Saddam’s mean of state governance. The Shiite people, for instance, were the major population in Iraq, but it was the Sunni people, the minority, that governed the country. That partially explained why when Ayatollah Khumeini spread Islamic Revolution abroad, Saddam rose to declare war with Iran, as he was afraid that the Shiite people in Iraq might unseat him.

連年戰禍帶給伊拉克的惡果，其人民卻因海珊的恐怖統治手段而怒不敢言，加上自波斯灣戰爭後的經濟制裁，雖然聯合國基於人道立場，允許伊拉克「以油換糧」免除其人民生活所需之匱乏，8但卻因以石油所換糧食均由海珊政府經手分配，進而使海珊獲得另一箝制人民的利器，導致伊拉克百姓非但未能獲得基本所需，反是民生更形凋蔽。從美軍進入伊拉克首都巴格達初期，民眾仍懼於海珊及其所屬爪牙的報復，而不敢公然歡頌，直到海珊雕像倒塌的那一刻，人民蜂湧而出，紛紛踐踏擊毀該雕像觀之，即可瞭解到海珊欲動員全國，行全民皆兵、整體抗敵的戰略指導，只是海珊政權的痴人夢話罷了。
Iraqi people suffer from wars for years running. But they were afraid of showing their anger in public as the consequence of Saddam’s coercive rule. The UN economic sanctions made the situation even worse. Despite UN, based on the humanitarian concern and aimed at relieving the urgent need of the Iraqi people, carried out the “oil for food” program,8 the distribution process was subject to Saddam’s control. This in turn gave Saddam another tool to dictate his people that, instead of improving their life,
made people live in destitution. It is true that people in Baghdad were hesitant to open their welcoming arms when the allied forces entered the city. They feared that Saddam’s followers would take revenge. It was not until the statue of Saddam fell did they came out of the street in great number and celebrated the sensational moment. The fact demonstrates that Saddam’s strategic guidance based on the concept of total war was exceedingly naive.