國防政策評論，第三卷，第一期，二○○二年秋季
Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol.3, No.1, Autumn 2002

印度與中共的互動
India’ Interaction with PRC

冷戰期間印度與中共的關係時而緊張甚至發生戰爭，時而和緩對話，並拓展關係，呈現出複雜的樣貌，主要原因係受到鄰國與國際格局的牽動。目前印度官方皆認為中共雖然是一個強大的鄰國，卻仍算不上是國際上的霸權，亦即意味著中共力量雖然強大，並在許多領域超越印度，但仍不足以在全球性決策機制中取得領導地位，但其言行有可能傷及印度的利益，有能力迫使印度屈服。中共軍售巴基斯坦，在緬甸建立海軍基地、雷達偵測站，直達緬甸的高速公路，雖被印度視為中共勢力深入南亞，挑釁的行為。但是印度採取低姿態的多面向策略；首先，它刻意避免與中共在言詞上或政治軍事上的衝突與對立；其次，印度力圖改善與中共的關係，尤其是在經貿方面；第三，雖然印度努力降低與中共衝突的可能性，但是仍藉由發展核武與傳統武力保護自己，增加自己在雙方關係惡化時的籌碼；第四，由於意識到中共未來將日益壯大，故積極解決邊界糾紛。印度也相信，持續的經濟發展是因應
中共競爭與威脅的最佳辦法。換句話說，印度選擇致力經濟建設成為強國的方式抵禦中共，而非加入其它反中共組織來達到目的。事實上印度認為，在處理中共問題時，並不需要大幅修正固有的不結盟策略，也不需要參與各種反中共的國際組織，印度堅持其戰略的獨立性，因此若無急迫的威脅的情況下，印度寧願採取強勢的方式自行處理中共問題。11
During Cold War, India’s relations with PRC were unstable as a result of interactions among the adjacent countries and geopolitical structure. Presently, Indian officials tend to regard China as lesser than a world superpower despite powerful. India thinks that although China is more powerful than India in many areas, it falls short of becoming a hegemonic power in global strategy. However, China remains potential to cause harm to India’s interests so that India takes a low profile when it comes to issues such as PRC arms sale to Pakistan, naval base and radar installations in Myanmar, construction of highway leading to Myanmar, which India regards as PRC’s penetration into Southeast Asia. Basically, India tends to avoid confrontation with PRC. India often attempts to
mediate tension with PRC through economic and trade tie. Despite its efforts of moderating tension with PRC, India does develop its nuclear capability as a bargaining chip should the relationship with China goes wrong. India is also keen to resolve border disputes, as it is also aware of PRC menacing presence. Having said that, however, India believes that ongoing economic development will serve as a viable means in responding to PRC competition and threats. In other words, India chooses economic development as a strategy, looking for the day when it becomes powerful enough to withstand PRC, instead of turning to joining any anti-China organizations to attain its objectives. In fact, India feel that there is no need to drastically modify its existing non-alignment policy when it comes to dealing with PRC, nor the need to take part in anti-China international organizations. This makes India firm on its strategic independenc e. Hence, in the absence of any pressing threat, India would rather take a stronger stance in resolving its confrontation with PRC.11

印度認為要維護其安全、國家地位、自主性，就必須在國際間扮演積極負責的角色，並同時繼續努力去除國家主義的殘餘勢力。就中共與印度關係而言，印度並不需改變傳統不結盟的做法，也無須支持區域內的反中共聯盟來圍堵中共。12事實上，即使因為畏懼中共成為強權，而促成這類聯盟的成立，印度仍會選擇戰略的獨立性。而且印度會將追求國力的提昇，以及經濟和科技的現代化列為超越中共與印度關係的考量。
India acknowledges that it needs to continue to play an active and responsible role, if it seeks national security, international status, self-autonomy, and it also needs to cast away its staying ethnic powers. As far as the Sino-Indian relationship is concerned, there is no need for India to deviate from its approach of non-alignment, or try to contain China by joining anti-PRC regional forums.12 In other words, India would stay with its strategic independence even at the presence of such types of alliance for fear of a rising PRC. To surpass China, India sees to it that it will continue building its national strength, modernizing its economy and technology.

印度在美國亞太戰略的角色
India’s Role to the U.S.’s Asia-Pacific Strategy

冷戰結束之後，印度的主要盟國蘇聯瓦解，加上雙方又有共同的敵人中共，美國與印度的關係也開始解凍。二○○一年五月，在各國還在觀望之際，印度率先表態支持美國全國飛彈防衛計畫，雙方關係也日益提昇，不僅兩國高級官員互訪頻仍，小布希政府甚至決定解除一九九八年制裁行動，奠定雙方更大格局的戰略合作、科技交流與執行聯合軍事任務的工作。
Following the end of the Cold War, one of India’s main allies – the Soviet Union, disintegrated. With the rise of China on the other hand, the once frozen Indian-American relations begin to thaw. In May 2001 as most of the world countries continue to observe, India moves to voice its support of the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program. This set their bilateral relations to soar. In fact, exchanges between the two countries increased, and President Bush also decided to lift sanctions instilled
against India prior to 1998. This decision has paved the way for greater strategic cooperation, tech exchange and joint military mission between the two.

印度在其外交政策構想中，不再將美國視為邪惡的力量，而是一個越來越受歡迎的夥伴，冷戰的終結也使印度了解，若無美國默許，甚至主動協助，要想成為區域霸權，達成快速發展經濟與維持社會穩定的目標將難以達成。甚至於有關與巴基斯坦之間的爭議、與中共的對立、嚴重的內政問題、大規模毀滅性武器的擴散以及經濟動盪等，印度都需要美國的大力支持。相對的，一九九八年印度的核子試爆除為各國所譴責之外，美國柯林頓政府也對印度採取限制武器及相關科技輸入的限制。有鑑於此，一方面，印度透過各項作為與經濟上的優異表現，極力輸誠，支持美國飛彈防禦系統，使美國接受印度在南亞地區所扮演的穩定角色；另一方面；美國布希政府解除了對印度的制裁之外，並擴大與印度的軍事交流，希望與印度建立夥伴關係。
India has no longer seen U.S. as evil force. Instead, the US is a welcoming partner. The end of the Cold War made India realize that it has little chance of attaining rapid economic growth or achieving its objective of social stability without the US tacit support or open assistance. Issues such as disputes with Pakistan, its stalemate with PRC, several internal administrative problems, diffusion of weaponry of massive destruction and fragile economy need the U.S. support. In retrospect, India’s nuclear explosion tests in 1999 led to global criticism and U.S. president Clin ton moved to restrict the exports of weapons and sensitive technology to India. In light of this, to improve the US view about India, India expressed its warm welcomes to the U.S. through a host of outstanding economic moves and voices its support for the U.S missile defense systems. The effects have been telling. Bush’s administration has not only lifted sanctions against India, but also has increased its military exchange with India, greatly securing partnership with India.

印度在南亞次大陸將是影響力最大的國家，隨著印度勢力的增強，其他強權如想在印度反對的情況下，強行干預南亞內部事務，勢將付出高昂代價。但在涉及美國等世界強權利益的重大議題，如波灣問題、台灣問題等等，印度所能施展的影響力仍然有限，只能扮演次要的角色，因為印度的影響力與美國過於懸殊，但是印度仍可藉由和美方配合而提高其本身對相關議題的影響力。例如印度可以協助美國減輕作戰負擔，給予許多軍事或經濟上的援助，在這樣的援助過程中，也提昇了印度的影響力。India’s role as a most influential country in South Asia subcontinent will grow alongside with its power. It would suffer great costs if any power tries to intervene Southeast Asian affairs faced by India’s protest. Yet major issues, i.e. the Persian Gulf issue, the Taiwan Strait crisis, that involve world superpowers, such as the U.S., found India with little help. India under this circumstances, was at best a facilitator because the gap of power between India and the US. Still, India will have much to gain to improve its national standing if India works closely with the U.S. on many issues. For instance, India can help ease the U.S. operational costs by offering military or economic assistances.

值得注意的是，印度和美國等國家原本就有強烈合作的誘因，在九一一事件之後，更使此種誘因成為正當理由，使印度藉由參與反恐聯盟加速與美國發展戰略同盟關係，藉以向東結合日本與東協，向西壓制巴基斯坦，向北抗衡中共，以主導南亞戰略形勢的發展。印度並在美國支持之下，參與了多項日本與東協的聯合軍事演習與戰略對話。
What worth noting is that there has been strong incentive for cooperation between countries of India and the US. The incentive has been justified after the September 11 tragedy that India can elevate its alliance with the US in the name of anti-terrorism. It can ally with Japan and ASEAN to east, contain Pakistan to west, counter balance PRC to north as an actor that directs Southeast Asia strategic planning and development. In fact, India, steered by the US global strategy, has in several occasions participated with Japan and ASEAN in several joint exercises and strategic dialogues.

澳洲、印度安全情勢對台海安全的影響
The Implication of Australia’s and India’s Security Situation
on the Security across the Taiwan Strait

從澳洲的國防戰略及與其他國家互動的策略來看，如果台海發生危機，澳洲只能是一個有限度的參與者，而無法扮演主要的角色。澳洲政府本身也明瞭對於台海危機或是台灣的未來前途與發展，其所能提供的助益相當有限，頂多是對各介入強權或是多邊安全機制的努力提供政治支持而已。在某種程度上，如果台海發生危機，美國採取支持中華民國的立場，澳洲會面臨兩難的抉擇，究竟要支持可以維持區域穩定與澳洲本身安全的美國，挺身與中共為敵，或是為避免與中共發生直接衝突，採取靜觀其變的旁觀立場，很難對此提出明確的方案。這仍要是其他因素而定，如果中共採取蠻橫態度，為積極擴張在太平洋的權力，出兵攻打台灣，如引起亞太各國恐慌，進而同仇敵愾由美國帶領採取一致制裁行動的話，澳洲基於美、澳、紐安保條約，必然協助美國採取軍事援助措施。但是如果係因台灣挑釁，並被美國視為麻煩製造者而採取壁上觀態度的話，恐怕連企求澳洲發表支持的聲明，都很困難。
但是可以想見的，在美國著力於國土安全與反恐戰爭之際，身為美國亞太盟邦之一的澳洲，將增加扮演輔助美國的角色。
Judging from Australia’s national defense strategy and interaction with other countries, Australia is likely to be a limited participant, i.e. information provision. It is incapable of playing an active role if crisis across the strait should erupt. The Australian government is fully aware what it can offer is rather limited. It is at best political supports through multilateral mechanisms. In a certain sense, in the event of Taiwan Strait crisis if the U.S. takes a supportive stance towards the Republic of China, Australia will be faced by a dilemma. It will be difficult for Australia to decide whether to support the U.S. that is capable of maintaining regional stability by declaring against PRC, or to choose as a bystander and avoid direct confrontation with PRC. The answer is elusive and other elements have to be taken into account as well. If PRC seeks to expand its military presence in the Pacific and choosing to besiege Taiwan with forces, this will trigger panics among the Asian countries, and force U.S. to send troops to intervene, Australia, as bound by the Australia-American ministerial (AUSMIN) talks would be forced to send in troop in support of the U.S. However, should the U.S. decide to take to a bystander stance in light of Taiwan’s provocation, there is little chance that Australia will declare its support. Yet what can be foreseen is that as the U.S. continues to reinforce its homeland security through anti-terrorism campaign, Australia – as one of the U.S.’s major Asia-Pacific allies, will continue to play a supportive role behind the U.S.

就印度而言，雖然印度曾與中共發生邊界的衝突，但在追求區域穩定維持經濟發展的前提下，印度仍會延續其不結盟的策略，雖然印度與美國關係日益提昇，印度仍會保持某種程度的獨立性，盡量尋求能在中共與美國之間左右逢源。印度會樂於在承平時其作為美國制衡中共的槓桿，但如果發生台海危機，冀望印度出兵協助美軍，必須要有強大的推動力量，或對其安全足夠的保證，才有可能。況且印度在喀什米爾的問題上，與巴基斯坦時有區域衝突發生，雖然因為九一一事件後，美國居間緩衝使印巴關係和緩，但是短期之內，印巴之間的歷史仇恨很難消弭，況且印度戰略優先順序是南亞、中南半島、南海各國的選擇下，印度也無多大餘力插手台海安全事務。
To India, its non-alignment policy is likely to continue with a view to maintaining regional stability and economic growth, despite border conflicts with PRC. While Indian-American ties grow, India will keep a certain level of independency that would allow it to gain advantages both from PRC and the U.S. India should be glad to act as leverage to the U.S. to counterbalance PRC in peacetime. But should crises hit the Ta iwan Strait, India’s desire to deploy forces for helping out the American troops will require a
strong push or enough warranty of its own security before India initiates this move. In addition, despite India’s Kashmir issue or conflicts with Pakistan ruffling the Indian-Pakistani relations have temporarily been soothed as mediated by the U.S. after the 911 incident, the historical hatred between India and Pakistan is not likely to go away soon. More sensible is the tendency that India’s current strategic priority is Southeast Asia, the southern China peninsula, South China Sea. All these render India too busy to interfere into security across the Taiwan Strait.

在九一一事件發生以前，美國視中共為競爭者，並在圍合策略的架構下，美國積極尋求亞太區域新興強權澳洲與印度，作為其圍合策略架構的主要成員國。此種策略雖然可以分擔美國在亞太地區全力平衡與穩定的責任，但是各國在其既有戰略目標與經濟效益的考量下，採取圍或採取合的比重，恐怕並非美國所能主導。尤其是印度，因為印度傳統軍力並不遜於中共，在擁有核武作為反擊中共武力的情況下，印度不需要因為懼怕與中共發生衝突而一面倒向美國，更無須擔憂失去美國支持而與中共交惡，仍會保有其外交自主性與獨立性。
Before September 11, the U.S. has viewed PRC as a competitor, which perception oriented the U.S. towards seeking ties with India and Australia as emerging superpowers under its containment strategic framework. Though such strategy could shift the U.S.’s workload in maintaining Asia-Pacific power balance and stability, the U.S. may not have the total say as to how the countries will cooperate with its containment or reconciliation approach because their choice would be tied to the existing strategic objectives and economic capability. This is especially true with India because India’s conventional forces are not inferior to that of PRC, and it can counter PRC with nuclear capability. It makes India free from the necessity to side with the U.S. for fear of conflicts with PRC, nor the risk of offending China if India lost the U.S. support. On the contrary, India can assure itself that it enjoys autonomy and independence diplomatically.

簡言之，由於印度與澳洲係美國亞太戰略架構之下的主要支持國，若無重大利益衝突，澳洲與印度必會支持美國在亞太的各項維持和平與穩定的政策，但若爆發台海戰爭，若美國全力投入援助中華民國，事前必須獲得亞太主要國家的支持，若無主要國家的支持，美國對採取的行動亦會有所保留。但相對而言，如果美國認為有其需要，也必定會全力說服盟國支持與協助其出兵或其他維持安全與穩定的行動。
In light of the fact that India and Australia continue to be main supportive allies to the U.S.’s Asia-Pacific strategy, Australia and India will continue to support various peacekeeping and US stability strategies across the Asia and the Pacific under the US leadership if there is no major conflict of interests. However, if wars should erupt across the Taiwan Strait, a full-scale intervention by the U.S. would require that US seeks support from its major Pan Asian allies, or the US will hesitate and limit its courses of action. Yet as the needs arise, the U.S. certainly will not rule out convincing its allies to support, or at least help maintain security and stability.

結語
Conclusion

澳洲與印度雖然在其西南太平洋及南亞地區屬於區域性強權，但似乎未將台海危機的處理與協助作為其最優先戰略目標，因為在涉及中共與美國兩強的重大議題中，兩國所能發揮的影響力有限，只能擔任次要的角色，而且重要的是，除非在利益與價值判斷明顯的情況下，兩國會選擇採取支持一方對抗一方的策略，否則兩國仍會以其國家最大利益作為重要考量。
Though as regional superpower in South Pacific and Southeast Asia, neither Australia nor India gives crisis management across the Taiwan Strait strategic priority, because the influence of the two actors will remain limited and in fact they are only capable of secondary roles in issues related US-PRC relations. More importantly, unless bound by obvious judgment and value perception, both countries would not subscribe to the policy option in the form of supporting one side but sacrificing another. They are most likely to choose options as a way to guard their national interests. Judging from the
current situations, chances for two countries to turn against the U.S. and side with PRC purely for economic gains remain slim.

在目前情況下兩國只顧經濟利益，不惜得罪美國而傾向中共的機率不高；但是傾向美國，執意與中共採取對抗的立場，也不能寄以厚望。重要的關鍵完全是看我國大陸政策的發展與美中台三角關係如何變化而定。盡管如此，並非無須重視與這兩個國家交往，相反的，反而應該積極與澳印兩國從事軍事交流與互動，爭取兩國對我在參予多邊安全機制的支持。
The chance for them to side with the U.S. in opposing PRC is less likely either. ROC’s policy over Mainland China will turn out to be crucial in this respect. This does not, however, imply that interacting with Australia and India can be de-emphasized. Instead, Taiwan should take a more active stance to interact with them in military exchange and trade and economy. We should strive for support from these two countries on the issue of joining multilateral mechanisms, and reinforce, at the grass-root level, their recognition of democratic values in Taiwan. Only through these efforts can we form a democratic united front and maintain security across Taiwan Strait.

註釋
Reference