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若論及影響台海危機的影響因素，毫無疑問的美國、中共與中華民國是最重要的三個行為者。台海危機的形成有其歷史背景及淵源，其中以美國最具關鍵地位，台海安全在美國亞太戰略中也佔有舉足輕重的地位。美國總統布希上台之後，有鑒於柯林頓政府對中共傾斜的交往政策受到許多美國精英的批評，乃採取對中共的「圍合」政策。其主要的策士如美國國務卿鮑威爾、國家安全顧問萊斯均視中共為美國的競爭者而非戰略夥伴。因為中共並非是一個維持現狀的強權，反而力求改變亞洲權力平衡，以對中共本身有利。因此美國不但持續避免大規模毀滅性武器及朝鮮半島問題上與中共合作之外，一方面也擴大其戰略空間，除了強化與原有盟國之關係之外，還拓展新的盟友關係。強化原有盟國的對象主要在日本、南韓及澳洲三個國家；拓展新的盟友關係則主要指南亞區域強權印度。尤其美國與印度關係更是快速發展，印度不僅率先支持布希飛彈防禦計劃，美國更取消對印度的制裁行動，放寬
對印度的軍事交流。印度在美國亞太戰略地位的提昇，加上印度與東協國家在經濟、政治互動的密切，印度在未來美國處理亞太問題時，不可避免會援引印度的支持與協助。澳洲一向在亞太擔任美國副警長的角色，不論是出兵協助作戰（如太平洋戰爭、韓戰、越戰及波灣戰爭），或是對亞太國家的經貿援助與和平維持行動，澳洲都是以美國馬首是瞻，不餘遺力，全力挺美。
To examine factors that affect Taiwan Strait security, we will undoubtedly come to our mind the U.S., PRC and the Republic of China. With historical evolvement and origin that led to Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States continues to hold the key and security across the Taiwan Strait remains crucial in the U.S.’s Asia -Pacific policy. Since U.S. president Bush took office, a congagement strategy as been sought in dealing with PRC as Bush saw the previous Clinton administration’s China policy having drawn strong criticism from some elite Americans. Members of Bush’s adminstration, such as State Secretary Colin Powell, National Defense Advisor Condoleezza Rice, regard PRC as a competitor to the U.S. instead of strategic partner. According to them, China seeks to destabilize balance of power in Asia instead of maintaining the status quo and that is to its benefit. With this policy attitude, the U.S. continues to work with PRC but skillfully skirts around issues such as weapons of massive destruction (WMD), the Korean peninsula problem and so forth in part to expand in its strategic territory, strengthening its relations with existing allies and expanding for potential allies. The existing US allies largely refer to three countries: Japan, South Korea and Australia. The expanding allies refer to the regional power: India. India expressed its support of Bush’s theater missile defense plan. The U.S. in return, has swiftly moved to lift sanctions against India, and proceeded generously with India in military exchange. India’s moving up the ladder in the U.S.’s Asia-Pacific strategy, together with India’s close economic and political tie with ASEAN countries will inevitably lead the U.S. to seek support and assistance from India in dealing Asia-Pacific issues in the future. Australia, on the other hand, has long played “the deputy sheriff” role aside with U.S. in managing Asia-Pacific Affairs, as Australia remains a dependable ally in support of the U.S. in respects of economic aid and peacekeeping operation.

在未來台海危機中，除了美國的的動向與態度是重要影響因素之外，在美國背後支撐的兩個亞太新興權力澳洲與印度，也具有一定的份量，本文即在探討未來台海危機中，澳洲與印度的影響與扮演的角色。探討澳洲與印度兩國的影響因素，不能將其抽離亞太安全環境，必須將其與東協國家、中共與美國及與台灣的互動一併納入考量。
In short, the U.S. will continue to act in a crucial role in terms of its intention and approach toward future Taiwan Strait crisis, but two emerging power, Australia and India will take up a certain role. This report aims to examine Australia and India’s influence and their roles related to Taiwan Security. In doing this, it is also aware that it must take into account the interactions among ASEAN countries, PRC, the U.S. and Taiwan when examining Asia-Pacific security.

澳洲的安全情勢
Australia’s Security Situation

澳洲戰略目標、國防政策與軍備現況
Strategic Objectives, Defense Policy and Current Forces

澳洲雖為亞太區域的主要強權，但其認為與中共、印度、日本與美國的關係，對此一地區的未來會有深遠的影響，並認為美國是阻止區域內發生任何戰略競爭的主要力量。澳洲於二○○○年所發表的國防白皮書中，提及其目前有四個國防優先事項：第一，澳洲的國防及其直接途徑；第二，增進鄰接地區與國家的安全；第三，與其他強權國家合作以促進東南亞地區的穩定與合作；以及第四，以適當的方法提供助益期能維持更廣泛的亞太地區戰略穩定。澳洲明確的重申與美國的聯盟關係，包括必須仰賴延伸性的嚇阻力量以對抗未來的可能核子攻擊。就地緣戰略來說，澳洲期望能與印尼政府合作「以建立長久性的新防衛關係」；也認為紐西蘭仍將是一個「受尊重的防衛夥伴」；另外澳洲認為自己負有支持巴布亞紐幾內亞防衛的責任，並承諾擔任美國在西南太平洋地區的「主要戰略夥伴」。
As a key regional power, Australia reckons the interrelations among PRC, India, Japan and the U.S. will continue to exert deep impacts to the region’s future. It regards the U.S. as a key force in curtailing strategic race within the region. As stated in Australia’s 2001 national defense white-paper, the four national defense priorities are: first, Australia’s homeland security; second, to enhance the security of its adjacent grounds and nations; third, to cooperate with other strong powers and maintain the stability and cooperation across Southeast Asia; fourth, to adapt adequate means with which to
maintain a broader strategic stability across Asia-Pacific. Australia succinctly reiterated its alliance with the U.S. to include its reliance on the U.S. to extend deterrence in fending off probable future nuclear attacks. In its geographic strategy, Australia looks to work with the Indonesian government for securing a new long-term defense relation. It takes New Zealand as a respected defense partner. Australia also feels obliged to support Papua New Guinea and committed to be a major strategic partner to the U.S. in Southeast Pacific.

澳洲的軍事戰略將本土的防衛列為最重要的任務，因此，澳洲必須能夠掌控其海空航道，即使屬於防禦的性質，澳洲部隊也力求能有境外打擊的能力，同時也會尋求提供支援，以保障鄰近國家的安全。例如在東帝汶獨立之後，澳洲派遣一千五百人協助穩定獨立之初的防衛工作，並逐年提供援助經費協助重建與發展。另外在巴布亞紐幾內亞與所羅門群島，亦派遣和平維持人員與提供援助經費。
With homeland defense as identified in Australia’s military strategy priority, Australia needs to safeguard its air and sea access and see to it that its troops are capable of conducting offshore combat duties even for defense purposes, rendering support fending the security of countries around it. For instance, Australia has dispatched 1,500 troops to assist East Turmoil’s defense in the la tter’s premature independence period with aids and funding. It has also deployed peacekeeping forces and aid funding to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in separate occasions as well.

澳洲總兵力約為五萬八千人（陸軍二萬六千人、海軍一萬五千人、空軍一萬七千人）兵力總數約與新加坡概同，但只佔日本與泰國的四分之一，然而澳洲的領土廣袤，約為日本的廿一倍，而在未來十年，澳洲兵力將維持在五萬四千人左右，如自力防衛本土，恐怕力有未逮，無法契合安全政策的需求，估必須藉助多重安全的機制。1
Australia’s military forces are composed of 50,700 troops, 24,000 in the army, 12,000 in the navy and 14,000 in the air force, that equal to roughly what Singapore has, or one quarter of what Japan or Thailand has. Yet in a landmass 21 times more of that of Japan, Australian’s 54,000 troops in the past decade may fall short of defending its homeland and leave it in the limb to require it to rely on multilateral security mechanisms existed through the Asia-Pacific.1

澳洲與東協國家的互動
Australia’s Interaction with ASEAN Members

從二次大戰之後，澳洲明瞭其主要威脅來自東南亞這個方向，因此在二次大戰結束之後，澳洲極力支援印尼的獨立，並透過可倫坡計畫積極援助該地區的發展。一九七一年澳洲與英國、馬來西亞、新加坡、紐西蘭五國簽署五國防衛協定，後來成為東南亞國協第一個對話夥伴。之後二十年，澳洲與東南亞國家關係更加強化，而東協各國也成為澳洲次大的外貿區域性市場。
As World War II ended, Australia is keenly aware that its main security concern will come from Southeast Asia. This compelled Australia to support Indonesia’s independence soon after the end of WWII and actively supported the region’s developing through the Colombo Plan. In 1971, Australia moved to enter the Five Power Defense Arrangement with UK, Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand to become the ASEAN’s first dialogue partner. Two decades later, ASEAN countries have become Australia’s second largest offshore market.

東協各國在冷戰期間對於安全的議題較少討論，但是在一九九一年東協國家後外長會議與一九九二年所舉行的東協高峰會議中，各國一致認為，安全問題應首次正式列入後外長會議的議程。因而從一九九二年開始東協國家的後外長會議就增加了安全對話。由於澳洲認為近鄰的東南亞國家與其安全密不可分，因此東南亞國家經濟的自由化和政治民主改革成功，符合澳洲的利益。東南亞國協一向是處理東南亞區域整合與糾紛的多邊組織，故澳洲一直希望能夠在東協扮演更積極的角色，但因為馬來西亞的長期反對，以及澳洲與印尼之間因為東帝汶的問題關係惡化，故在東南亞國協中的影響力日漸低落。但因為南海問題的爭議可能會透過東協或亞太經合會管道解決，所以澳洲認為自己不會被捲入南海的領土爭議。
While ASEAN countries may have little to say in the topic of security during the Cold War era, the 1991 post ministerial meeting attended by ASEAN and the 1992’s ASEAN summit found attending offic ials take to the view that security issues need to be included in the post-ministerial meeting agenda. This has paved the way for ASEAN post-ministerial meetings to include security dialogue. As Australia views itself as inseparable to its adjacent Southea st Asian countries, it is only natural that Australia regards Southeast Asia’s trade deregulation, political and democracy reforms meet its interest. And as the ASEAN has consistently been a multilateral organization that deals with Southeast Asia’s integration and disputes, Australia has been looking to play a more active role at ASEAN, although the long-term opposition of Malaysia, and deteriorating relation between Indonesia and Australia due to the East Turmoil issue, have ill effected Australia’s influence in ASEAN. On the other hand, as Australia believes that the future South China Sea problems can be resolved through ASEAN or Pan Asia Summit, the chance for Australia to be involved in South China Sea territorial disputes is slim.

澳洲與中共的互動
Australia’s interaction with PRC

一九八○年代澳洲尚未將中共視為一種威脅，雖承認中共是一潛在強權，但是澳洲鼓勵中共參予成為對等國際社會的成員。2到了一九九一至一九九五期間，中共與澳洲的關係陷入困難與挑戰時期，因為中共軍力迅速竄升，在亞太區域成為軍事上與經濟上的強權。3澳洲的外交政策也開始嚴重關切中共成為軍事區域強權後的影響。大體言之，澳洲內部對中共在區域內的角色大致有三種看法，第一種看法認為中共將扮演「加速現狀」的角色；第二種看法認為中共是崛起中的亞太共同體；第三種看法認為中共是亞太權力平衡中的要角。4雖然這些觀點對於中共未來的目標有一致的看法，就是中共在追求一個統一、內部穩定的強國；但是對於中共達成此等目的的能力及中共的強大對本區域產生何種影響，以及澳洲應如何處理與中共及美國之間的雙邊關係，則有不同的觀點。
In the 1980s Australia did not view PRC as a threat. It however recognized it as a potential strong power, while Australia does encourage PRC to become a member of the global community on equal position.2 Between 1991 and 1995, PRC rose as a military and economic main power in Asia-Pacific. This has added the Sino-Australian relationship with complication and challenges.3 Australia’s foreign policy also begins to address the ramifications as a result of PRC becoming a regional power. Three opinions toward PRC military role are tabled in Australia. Firstly, PRC is to take the role to change the region’s status quo. Secondly, PRC will to be a crucial member contributing to the rise of Asian. Thirdly, PRC has a crucial role in Pan Asia’s power balance.4 Although consensus exists on PRC future objectives that PRC will eventually become a unified and stable power, there are different views as to whether PRC can attain its objectives effectively, the regional impacts and how Australia addresses the relations between PRC and the United States.

持第一種看法認為中共與西太平洋其他國家一樣，都志在尋求更大的財富、權力及更穩定的內部情勢。由於區域內國家都會持續追求財富與權力，所以區域內的情勢會加速發展，但絕不可能因而改變現今的權力階層狀態。第二種看法者卻認為由於中共與其他國家致力追求權力與財富，因而會改變這些國家的社會性質以及區域的秩序。因此必須建立相關的機制來促進貿易自由化，確保區域穩定，並增加相互了解，以強化這種相互依存的關係。對中共的影響就是中共會對亞太地區各項日漸茁壯的多邊機制作更深入的參與，並因而變得更開放、更自由而不會追求有害區域內其他國家的利益。第三種看法認為中共將成為亞太權利平衡的要角，雖然可能從亞洲金融危機中恢復經濟實力，但仍然將繼續為新舊緊張關係、敵對態勢以及動亂情勢所苦。
Those who subscribed to the first view reckon that PRC, same as other Pacific countries, aims to seek greater wealth, power and stable domestic development. Since most of the regional countries have continued to pursue wealth and power, nothing can change PRC’s power status within the region. Those taking to the second view reckon that since PRC and the other countries are pursuing power and wealth, this would alter these countries’ social fiber and regional order. As such, it needs to instill certain mechanisms with which to secure trade liberalization, maintain regional stability and improve
mutual understanding with a view to reinforcing interdependence. The impacts will take shape as PRC becomes more involved in the ever-evolving multilateral mechanisms across Asia-Pacific and become more liberal and benign. Those who subscribe to the third view recognize that PRC would take a leading role in Asia-Pacific power ba lance and would continue to be tormented by its internal power struggle despite economic strength demonstrated in the Asian financial crisis.

由於對中共觀點的不同，也形成澳洲不同程度差異的中共政策。例如，支持「加速現狀」觀點者，傾向同意或支援美國軍事事務革命以及東亞建立戰區飛彈防禦系統等計畫，同時澳洲軍隊與美國軍隊必須維持合作關係。持「亞太共同體」觀點者認為澳洲對中共的政策重點在（一）鼓勵中共參與及遵守區域及多邊機制，並對此等機制承擔義務；（二）與中共建立更強固、更多樣化的雙邊關係；（三）澳洲政策著力於處理兩國共同利益的議題；（四）促成中共內部不會以產生衝突的的方式進行有正面意義的改變。如澳洲正在推行的雙邊人權問題對話，以及旨在促進文明社會與法治的「人權技術協助計畫」等。5
Varied viewpoints toward PRC have lead to different versions of Australia’s China policy. For example, those who support the view of changing the current status quo would tend to agree or support projects such as American Revolution in Military A ffairs (RMA) and instill a missile defense system in East Asia and the Australian armed forces and the American troops as a way to keep collaboration with the US. Those that subscribe to maintain an common entity of Asia reckon that Australia’s China policy rests on, firstly, encouraging PRC to partake and abide by regional and multilateral mechanisms
and to assume obligations to such mechanisms; secondly, establishing with China more diverse bilateral relations; thirdly, addressing Australian policy focusing on the subject of mutual interest between PRC and Australia; fourthly, promoting PRC internal change positively and without conflict. Australia indeed is pushing for a human rights dialogue and human rights assistance program bilaterally.5

持第三種權力平衡的觀點也為澳洲帶來政策上的利益及須加以考慮的重要事項，雙方則是一種合則兩利的狀態。如中共曾協助爭取釋放在南斯拉夫援助計劃中被囚禁澳洲人員及被囚禁於上海的澳籍華裔商人等。6另外由於中共是聯合國安全理事會的常任理事國，對於澳洲在聯合國欲追求的許多事務都有很重要的影響力。更何況澳洲也可以運用與中共的強固關係，在美澳之間某些貿易爭議中對美國施壓。
Those taking to a power balance viewpoint reckon that PRC offers Australia with gains. Both sides ought to continue a harmonious and mutually beneficial relation. For instance, PRC helped the release of detained Australian personnel and Australian merchants detained in Shanghai through its Yugoslav Assistance Program and things of that nature.6 In addition, PRC being a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council also provides significant influence whenever Australian look to resolve certain issues within the U.N. On the other hand, admittedly, Australia can also use a strengthening Sino-Australian relation to exert pressure on the U.S. in U.S.-Australian trade disputes.

澳洲對中共也有所助益，如澳洲對太平洋島國巴布亞紐幾內亞、諾魯、萬那杜、斐濟、東加有重要的影響力，中共要挖我外交牆角，與這些島國建交，也會運用澳洲對這些島國的影響力。綜言之，澳洲對中共的外交政策仍以務實的態度，將現實利益與權力平衡為主要考量，不會在某些議題上對中共進行挑戰，對於如南海問題與中共人權問題，澳洲寧擔任對話者維持利益，而不會採取公然指責的對立態度。但是如果中共在南海問題上採取冒進的行動，澳洲基於地緣戰略勢必要與東協國家站在一起。但在台灣安全議題上，澳洲在官方立場上仍會堅守一個中國的原則的政策，但是如果中共並非挑釁而對台灣採取攻擊行動，澳洲也不會第一個起來反對中共，支持台灣，仍會視美國與日本的反應，扮演配合與支援的角色。
Relations with Australia offer certain tangible advantages to PRC as well. For instance, Australia has ex erts significant influences on the Pacific island countries including Papua New Guinea, Republic of Nauru, Granada, Fiji, Tonga. China would invariably turn to Australia when it tried to sabotage Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with the above coutries. In sh ort, Australia’s foreign policy with PRC will still be led by a practical approach according to potential yield and power balance, and Australia is less likely
to confront PRC on certain issues. As to the South China Sea issues and Communist China’s human rights problems, Australia will play the role as a dialogue intermediary for maintaining its interests. Yet should PRC choose to take drastic action in South China Sea, Australia, as bound by its geopolitics, would be forced to side with ASEAN countries. When it comes to Taiwan issue, should Taiwan strait military conflict erupt in the future in determining, Australia’s official stance will stick to one China policy, and it also will see the response of the U.S. and Japan as a way to decide how its supportive
role will be.